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Ein Prediger muss nicht allein weiden, also dass er die Schafe unterweise, wie sie rechte Christen sollen sein, sondern auch daneben den Wölfen wehren, dass sie die Schafe nicht angreifen und mit falscher Lehre verföhren und Irrtum einföhren.

Luther


Es ist kein Ding, das die Leute mehr bei der Kirche behält denn die gute Predigt. — *Apologie, Art. 24*

If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? — 1 Cor. 14:8

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Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

II

The Historical and Educational Background Which the Philosophies of Education Presented in the *Yearbook* Body Forth

Were we asked: How did modern education arrive at its present status? we would reply that the answer to this query is not difficult to give, at least it is not difficult to register pertinent observations.

With respect to the Catholic Church and its interest in education it must be remembered that Loyola and his followers vigorously promoted Catholic education as a counter measure to the Reformation. The Catholic Church of that day was not interested in education for the sake of education, but it used this means as one among others to safeguard its interests. In only comparatively recent times did the Catholic Church begin to insist that the education of its constituency be left to the Church. Yet even today about fifty per cent of the Catholic youth is not educated in Catholic schools. With respect to factors which were directly or indirectly responsible for bringing about modern views in education, I shall call attention to some which Prof. E. H. Reisner most ably presents in the introductory chapter of the *Yearbook*. According to his analysis, the modern outlook on the world, which one finds reflected in philosophies of education, is due largely to factors such as these:

1. The scientific revolution since the Renaissance. This revolution broke away from the authority of the Church and ultimately from divine revelation itself and enthroned human reason.
2. The optimistic belief in human progress since the days of the Renaissance; men were beginning to believe that not faith and prayer, but science was the means to control poverty, disease, famine, war, and political tyranny.

3. Men had broken away from the medieval position of *contemptus mundi* and had engaged in the undertaking (a precarious undertaking indeed!) to establish the kingdom of God on earth.
4. The skepticism of great thinkers from the days of Hobbes down to the present day.
5. The idealistic detour, a detour from a crass materialism which had settled down on France at the close of the 18th century, but a detour also which produced such idealistic thinkers as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, T. H. Greene, Froebel, Felix Adler, Josiah Royce, and W. T. Harris, for whom the world was at best no more than an objectivation of the Absolute.
6. The popularization of the evolutionary theory, which did away with a limited 6,000 years since the creation of the world and extended time to billions of years.
7. The doctrine that matter is not dead stuff, as Aristotle held, but electric energy (Ostwald).
8. The doctrine that man's mind, in common with that of animals, is a biological phenomenon performing a biological function; it is better than that of animals, but not intrinsically different; it is purely a means of contact of an organism with the environment which produces knowledge (thus did materialism cut the Gordian knot in epistemology, the problem of how we acquire knowledge). For a clear statement of the relation of modern materialism to the problem of knowledge we refer the reader to an article by Paul Weiss titled "Cosmic Behaviorism" in the *Philosophical Review* (July, 1942).
9. The good is scientifically applied conduct.
10. There is no reality beyond the world of experience (materialism, some forms of naturalism, experimentalism).
11. The scientist is not interested in the problem of being (causes), but only in an analysis and description of experience, especially the problem of knowing and conduct—truth and goodness.

Admitting all these factors, which, according to Professor Reiser, have largely determined the outlook of modern philosophies of education and allowing still others, such as the impact on Western civilization of the doctrine of economic determinism, the rise and decline of the capitalistic system, the penetration of the applied sciences into all nooks of the American way of life, the expansion of American education culminating in mass and compulsory education, and the cancerous growth of international complications, it cannot be denied that major implications inherent in present-day philosophies of education would not have exerted so powerful an influence, had there not been brilliant minds whose range and depth encompassed many of these factors and appreciated their significance for education and the philosophy of education. There were, and still are, such minds. One need but think

