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## CORDATUS' CONTROVERSY WITH MELANCHTHON.

The period of unrest at the university of Wittenberg during the year 1536 and the following years affords material for reflection to the psychologist, the historian, and the dogmatist. We behold men whose names have become household words in the Lutheran Church in a curious disagreement with each other. When righteous men differ, they expose not only their points of difference, but also themselves, their character, to public view. And when the matter at issue between them concerns the common faith of Christians, every believer has reason to take notice of the difference and to try to understand its weight. The study of a theological controversy, when rightly pursued, is very useful. It aids the student materially in fixing in his own mind both the *τί* and the *πῶς* of a doctrine, the matter proposed for man's belief and the correct manner of proposing it. The personal features of a controversy — and what controversy was ever without such features? — may not be pleasant and delectable. But even from these features the student may draw wholesome lessons for his own conduct.

In the controversy before us we find a close friend of Luther arrayed against another very dear friend of the Reformer. Cordatus, the pastor of Niemegek, is usually represented as a narrow-minded, quarrelsome character, an orthodox verbalist, a self-seeking worshiper of Luther. His frequent changes of pastorate — Koestlin even speaks of his being driven out of Bohemia — seem to indicate a morose temperament. His

language is often stern. There are occasions when he appears moody and passionate. Melanchthon is usually pictured as a suave, amiable man of learning, peace-loving, considerate, accommodating, and easily affected by strife. Between the two stands Luther, a plain, practical man with a frank and fair-minded heart, a ready perception of the merits of a doctrinal issue,—an unbiased and impartial judge to whom disputants willingly submit their difference and to whose judgment they yield.

But it is not the personal features of the controversy that concern us most. They are merely accidental, and we propose to give them only a passing notice. The important point, in our estimate, is the theological value of the controversy. The *χρονόμενον* in this controversy, as Cordatus viewed it, was the relation of good works to justification, a matter which is seen at a glance to have affected the very heart of the new doctrine. The particular work which Cordatus feared was being unduly pressed as an indispensable requisite for justification was contrition. Contrition had been termed "*noster conatus*," our effort, toward obtaining justifying faith. It is very likely that it was this language that caused Cordatus to stumble, all the more because this effort was termed the *conditio sine qua non* of justification.

In order to understand the contention of Cordatus it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the public statements which the evangelical party up to the year 1536 had made regarding this matter, and to which its followers had become obligated. The *Augsburg Confession* had clearly stated why, and in what respect, justifying faith excludes works, and why, and in what respect, it includes, resp. necessitates them. Art. IV, Of Justification, had declared: "They teach that men cannot be justified [obtain forgiveness of sins and righteousness] before God by their own powers, merits, or works: but are justified freely [of grace] for Christ's sake through faith, when they believe that they are received into favor, and their sins forgiven for Christ's sake, who by His death hath satisfied for our sins.

This faith doth God impute for righteousness before Him, Rom. 3 and 4." Art. VI, Of New Obedience, had declared: "They teach that this faith should bring forth good fruits, and that men ought to do the good works commanded of God, because it is God's will, and not on any confidence of meriting justification before God by their works. For remission of sins and justification is apprehended by faith, as also the voice of Christ witnesseth: 'When ye have done all these things, say, We are unprofitable servants.' The same, also, do the ancient writers of the Church teach; for Ambrose saith: 'This is ordained of God, that he that believeth in Christ shall be saved, without works, by faith alone, freely receiving remission of sins.'" In Art. XX, Of Good Works, we find the following language: "Ours teach, that it is necessary to do good works; not that we may trust that we deserve grace by them, but because it is the will of God that we should do them. By faith alone is apprehended remission of sins and grace. And because the Holy Spirit is received by faith, our hearts are now renewed, and so put on new affections, so that they are able to bring forth good works. For thus saith Ambrose: 'Faith is the begetter of a good will, and of good actions.' . . . Hereby every man may see that this doctrine is not to be accused as forbidding good works, but, rather, is much to be commended, because it showeth after what sort we must do good works." (Book of Concord, p. 46.)<sup>1</sup> The relation of good works to justification is once more touched upon in Art. XXVII, Of Monastic Vows (p. 60). In the *Apology* the force of the *particulæ exclusivæ* is urged (p. 96, 73), and the confessors state: "Love also and works ought to follow faith. Wherefore, they are not excluded so as not to follow, but *confidence in the merit of love or of works is excluded in justification.*" "Good works are to be done on account of God's command, likewise for the exercise of faith, and on account of confession and giving of thanks. For these reasons good works ought necessarily to be done." (115, 68.) "We believe and teach that good works must neces-

