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EVIDENCE OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE LORD.

(By request.)

The faith of Christendom is found ultimately to rest upon a single miracle. Christians themselves are taught to stake all on this miracle: "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, your faith also is vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that He raised up Christ: whom He raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised. And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished." 1 Cor. 15, 14—18. Thus Paul. This is not hyperbole.

Facts of sacred history show that the supreme importance of the resurrection of the Lord was recognized not only in verbal statement, but in the entire activity of the early Church. In the same chapter from which we have just quoted Paul sketches in a few lines the essentials of apostolic preaching. He states, v. 1: "I declare unto you the Gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received," etc.; and then proceeds in vv. 3. 4 to say: "I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day according to the Scriptures." Peter's Pentecostal oration, the first public effort of an evangelical preacher in the New Testament, states, and proves by means of Old Testament

IN BEHALF OF PAUL GERHARDT AND THE ELENCHUS.

Six weeks before his sixtieth birthday, at an age when the judgment of men is matured and their actions are taken deliberately, Paul Gerhardt, poet-confessor of the Lutheran Church, resigned his office of second *Diakonus* at St. Nicolai in Berlin (January 27, 1667). The reasons for this painful step appear to pass the comprehension of not a few of his less scrupulous epigones in the land over which the resolute house of Hohenzollern holds sway. Palmer confesses that he is "puzzled" at Gerhardt's action. He is at a loss to understand "why a poet of so rich and pure a mind, and a theologian whose religion and Christianity was not riveted to dogmatic formulas,—as has been the case with many before and after him,—not only failed to keep aloof from the wrangles of his day, but is even seen to have been the most uncompromising opponent of the Reformed theologians." He has scanned critically the features of Gerhardt in the portraits which Langbecker and Schulz have added to their biographies of Gerhardt, and he declares: There is not a trace of bigotry, of the *odium theologicum*, discernible in this benevolent countenance; it reminds one much more of Herrnhut than of Wittenberg portraits. He concludes, accordingly, that in Gerhardt's resignation "we have before us a psychological problem to which our modern theological consciousness furnishes no key, because we

have been taught to view the ethical content of Christianity in a relation of greater freedom not to faith but to fixed dogmatical formulas, and, in particular, not to regard the pulpit as the arena for theological controversy. What was demanded of Gerhardt appears to us as so self-manifest that we would not view those demands as a limitation placed upon academic liberty, all the more because the end of preaching and ecclesiastical decorum of themselves erect necessary barriers to the freedom of speech. Nor could Gerhardt desire for his own person that license which zealots demanded; the Electoral edicts must have seemed oppressive least of all to him." He grants, however, that it must have been the conscience in Gerhardt that caused him to tremble at the mere possibility of making even a slight advance to Reformed theology. And the warning to his son in Gerhardt's testament: "Beware of syncretists; for they seek temporal gain and keep faith neither with God nor man," Palmer views as evidence that the pious mind of Gerhardt, reared as it was in the Lutheran faith, felt the disturbances which Reformed and unionistic tendencies had created at Berlin as a profanation of sentiments which he regarded as sacred. He believes that the age of Gerhardt was still at a far remove from the unqualified postulate of modern enlightenment, viz., that opponents in a controversy must endeavor to comprehend each other's views, each trying to place himself in the other's position,—an art which Palmer thinks does not by any means lead to indifferentism or to the surrender of the basic principles of a person's faith, but rather to clemency and justice in framing one's judgment of another's views. (Herzog, R. E. 5, 47 f.) Twisten criticises Gerhardt's action from the view-point of the unionist. He argues that a certain minimum of union must be allowed in every case where two or more churches meet within the same territory. Such ethical relations as connect a person with the commonwealth and the family, being common to members of all churches, must remain points of contact and occasions for fellowship between them, and each church must reduce the demands which it makes upon its mem-