of William James, William C. Bagley, Charles A. Judd, Edward L. Thorndike, Franklin Bobbitt, George S. Counts, Boyd H. Bode, Harold Rugg, and others. But the one man who, as it were, gathered up into the prism of his mind practically every colorful light wave of the present era in human history is Prof. John Dewey. It has come to pass that modern philosophies of education are either very largely implicit in, and explicit of, Professor Dewey's outlook, or they express more or less reactionary moods. Experimentalism, which finds its most ardent disciples in various schools of "Progressivism," claims Professor Dewey as its spiritual father. Realism, to the extent that it stresses the scientific outlook, is rooted in Professor Dewey; to the extent that it insists on *the principle of independence*, it is at variance with Professor Dewey. Idealism, to the extent that it has taken over techniques and procedures from experimentalism, is greatly indebted to Professor Dewey; to the extent that it condemns materialistic strains inherent in pragmatism, it opposes Professor Dewey. Aristotelianism, because of its belief in absolute principles, is at present perhaps the most pronounced reactionary mood to Professor Dewey's pragmatism. Scholasticism, inasmuch as it approves of such aspects of experimentalism as do not interfere with the ultimate objective of Catholic education, is under obligation to Professor Dewey; inasmuch as it stresses rational as well as divinely revealed principles, it sets its teeth against Professor Dewey. If the bulk and range of an author's literary productions is one index of that person's influence, then Professor Dewey's views have had a singularly wide and potent bearing on American as well as European thought. In Prof. Paul A. Schilpp's outstanding work titled *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, an incomplete list of Professor Dewey's books and articles covers sixty-five pages, and in *Who's Who in Philosophy* (1942) a bare enumeration of Professor Dewey's publications fills eleven double-column pages.

What are Professor Dewey's views on education? In my attempt to summarize them, I am guided largely by Prof. Robert L. Cooke's able analysis of Professor Dewey's doctrines in his *Philosophy, Education, and Certainty* (1940), a work which received the written commendation of Professor Dewey himself (see *The Sunday School Times*, June 7, 1941, p. 459).

1. Professor Dewey took over from William James the doctrine of pragmatism, which Woodbridge Riley exalts as "the philosophy of practicality, the gospel of energy, whose prime criterion is success," and this he developed and applied directly to education. It should be noted that pragmatism is rooted in, and draws its arguments and analogies from, evolution. In accounting for the difference between true and false, right and wrong, good and bad,

beautiful and ugly, pragmatism is in effect employing the Darwinian notions of spontaneous variation and the struggle for survival.

2. Professor Dewey, following in the footsteps of Pestalozzi and Froebel, stresses activity, doing by learning. According to him, all learning must come to the child solely as a by-product of his experience in school and out and is never something to be learned directly and for its own sake.

3. Professor Dewey developed the doctrine of reflective (scientific) thinking. This he took over directly from the scientific method. Ideas are instruments of integration, continuity, and survival. Education is the instrument by which the developing and changing personality of the growing child may be integrated and facilitated.

4. According to Professor Dewey, the course of study should be oriented toward the world of the present rather than the past, and only in a limited degree toward the future.

5. External discipline is taboo with Professor Dewey, though he vigorously condemns "easy learning."

6. Professor Dewey opposes the program of vocationalists; he stresses that type of activity which aids *mental growth*.

7. According to Professor Dewey, mind and intelligence have evolved through the centuries in the process of the interaction of the organism with the environment in its various physical and social aspects and the application of the lessons of experience; thus the possibilities of change through growth are unlimited. Knowledge is the result, and not the guide, of an action (behaviorism).

8. Professor Dewey emphasizes the powers inherent in modern science and in reason. He believes that science will eventually control all of nature and that intelligence can do away with evils once thought inevitable. To subjugate devastating disease is no longer a dream; the hope of abolishing poverty is not Utopian. Science has familiarized men with the idea of development, taking effect practically in persistent gradual amelioration of the estate of our common humanity. The problem of an educational use of science is then to create an intelligence pregnant with belief in the possibility of the direction of human affairs by itself.

9. With respect to aims and objectives, Professor Dewey believes that there is no such thing as a fixed and final set of objectives, even for the time being. Each day of teaching ought to enable the teacher to revise and better in some respect the objectives aimed at in previous work.

10. Professor Dewey advocates that schools place major emphasis not on the basic sciences, but on the social sciences in their most active and immediate aspects. Physics and chemistry, so he believes, lead the student away from the concrete realities of experience to a systematic realm of symbolic abstractions, whereas sociology and psychology familiarize the student with human experience as it is actually experienced, in all its concreteness as well as in its fragmentariness.

11. Professor Dewey sponsors a new social order. He is definitely dissatisfied with the present order. He is opposed to the division between laboring classes and leisure classes. At one time he was interested in a projected new national political party. He was among the first to promote teachers' unions and sponsored an agreement between these unions with industrial unions.