1) All references to B. of C. according to Jacobs' Edition.

sarily be done (*for the inchoate fulfilling of the Law ought to follow faith*); nevertheless we ascribe to Christ His own honor." (119, 93.) "No one can infer anything more from this text (1 Cor. 13, 2) than that love is necessary. This we confess. So also not to commit theft is necessary. But the reasoning will not be correct, if some one would desire to frame thence an argument such as this: 'Not to commit theft is necessary. Therefore, not to commit theft, justifies.' Because justification is not the approval of a certain work, but of the entire person. Hence this passage from Paul does not contradict us." (121, 101.) "James has spoken shortly before concerning regeneration, *viz.*, that it occurs through the Gospel. For thus he says (1, 18): 'Of His own will begat He us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures.' When he teaches that we have been born again by the Gospel, he teaches that we have been born again and justified by faith. For the promise concerning Christ is apprehended only by faith when we set it over against the terrors of sin and of death. James does not, therefore, teach that we are born again by our works." (127, 126.) "Sins are redeemed by repentance, *i. e.*, the obligation of guilt is removed, because God forgives those who repent, as it is written in Ezek. 18, 21. 22. Nor are we to infer hence that He forgives on account of works that follow, on account of alms; but on account of His promise He forgives those who apprehend His promise." (131, 142.) Again and again, in ever varying form and in every possible connection, the *Apology* states, illustrates, urges the essential difference of faith and works, justification and renovation, Law and Gospel. From the *negotium justificationis* works must be excluded utterly. This is one truth which the two primal confessions of the Evangelicals inculcate. On the other hand, they commend good works, as Luther had done, who said: "Extra causam justificationis nemo potest bona opera a Deo praecepta satis magnifice commendare." Such axiomatic utterances of later theologians as these of Kromayer: "Bona opera non praecedunt justificandum, sed sequuntur justificatum;" "Bona

opera non nominibus, sed adverbii sunt dijudicanda, *i. e.*, non tantum bona esse, sed et bene fieri debent" — have grown out of the teaching that was voiced at Augsburg. Yea, the controversies which agitated the Church in the days of Agricola, and, later, of Major were judged in advance by the teaching of the *Augsburg Confession* and the *Apology*, and in composing the differences which had arisen regarding the question of the necessity of good works the framers of the *Form of Concord*, in Art. IV, had recourse to the *Confession of Augsburg* (584, 14).

Galle (*Melanchthon als Theologe*, p. 358 ff.) has reproduced a conversation which took place between Luther and Melanchthon at Bugenhagen's house in the presence of Jonas and Cruciger just before the outbreak of the Cordatus controversy in 1536. It appears that Melanchthon wanted to secure from Luther certain statements regarding the latter's view of the relation of good works to justification. By these statements Melanchthon wished to be guided in his pending interview with delegates from France and England whose arrival in Germany was expected about that time. The conversation is highly interesting and instructive, says Galle, and the reader will agree with him.

*Philip*: Augustine, it seems, has expressed apter thoughts when not engaged in controversy than when he spoke in controversy. For he speaks as if we must hold that we are righteous by faith, *i. e.*, by our renewal. If this is true, we are righteous not by faith alone, but by all gifts and virtues [bestowed upon us]; and this is what Augustine plainly intends to say. Hence has arisen the scholastic teaching of the grace which renders acceptable (*gratia gratum faciens*). Now, do you believe that a person is righteous by renewal, as Augustine does, or by gratuitous imputation, which takes place outside of us and is by faith, *i. e.*, by confidence which springs from the Word?

*Luther*: I believe and am quite persuaded and certain that this is the true meaning of the Gospel and of the apostles, that

we are righteous before God solely by His gratuitous imputation.