12. The following quotations will throw light on Professor Dewey's religious views:

The sinfulness of man, the corruption of his heart, his self-love, and love of power, when referred to as causes are precisely of the same nature as was the appeal to abstract powers that once prevailed in physical science and that operated as a chief obstacle to the generation and growth of the latter (*A Common Faith*, 1934, p. 77).

Similar statements are quoted by Professor Cooke in his article "What Is Wrong with American Education?" (*The Sunday School Times*, June 7, 1941, p. 460). Some of them are:

The idea of the sinfulness of man, the corruption of his heart, is a retarding force hindering progress and offering the chief obstacle to the development of social intelligence. . . .

The idea of mere individual salvation of individual souls is a denial of the possibility of rational operation of intelligence in the conduct of human life. . . .

Faith in God, in authority, ideas of souls and immortality, belief in divine grace . . . have been made impossible for the educated mind today. . . .

For further study of Professor Dewey's religious views, I refer to my tract *The Lutheran Elementary School, an Interpretation*.

In the light of this brief analysis of Professor Dewey's thought it should be evident that modern philosophies of education are deeply grounded in his views. Professor Cooke is right when he says, "It is no exaggeration to say that the entire present-day picture of education centers about Dewey, his ideas, and the developments leading from his ideas" (*op. cit.*, p. 167). Experimentalism took most kindly to him, other philosophies less kindly, but none could escape the impact of his thought. It is self-evident therefore that also a Lutheran philosophy of education will have

to take issue with Professor Dewey and his influence on modern education.

We have concluded our story of the historical and educational background which the philosophies of education presented in the *Yearbook* body forth. We shall now venture to suggest basic considerations of a Lutheran philosophy of education.

III

Theory of a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

Among many questions which arise in our mind when we inquire into the nature of a Lutheran philosophy of education the following seem to be most relevant: What areas and aspects of the educative process come under the purview of a Lutheran philosophy of education? What is the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education? What is its foundation? What ought a Lutheran philosophy of education try to do? And how does it achieve its ends? We shall, therefore, in this final chapter examine the following aspects of a Lutheran philosophy of education: 1. its scope; 2. its content; 3. its aims and objectives; and 4. its methods and means.

1. Scope of a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

A Lutheran philosophy of education takes into account *all* areas and aspects of the educative process. Organization and content of the curriculum, methods, educational psychology, child psychology, educational science, individual differences, classroom organization and management, tests and measurements, administration, finances, and other factors related to education come under the jurisdiction of a Lutheran philosophy of education.

Let me illustrate. Lutheran education—I am thinking now in terms of education as it is carried on in our Church—embraces *all age levels*. We seek to provide education for the pre-adolescent child, the adolescent youth, and the matured adult. Furthermore, a glance at the curriculums operative in our schools reveals that we conduct *various types of schools*. Our parish schools teach those fundamental subjects and develop those basic skills and habits which are requisite for more advanced study. Our secondary schools provide a pre-liberal-arts training or prepare for a commercial or an engineering career, or for other vocations. Our university at Valparaiso conducts a college of liberal arts, a college of law, and a college of engineering. Courses offered in our pre-theological schools are oriented in the direction of preparing students for the study of theology. Our seminaries at Springfield and St. Louis equip young men for the multifarious tasks of the Christian ministry. Our teachers' colleges train young men and women for service in our parishes as teachers, as organists and

choir directors, and as leaders of young people's groups. We also conduct part-time agencies of religious education such as vacation Bible schools and Saturday schools. Finally, though we naturally tend to conceive of education in terms of *institutions*—parish schools, secondary schools, university, pre-theological schools, seminaries, teachers' colleges—we must bear in mind that we have with us *non-institutional education*, that is, education carried on in the home. Unfortunately, we are not always conscious of this fact and do not always seem to appreciate its vast significance. This may be the reason, too, why we have made no more than a fair beginning in the way of providing suitable educational materials for the Christian parent (though individuals in our circles are performing noble service in this fertile field) and for the Christian adult whose formal education has terminated perhaps many years ago. The scope of Lutheran education, therefore, of which a philosophy of Lutheran education must take account, embraces *every age level, every type of School, and includes both institutional and non-institutional education.*

2. Content of a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

In my effort to define the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education I am following the lead suggested by Professor Adler. He believes that the content of the philosophy of education is *knowledge* (as opposed to *opinion*) and that this knowledge consists in *principles*. Similarly, I conceive the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education to be *knowledge, knowledge of the principles* which govern, or should govern, the entire process and system of Lutheran education. I hold this knowledge to be the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education because my analyses of the philosophies of education represented in the *Yearbook* and of other philosophies of education have persuaded me that substitution of any other content degrades the philosophy of education to a hopeless *mélange* of opinions sometimes expressive of totally unrelated aspects of education.

A Lutheran philosopher of education must, therefore, meticulously guard against confusing principles of his philosophy with private opinions. He must, furthermore, not speak with the voice of authority when no principle is involved or when no principle exists. A Lutheran psychologist, let us say, or a Lutheran administrator of education, or an experienced Lutheran teacher must not pose as an educational philosopher (make an opinion appear as a principle) when he is merely voicing opinion. It will readily be seen that much confusion in our educational thinking results from the tragic fact that the philosopher of education expresses an opinion whereas he should have spoken with the

voice of authority (stated a principle) and that the practitioner poses as a philosopher of education whereas he is rendering no more than an opinion. Such confusion is fraught with great danger. It easily leads to misunderstanding, dissension, bitterness, and estrangement, and impedes the wholesome progress of the educative process.

The difficulty which arises from confusing principles with opinions (and vice versa) can be overcome, at least approximately, in an educational system as limited in scope as ours. Indeed, more centralization of authority and greater co-ordination of effort may be necessary. We can, to use an illustration, well conceive of a synodical committee on education being so constituted that it will consist, on the one hand, of experts in the knowledge of principles and, on the other hand, of experts in opinions, such as administrators, educational psychologists, educational scientists, and experienced teachers can render. Such a committee would study all phases of our educational system, be guided by unalterable *principles*, agree on the basis of majority vote on *opinions*, and submit its reports in terms of principles and opinions. Perhaps such a committee is Utopian, perhaps it would have to be vested with more authority than Americans ordinarily grant their leaders, but it would function more successfully than committees constituted of individuals expert neither in knowledge nor in opinion. What I have said about the constituency of such a synodical committee on education would, of course, hold, *pari passu*, of every other committee in our circles entrusted with matters of education.

We inquire next: What are the sources from which these principles are derived? Or what is the foundation of the knowledge which constitutes the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education? It will be remembered that experimentalism, realism, and idealism recognize two sources of knowledge, science and reason, though types of religious idealism look for support of some of their principles to divine revelation. Professor Adler, who recognizes science and reason as sources of knowledge, is assured, however, that "religious education rests on supernatural knowledge, the ultimate source of which is Divine Revelation" (p. 220). Scholasticism has an undue veneration for reason as a source of knowledge without, however, disparaging assured results of science. It goes to divine revelation for many of its principles.

A Lutheran philosophy of education draws its principles from three sources, divine revelation, reason, and science, the primary one being divine revelation. In problematic situations it always seeks to determine whether divine revelation has laid down a universal principle. Discovery of such a principle determines its course of action. If divine revelation does not disclose a principle,

a Lutheran philosophy of education resorts to secondary sources such as postulates of reason and findings of science.

When we speak of "principles" derived from reason and science, we do not mean to imply that these principles are absolute in the same sense in which divinely revealed principles are absolute. They are rather tentatively held principles. Examples of such principles would be: "The earth is round" and "Two and two are four." By maintaining the validity of these principles we oppose skepticism, which questions the truth of every principle, as well as agnosticism, which denies all truth. We hold to the position that in our most common experiences sensations do not deceive us and that things are as they appear to the senses and as reason thinks of them. Yes, we thank God that He permits man by means of his reason and by means of experimental science to discover and explore many truths which He has not revealed in His Word. At the same time we profoundly regret that since the Fall, in particular since the days of the great Greek thinkers, man has frequently believed in the unerring judgment of reason and in the ultimacy of experimental science. History clearly demonstrates that even in the solution of very simple problems that surround man in his daily life the profoundest researches of reason and science have frequently failed. We feel genuinely sorry for exponents of experimentalism and other philosophies, including scholasticism, who in spite of the many wrecks of rationalizations and "assured" scientific findings strewn along the highway of history still hold to the ultimacy of reason and to the firm belief that science can and will solve all problems lying not only in the realm of nature, but in the realm of human relationships as well. To the extent, however, that principles derived from reason or science are tentatively firmly established a Lutheran philosopher of education builds them into the texture of his philosophy, always remembering, however, that he must never permit them to trespass on holy ground and that further researches by reason and science may call for drastic revisions of these principles.