*Philip:* Is man righteous solely by God's mercy? It seems that he is not righteous by mercy alone, because our righteousness, *i. e.*, a good conscience based on our works, is necessary. Or do you not intend to grant the statement that a person is righteous principally by faith, and by works as a less principal cause; if faith signifies nothing but confidence, and if it is understood that the fulfillment of the Law is not required in order that confidence may remain sure, but that faith supplies what is lacking as regards the Law? You grant a twofold righteousness and also that both are necessary in the sight of God, namely, the righteousness of faith and that other, of a good conscience, in which faith supplies what is lacking in regard to the Law. What else is this than saying that a person is not justified by faith alone? You surely do not take the act of being justified (*justificari*) for the beginning of regeneration, as Augustine does. Augustine does not hold that men are saved freely but by virtues which have been bestowed upon them. What do you think of this opinion of Augustine? Augustine's whole view of the matter of merits is different from ours, and puts aside nothing but the merit of an ungodly person.

*Luther:* I hold that a person becomes, is, and remains righteous, or a righteous person, simply by mercy alone. For this righteousness is perfect; it is set up over against God's wrath, death, and sin, and swallows up all these, and renders a person absolutely (*simpliciter*) holy and innocent, just as if, in reality, there were no sin in him, as John says: "Whosoever is born of God sinneth not." For to be born of God and, at the same time, to be a sinner, is a contradiction. After this righteousness a person is, and is called, righteous by his work, or fruits, which God, indeed, both requires of him and rewards. This righteousness I call external and a righteousness of works, and it cannot be absolutely (*simpliciter*) holy, while a person sojourns in the flesh and in this present life. Accordingly, it

neither removes death nor sin, nor can it offer resistance to them, but merely prevents future and greater sins.

*Philip:* What about regenerated Paul? Whereby was Paul, after he was born again, forthwith righteous, *i. e.*, accepted?

*Luther:* By nothing else, of course, than by his new birth through faith, by which he was made righteous and ever thereafter remained righteous and accepted.

*Philip:* Is he righteous only for mercy's sake? Or is he righteous chiefly on account of God's mercy, and in a remote way (*minus principaliter*) on account of his virtues, or works?

*Luther:* No; on the contrary, the virtues and works are righteous because of the righteous Paul [their doer], just as a work is pleasing or displeasing on account of the person who performs it, as even Terence states. For a good work performed by an evil person is accepted not even with men.

*Philip:* It seems that one is righteous not by God's mercy alone. For you teach yourself that the righteousness of works is necessary, and that, in the sight of God. And Paul is acceptable both as a believer and as a doer; if he were not a doer, he would not be acceptable. Hence, our own righteousness is, at least, a kind of partial cause (*aliqua partialis causa*).

*Luther:* It is necessary; however, not by a legal necessity, or one of compulsion, but by a gratuitous necessity, or one of consequence, or of an unalterable condition. As the sun shines by necessity, if it is a sun, and yet does not shine by demand, but by its nature and its unalterable will, so to speak, because it was created for the purpose that it should shine, so a person created righteous performs new works by an unalterable necessity, not by legal compulsion. For to the righteous no law is given. Further, we are created, says Paul, unto good works. By the way, your remark, If he were not a doer, he would not be acceptable, states by implication that it is impossible to be a believer and not a doer.

*Philip:* For this reason Sadoletus claims we are making contradictory statements, because we say a person is justified

by faith alone, and yet state that the righteousness of works is necessary.

*Luther:* Ah, but it is because false brethren and hypocrites pretend faith that works are demanded, in order that they may be confounded in their hypocrisy, just as Elijah demanded works of the priests of Baal, on which occasion Baal was confounded. For in this manner God, too, necessarily does nothing but what is good, and yet without law.

*Philip:* When you say that we are justified by faith alone, do you refer only to the beginning (of justification), I mean, to the remission of sins? Or do you mean to say that regenerated Paul was accepted, also after his regeneration, not on account of his own obedience and virtues, at least partly on account of them, but only on account of God's mercy?

*Luther:* You should rather say that Paul's obedience is accepted because Paul is a believer, otherwise his obedience would not be accepted at all. And when a person is righteous by faith, he is righteous for all time, as long as his faith remains. It is, therefore, an unhappy distinction to divide a person (as far as he is a believer) into beginning, middle, and end. Accordingly, a person's works shine because they are rays of his faith, and are accepted because of his faith, not vice versa. Otherwise, in the matter of justification, the works which follow faith would be more excellent, and thus, faith would be justifying faith only in the beginning, afterwards it would step aside and cease and would leave the distinction (of justifying a person) to works, and become void and defunct.

*Philip:* Paul is righteous, *i. e.*, accepted unto eternal life, by God's mercy alone. On the other hand, if there were not superadded —

*Luther:* That is impossible!

*Philip:* — a partial cause, namely, his obedience, he would not be saved, according to the passage: "Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel!"

*Luther:* There is no partial cause superadded, because faith is always operative, or it is not faith. Hence, no matter



what works are or what their value may be, their whole existence and value is due to the glorious virtue of faith which is the sun from which these rays cannot but (*inevitabiliter*) radiate.

*Philip*: In Augustine's teaching the phrase "by faith alone" excludes only the works which precede faith.

*Luther*: That may or may not be so, nevertheless the statement of Augustine: "I shall be troubled, but I shall not be confounded, because I bear in mind the wounds of the Lord," sufficiently shows that he agrees with us. For, there he clearly believes that faith avails in the beginning, middle, end, and for all time, as David says: "With Thee is forgiveness," and again: "Enter not into judgment with Thy servant."

*Philip*: Is this statement correct: The righteousness of works is necessary for salvation?

*Luther*: Works are necessary not because they effect or obtain salvation, but they are present with, and accompany, faith which obtains salvation, just as I must necessarily be present when I am to be saved. *Ich werde auch darbey sein, sagt jehner gesel.* What Sadoletus imagines is probably this, that faith is a work demanded by the divine Law, like charity, obedience, chastity, etc. Accordingly, a believer fulfills one, or rather the first part of the Law, and thus has the beginning of justification or of righteousness. However, when the beginning has been secured, the fulfillment of the other commandments enjoining works, after faith has been obtained, is also required. There you see that Sadoletus has no understanding at all regarding this business. For if faith were a work demanded of us, Sadoletus would be altogether right, and in that case faith would in the same way begin to renew a person as other works, performed afterwards, continue to renew him. But we claim that faith is a work of promise, or a gift of the Holy Spirit, and that it is, indeed, necessary, in order that the Law be fulfilled, but is not obtained by the Law and its works. However, this gift, when once bestowed, renders a person forever new, and such a person thereupon proceeds to perform new works, not vice versa, *viz.*, new works do not make the person

new. Thus the works of Paul are accepted, not because they are good, but because Paul, who performs them, is an accepted person; and they would not be accepted, unless Paul were accepted. Accordingly, the righteousness of a person in the sight of God is in no wise owing to his works, although they shall redound contingently to the person's honor, because of certain rewards (which will follow them). But they do not justify a person. For we are all equally righteous in the one Christ; we are equally beloved and accepted as to our persons, though one star differ from another in brightness. But God does not love Saturn more than He does the sun or the moon. Briefly, believers are new creatures, new trees; accordingly, the aforementioned demands of the Law do not apply to them, *e. g., faith must do good works*, just as it is not proper so say: *the sun must shine, a good tree must produce good fruit, 3+7 must equal 10*. For the sun shines *de facto*, a good tree is productive *de facto*, 3+7 equal 10 *de facto*. It is their property, not to become, or to be compelled to be, but to be in very deed. (You must grant this), unless you would make the statement conditional and hypothetical, and say: *If the sun is a sun, it must needs shine; if you wish to be a believer, it is necessary that you are active*. But such language might be employed in reference to a painted sun or a fictitious faith; to speak thus of true faith and the real sun would be ridiculous. —

This friendly dispute was taken down in writing by those present, and sixteen years later, in 1552, when engaged in controversy with Andrew Osiander of Koenigsberg, Melanchthon published it as an appendix to a polemical tract. His aim was to show that Osiander could not claim Luther as his ally, when contending that in justification man is *made* righteous, because the righteousness, or holiness, of God is imparted to him. Melanchthon had well understood Luther's mind, and was able to represent Luther's teaching. We shall bear these facts in mind, and now turn to Cordatus.