We inquire further: What are these principles which a Lutheran philosophy of education finds in divine revelation? We shall not attempt to present all of them. We shall call attention at this point only to those which are of particular relevance in the educative process.

With respect to knowledge of God, divine revelation acknowledges a natural knowledge of God (Rom. 1:19, 20; Ps. 19:1). But divine revelation is equally clear in saying that this natural knowledge of God is incomplete. It reveals many truths regarding the nature of God and His relation to the universe which reason and experimental science cannot of themselves discover. It reveals,

for instance, that God sent His Son into the world to save sinners from sin, death, and hell, and that whoever believes in the incarnate Son of God, Jesus Christ, as his Savior, will be eternally saved and that he who does not believe in Jesus Christ as his Savior will be eternally damned. It reveals many other truths about God on which we need not dwell at this time. The point is that the Lutheran philosopher of education draws his principles regarding the nature of God and regarding God's relation to man from divine revelation and is not satisfied with the highly fragmentary knowledge of God which reason or science discloses.

With respect to the universe divine revelation teaches that God created this universe by His almighty Word. In the entire Bible there is not the slightest evidence that this universe evolved even though since the days of the Greeks human reason has frequently found it convenient to postulate the gradual evolution of the universe. Divine revelation also teaches that this universe will be destroyed even though human reason has at times found it agreeable to believe in an eternal and changeless universe or in a Nietzschean doctrine of "eternal recurrence."

With respect to man divine revelation is most explicit. God created man according to His own image. Man is not a brute. Professor Brubacher legitimately poses the observation: "The significance of this difference (that man is not a brute) is that man with his rational nature can be educated while the brute without it is capable only of being trained. What such a distinction would mean for inferences drawn from animal experimentation as to human learning can easily be imagined" (p. 306). Divine revelation also teaches that man whom God created in perfect knowledge of God and in perfect holiness fell into sin and by his sin corrupted not only himself but also all of his descendants. Man, as he is born of woman, is thoroughly corrupt according to body, soul, and mind. Divine revelation knows nothing of a supernature of which Adam and his descendants were deprived after Adam's fall. This teaching of scholasticism is a fiction of erring human reason. Divine revelation rejects the teaching of Rousseau and his disciples, including many "progressives," that "man is perfect as he comes from the hand of his Creator." Divine revelation knows nothing of the teaching of other thinkers that man is born amoral, neither good nor bad, having potentialities, however, toward good or evil. Divine revelation rather teaches that man is born with predispositions not toward good, but only toward evil and that these evil propensities soon express themselves in sinful attitudes, desires, thoughts, words, and deeds. Divine revelation, furthermore, makes it clear that unregenerate man, in so far as he still leads a decent life, respects the rights of others and the authorities placed over

him, and proves himself a useful citizen, does this as a result of the fact that there still is operative in him the divine voice of the Moral Law which God had written into Adam's heart (Rom. 2:14, 15). For that reason we can well appreciate the "ought" in the Kantian ethics and we marvel at the lofty heights to which other idealistic ethical systems have frequently aspired. But divine revelation shows that man can never by the observance of the Law still operative in his heart satisfy God and merit His good will and pleasure, much less eternal salvation.

These, then, are some of the principles inherent in the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education. Their source is divine revelation. All principles derived from this source are changeless and timeless. They are absolute truths, truths which reason and science can gratuitously disclaim but can never discredit and disqualify.

3. Aims and Objectives of a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

At the outset of my discussion of aims of a Lutheran philosophy of education I wish to emphasize that I am not now referring to aims and objectives of Lutheran education, but to aims of a Lutheran philosophy of education. Immediate aims and objectives of any area in the vast field of education must be determined by administrators, teachers, educational psychologists, educational scientists, groups (usually the faculty) that set up the curriculum, and other responsible officers. These aims and objectives lie for the most part in the field of opinion, and opinion, as we have seen, does not share in the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education. It may indeed be difficult at times to determine whether a given instance involves a principle derived from divine revelation or from established data of reason and science or an opinion pre-scinded from a limited number of like cases. The only God-pleasing way of solving such problems is the application by all concerned of the law of Christian charity. Ordinarily a Lutheran philosophy of education enters on the scene only when it finds it necessary to say that immediate aims and objectives must be in harmony with, and seek to promote, the aims and objectives of a Lutheran philosophy of education.

But what are these aims and objectives? They are, in brief, the sincere endeavor of all who are engaged in some way or other in the task of Lutheran education to draw up, as far as this is humanly possible, the principles of a Lutheran philosophy of education and a comprehensive body of expert opinion on educational matters.

Inasmuch however as these principles are very largely identical with the ultimate aims and objectives of all Lutheran education

and constitute the very *raison d'être* of Lutheran education, it will not be regarded amiss if I state them:

They are the following four: 1. promotion of respect for the individual; 2. promotion of faith life; 3. promotion of spiritual and moral life; 4. promotion of physical, intellectual, and emotional life.

A Lutheran philosophy of education insists that everyone engaged in some way or other in the task of Lutheran education recognize that human society is not an indiscriminate mass resembling a Platonic idea, but an aggregate of individual human beings. It is frequently said in our day that the basic difference between democracy and totalitarianism is this: Democracy recognizes the dignity and rights of the individual, whereas totalitarianism regards the individual merely as a means to an end, the end being the State. Unfortunately, however, this evaluation of the individual is frequently no more than a catchword, a shibboleth, intended to define what we are fighting for and to be shelved and forgotten as soon as the war is over. But the fact is, according to divine revelation, that every individual does count for something. Every individual has an immortal soul, for which Jesus spilled His life's blood. It follows that everyone engaged in the task of Lutheran education recognize this principle, and whether he be administrator, teacher, or perform other service in the interest of Lutheran education strive to promote this divinely revealed principle. From the point of view of divine revelation it makes no difference whether a child or student has an average or low or high I. Q., whether he is a perfect specimen of health or whether he is afflicted with some physical handicap. It makes no difference whether an individual belongs to the privileged or the underprivileged group, and whether he is white or black, yellow or red.

Furthermore, a Lutheran philosophy of education seeks to promote the faith life of all who are being educated in the Lutheran system of education. The greatest privilege which anyone engaged in Lutheran education enjoys is to contribute on his part to the development of the faith life of those who are being educated by him. We dislike shibboleths such as "child-centered," "society-centered," "integration," and others because, as we have already indicated, they easily lend themselves to oversimplification and false emphasis. But there is one shibboleth which ought to resound throughout our education system. This shibboleth is "Christ-centered." Lutheran education should be "Christ-centered," not, first of all, in the sense that Christ be held up to our pupils and students as the Great Teacher or the paragon of virtue, but that He was crucified for the sins of the world; "Christ-centered" in the sense in which Paul thought of Christ when he wrote, "I am determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ and

Him crucified" (1 Cor. 2:2). This unspeakable truth that Christ was crucified and died for the sins of all mankind must, as I have written elsewhere, "be the basis of all instruction in religion, the terminus to which the Christian educator must ever and again direct the thought and activity of his pupils or students . . . the point of vantage from which he is able to evaluate correctly all knowledge made available by reason and scientific investigation."

A Lutheran philosophy of education seeks to promote also the spiritual and moral life of the pupil and the student. It indeed recognizes the value of character training which is carried on in Bibleless, Godless, and Christless systems of education of our day. But it maintains that the individual is able to lead a God-pleasing spiritual and moral life only as a result of the operation of the Holy Spirit on his heart and that only to the extent that he reads and meditates on God's Word and attends Holy Communion will his spiritual and moral life be deepened and improved. Therefore a Lutheran philosophy of education disavows the sufficiency of Aristotelian ethics which makes happiness the highest good, even though Aristotle had in mind happiness achieved by virtuous activity. It regards as insufficient also Kantian ethics, which rest on the principle of duty for duty's sake. It opposes utilitarian and all naturalistic ethics, which ultimately are inspired by considerations of temporal rewards and punishments. It rather insists on the application of the ethics which rest on those absolute principles laid down by God Himself in His inspired revelation. It strives to stimulate the spiritual and moral life of its pupils and students by repeated reference to the love of God in Christ Jesus and to the need of studying God's Word and frequently partaking of Holy Communion.