It was on July 24, 1536, when Cordatus, who happened to be in Wittenberg, went to the university and attended a lecture

of Cruciger. Cruciger was commenting on the Gospel of John, and in the course of his lecture said: "Christ alone is the meritorious cause; meanwhile it is true, nevertheless, that man must be active in a manner; we must be contrite, and must rouse our conscience by means of the Word, in order that we may conceive faith. Thus, our contrition and our effort are indispensable prerequisites of justification." (*Tantum Christus est causa propter quem; interim tamen verum est, homines agere aliquid oportere, nos habere contritionem, et debere verbo erigere conscientiam, ut fidem concipiamus. Ita nostra contritio et noster conatus sunt causae justificationis sine quibus non.* Corpus Reformat. III, 159.) Cordatus was startled by this statement. Bretschneider says, he was *animo offensus*, because he held Cruciger's statement to be out of harmony with the genuine doctrine of justification as set forth by Luther. It does not appear that he challenged Cruciger at once, but happening to visit Melanchthon immediately after the lecture, Cordatus spent an entire evening discussing the matter with him. *Ibid.* 3, 350. He went home ruminating what he had heard. On August 20th he addressed a letter to Cruciger. The letter is not extant. It attacked the position which Cruciger had taken in his lecture. Cruciger did not reply. On September 8th Cordatus addressed a second letter to Cruciger. Bretschneider, who has discovered this letter, states that it is written in a confused style and in a wretched manner. He reproduces a part of it, which reads: "I wrote you August 20th regarding the lecture which you delivered July 24th, and which I heard, and stated how I had been wounded in conscience by same. And I asked you, accordingly, to heal me. However, since you have not done so hitherto, you must not take it amiss, nor feel surprised, if I seem now to write to you things that are rather harsh.—Accordingly, when you continue proclaiming your sophistry, or your popish teaching, or your philosophy, why shall not I continue contradicting you and confessing the faith which I have in Christ? Moreover, I believe that by so doing I act from a consideration of the honor and reverence

due you all, because, years ago, you at Wittenberg have taught me the faith wherein I stand. If what you have stated publicly in your lecture and what I now maintain firmly to be an error contrary to the article of justification, *i. e.*, against the salvation of men, will be publicly corrected by you, either in my presence or absence, I shall hold my peace; if not, I shall take my charge against you before the venerable theological faculty of Wittenberg, that they may pass judgment on you and on me, and on this mooted matter, which affects the cause of Christ. I shall not appeal to Dr. Mart. Luther, that only man through whom we have become believers in Christ, nor shall I call on him while this matter remains undecided, unless called upon to do so or forced by some necessity, so as not to give occasion to slander to the mock-theologians, of whom there are not a few at Wittenberg among your learned linguists, and who would rather read the dead Erasmus than hear and read the living Luther." True, this was blunt language, — *asperiora*, as Cordatus terms it. And there is a spice of humanity in the strong admiration expressed for Luther, which causes Bretschneider to bring his excerpt to an abrupt close, with the remark: "Cordatus has added many other things, the gist of which is that not a syllable (*non verbum*) of Luther's teaching on this doctrine must be abandoned." Evidently, Cruciger had met with an opponent who disdained gloves. But that is unessential. The question is: Was Cordatus justified in taking exception to the teaching to which he had listened?

We have Cruciger's reply, dated September 10. "I had just begun to answer your former letter, my dear Cordatus, when some unforeseen occurrence prevented me from completing my answer, and in the meantime I have been away from home, and afterwards did not think that there was need of hurry, because I believed that your fervor had cooled, and, that being the case, we could personally discuss the matter some time in an amicable manner. However, I observe, even without your effort, that the heat of which I spoke has rather increased, and I would not expose myself to it lest I add oil to the flames.

And besides, naturally I do nothing more reluctantly than fight. Accordingly, I shall, first of all, implore you with all my heart for Christ's sake not to stir up something out of which there might arise an offense among us in an unessential matter (*non necessaria de causa*); for you observe that already everything is filled with disturbance and scandals. —Replying, next, to the matter that is now between us, and in order to do this as briefly as possible, without introducing matters that are foreign to the subject, and laying aside, or, if you will, rather passing over until some future time other matters which you have stirred up plentifully enough, I am constrained to say, — however, without malice to you, — that you have done me wrong, — although I do not interpret your action so as to say that you have done so intentionally, — because in your former writing you say, when rehearsing a sentence from my lecture, that this was the way I expressed myself: 'We are justified by our works, these being, as it were, the indispensable prerequisite.' I never spoke thus, nor did I hold that view, nor has any person in our school, as far as I know, spoken thus: 'We are justified by our works;' but while expounding the statement (*exclusio*) of Paul: 'We are justified by faith,' I expressly stated that Christ was nevertheless the meritorious cause of justification. Thereupon I added the further remark in this statement: 'We are justified freely,' and said that contrition was not excluded but was necessary in a person that was to be justified, and I called our contrition *causa sine qua non*, because without it faith cannot exist. Nor did I wish to lay down a law to anybody, compelling him to use this expression *causa sine qua non*, but I considered it no improper expression. I ask you, in the first place, whether you believe contrition to be necessary in a person that is to be justified. If you answer this question, as I confidently expect you to do, I desire to be shown in what way contrition is required, and in what terms you would have this matter expressed and explained, and if my expressions are not acceptable, that you suggest better ones. For about words I shall not wrangle either with

you or with anybody else. However, if we do not differ as regards the matter, I pray you to grant me liberty to employ terms which are of recognized usage in schools and are considered adapted for teaching. You will greatly oblige me by teaching me a better way. — I wished to say this much in all brevity at the present time, lest you should think that I meant to ignore you, and these are certainly the main points. If you offer any other points, I shall, if need be, reply to them at greater length." (l. c. 3, 159.)

The general tone of this letter is considerate. As regards the explanation which Cruciger offers for not writing sooner, it is hardly fair. An educated gentleman can afford to ignore undue fervor on the part of his opponent, but a conscientious theologian cannot afford to ignore a challenge of his teaching. A prompt reply acknowledging the opponent's perfect right to offer criticism and meeting him, in a matter-of-fact way, on the points controverted, would have been proper. Cordatus replied September 17th, as follows: "Your letter of September 10th, my dear Doctor, was handed me on the seventeenth, and I shall reply in the order of its contents. In the first place, your statement that the principal reason why you deferred answering was because you were in hopes that my fervor would subside, I regard as well-intentioned, although I wrote you nothing about my fervor, but about my grief and pain. Secondly, as regards your reluctance to fight, I know that to be quite so, and just as much do I wish that no one, no matter how modest and kind-hearted he may be, would commit anything for which he must be fought to a finish. Thirdly, you request me not to stir up something out of which offenses might arise. On this point I shall certainly show myself open to entreaty. But as regards the reason which you offer, *viz.*, that already everything is filled with unrest and scandals, I reply that this circumstance shall not deter me from raising objections, if anybody offends against the faith of Christ, for it is impossible to teach and to defend one's teaching without unrest and scandals. Let Christ who has sent this sword remove it, and unrest and scandals will

cease. In regard to your third point, that I have wronged you, I answer candidly, first, that my hearing and memory must have been very bad if you lectured only on contrition. And, indeed, if it is as you say, I have stirred up plenty of trouble, as you write, and I add, more than plenty. Secondly, you acknowledge that you have termed our contrition *causa sine qua non*. Does not this one work alone give me the same ground for objecting to your lecture, as all our works would, which latter I believe to have heard you say? Furthermore, I wonder why contrition is being urged so much now and why you do not rather urge, in the place of contrition, that phrase which you have used formerly in teaching and writing, *viz.*, that faith is not without repentance, so that our present would harmonize with our former teaching, which is most certainly correct. For Christ demands that repentance and faith should be preached in His name. I do not deny contrition, but since the term contrition was coined (*commissus*) under popery, etc., my suspicion would be roused and I would believe that an innovation was being introduced that is not quite desirable. Accordingly, for the present I do not answer your question whether contrition is necessary for justification. I should, indeed, readily reject the expression *necessary*, if it were understood in the same sense as those understand it who cast up the question, Whether a Christian ought to do good works. I should answer, that it is not necessary. Regarding the proper mode of explaining this matter of contrition I say,—not wanting to teach you, but answering your question,—that (by using this expression) I would be explaining a term of clear signification by one of obscure meaning, and since Christ commanded repentance and faith to be preached for the remission of sins, those terms should be recognized in all schools and should answer all purposes. For thus Christ taught and regarded those terms as adapted for teaching when He began teaching and when He ceased. I shall follow Christ and His apostles in my phraseology as much as I can. I have said goodbye to other terms. This is what I wished to say in all brevity in reply to your letter rather than

in regard to our controversy. I have done so quite hurriedly because there happened to be a messenger ready to carry my reply. Besides, I see that it will be necessary that I come to see you. May Christ by His Spirit preserve mutual concord and unity of doctrine among you. Amen. Farewell to you and to your entire family, and remember the man from whom you have heard and learned the theology of Christ, namely, our teacher Luther, who is the doctor among the doctors of theology.”  
(l. c. 3, 161.)

*(To be continued.)*

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