A Lutheran philosophy of education seeks, finally, to promote the physical, intellectual, and emotional life of all who are educated in the Lutheran scheme of education. I take the liberty to repeat here what I have written elsewhere: "Since the secular activity of a Christian does not constitute a life apart from his Christianity, a Lutheran philosophy of education not only allows for, but also imposes on, the Christian educator and others instrumental in the educational process of our Church the duty and responsibility adequately to prepare pupils and students for their life on earth. All those engaged in the educative process must aim to safeguard and improve the physical health of their pupils, to sharpen their intellect, to stimulate their emotional life, to direct their will, to discover and to develop native skills and interests, and to enrich their minds and memories with knowledge indispensable for successful living in this world and with a deep appreciation of the culture which past ages have bequeathed to the present generation."

4. Methods and Means of a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

We have noted that the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education are those absolute principles, those "fixed stars" implicit in divine revelation, as well as those established truths which reason and science make available. We have also examined the aims and objectives of a Lutheran philosophy of education and have discovered that these aims and objectives are very largely identical with the ultimate educational aims of all who are engaged in Lutheran education. We inquire, finally: By what methods and by what means does a Lutheran philosophy of education hope to achieve its aims and objectives?

The caution is again in place that we are not now concerned with methods and means which, for example, the practitioner in the teaching profession employs in order to achieve his aims. Whatever methods a teacher, whether he is teaching in the kindergarten or in the grades or in the secondary school, in a pretheological school or in other Lutheran schools, employs must be left to his discretion. The choice of methods by the teacher, the administrator, and others engaged directly or indirectly in the educative process belongs, by and large, not into the field of principles, but into the field of opinion. That consideration alone ought be sufficient to warn overenthusiastic teachers of method against exalting some methods to such heights that students will be apt to regard them as fixed principles. To be sure—if we are allowed to continue this digression—a teacher should be constantly alert to ascertain what reason and scientific experiment have discovered by way of achieving quicker, easier, and surer results through the application of different, if not new, methods. But he must never overrate methods at the expense of those principles which constitute the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education and which he must strive to realize above every other consideration.

In order to achieve the aims and objectives of a Lutheran philosophy of education, it goes without saying that everyone responsible for Lutheran education must himself believe in these principles, strive to gain a firmer grasp of them, and in his daily conduct reflect his allegiance to these principles, whether he happens to be on or off the schoolground or campus. He must, furthermore, make it his business that these principles find expression in publicity efforts, such as school catalogs, school papers, posters, sermons, addresses, and the like. He must also keep an ever-watchful eye on the curriculum. This must clearly reflect the school's aims to promote the faith life, the spiritual and moral life, and the physical, intellectual, and emotional life of its pupils or students. Necessarily, therefore, the Word of God must occupy a prominent place in the curriculum. May I add, in passing, that

the Word of God must permeate the entire life of a Lutheran school. Students, teachers, and administrators must study it systematically in private. In fact, one would expect that at least the interior decoration of every Lutheran school symbolize by means of murals, famous paintings, and inscriptions Biblical stories and truths.

Finally, since many principles of a Lutheran philosophy of education are abstracted from reason and science, it goes without saying that everyone engaged in teaching and in administrative work in any one of our schools should be thoroughly familiar with his field of interest. Our teachers of the common branches, our teachers of mathematics, psychology, sociology, history, languages, the fine arts, the basic and natural sciences, and other subjects ought know their respective fields exceptionally well. Are they not continually abstracting from these areas of knowledge principles which form part of the content of their Lutheran philosophy of education? Are they not frequently called on to render expert opinions?

We have now completed our analysis of a Lutheran philosophy of education. We recognize painfully that we have left many questions unanswered and many problems unsolved. For this reason we have not titled our essay "A Lutheran Philosophy of education" but "*Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education.*" We believe, however, that, with the help of brethren in the field, it should not be impossible to formulate, on the one hand, a set of those principles which constitute the content of a Lutheran philosophy of education and, on the other hand, a fairly comprehensive set of expert opinions. When this goal has been realized, we shall have moved far away from a nebulous *toward* a philosophy of Lutheran education and be headed in a straight course toward *the* Lutheran philosophy of education.

"And being now at some pause," as Francis Bacon said when he had finished writing a book, "looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me (as far as a man can judge of his own work) not much better than the noise or sound which musicians make while they are tuning their instruments; which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards."

St. Louis, Mo., August 31, 1942

PAUL BRETSCHER