bers for exclusiveness to such a degree as to render such fellowship possible. An absolute separation between members of dissenting churches would not only prohibit intermarriage between them and thus destroy the wholesome influence of kinship and domestic relations, but it would even render the peaceful coexistence of such church-members within the same community, their neighborly intercourse, their cooperation in secular pursuits, their joint action as a body politic impossible. Accordingly, Twisten holds that the law of parity pursuant to the convention of the Peace of Westphalia has made it incumbent upon states to constantly guard against excesses of one denomination against the other and to confine each within the limits of its covenanted concessions. Nor should such guardianship of the state be resented by the churches as coercion, because 1) that which the state aims at is a duty which the Church owes to mankind regardless of any state action, viz., to cultivate Christian kindness, peaceableness, concord, and to exercise a Christian influence within the commonwealth; 2) because the state holds this relation of guardian towards all churches alike. A condition of mutual forbearance and toleration will thus ensue, and all churches will, under the practical working of this law, aid in exhibiting Christianity as a factor in the forming and conserving of the civic order and of society in general. He concludes: "While in the seventeenth century even so mild-mannered a gentleman as the poet Paul Gerhardt resigned his office rather than consent to the supposition that he would refrain from condemning and scoffing at the confession of his prince, even when not expressly obligated to that effect, there will be hardly any one found in Prussia nowadays for whom the Electoral edicts of 1661 and 1662 would require to be renewed." (Herzog, R. E. 16, 676 f.) Krummacher charges Gerhardt and his associates with evading the point at issue in the controversy with the Reformed theologians, because the former refused to regard the latter as brethren by stating: "A Christian is a person who holds the true saving faith pure and unadulterated, and also exhibits the fruits thereof in his

life and conversation; hence, I cannot regard the Calvinists *qua tales* as Christians." (Pieper, *Zeug. d. Wahrh.* 4, 446.) Henke plainly shows disdain of the Lutherans in the controversy with the Great Elector because "they scrupled about abandoning their attacks upon, and their condemnation of, those doctrines which had been rejected in the confessional writings of the Lutheran Church, and seemed to fear that they were violating their oath of allegiance to those writings." (Herzog, R. E. 15, 360.) Victor Strauss censures both parties to the controversy for their failure to take a philosophical view of the difficulties existing between them. "Granted," he says, "that the Elector was actuated by the best motives, still his whole effort was a mistake. The unity of the spirit can be attained only by an historical process by which contrasts are resolved into that higher truth in which they are one. This truth, however, cannot be discovered by a royal mandate; the Spirit of God, who will have no one to prescribe time or place to Him, must reveal it. It has been said that the government must be above the parties. That is fair whenever the point at issue is the rights and duties of the parties within the state. But this demand cannot be fulfilled in the domain of truth and the perception of truth, especially religious truth. As regards this domain, the government as such must take its position altogether outside of the party lines; any interference on its part is either superfluous, or fruitless, or unjust. The history of the spirit cannot be made [to order]. However, this is rarely understood. Any one who is serious in his convictions naturally believes himself to be right, and regards the opposition with which he meets as springing from sources of insincerity, stubbornness, passion. So the Elector regarded the conduct of the Lutheran preachers, and so the Lutherans and the Reformed regarded each other's conduct." (*Sonntagsbibl.* 1, 70.)

Some things in the views expressed sound strange to an American. Twisten's argument, *e. g.*, seems beside the mark to one who has grown up and lived in a commonwealth where church and state are separated, and the state regards the mem-

bers of the church merely as citizens on a parity with other citizens, where governmental action looking toward the regulation of the internal affairs of the Church, or the relation of one denomination to another, is not so much as thought of, and where the denominations recognize that their members have duties to perform to the commonwealth and to one another as neighbors and fellow citizens. We understand from Twesten that matters are different in countries, like Prussia, where the state is a determining factor in the arranging of the affairs of the Church. But Twesten commits an historical inaccuracy when he refers to Gerhard's resignation in the connection he does. For the inference can be none other than that Gerhard's position and that of the Lutheran clergy affected the civic and social relations of church-members. This is not true. Gerhard, in particular, was very popular in Berlin, as a kind-hearted pastor, of cordial address. Neither against him, nor against the other Lutheran pastors was there a charge of unneighborliness or insubordination to the magistrates raised. On the contrary, the city council of Berlin and the Estates of Brandenburg, yea, and the various guilds of Berlin, irrespective of creed, united in invoking the Electoral clemency in his behalf when his resignation had become known. Gerhard's letters to the Elector (see Becker, *Paul Gerh.*, p. 52) breathe loyalty and reverence for the prince. So do the statements which Gerhard's superior, Lilius, had to make to the Elector. And all the counsels which the Lutheran clergy in Berlin, Stendal, etc. received in those days from Jena, Leipzig, Wittenberg, Nuremberg, Stralsund, Hamburg, Greifswald, Rostock (see Loescher, *Alt. u. Neu.*) do not contain a single hint, that the civil relations of the Lutherans to their sovereign and to their fellow citizens had become an issue. At the conclusion of the Berlin Colloquy the Lutheran theologians declared, 1) that they would abide by the doctrines of their Church; 2) that they would show to the Reformed all neighborly and Christian love, and would wish from their heart that they (the Reformed) would all be saved. (Becker, p. 31.) The Electoral edicts, it is true,

mentation heated debates in towns and villages between adherents of dissentient creeds, and manifest concern for the maintenance of the public peace. But these disturbances cannot have been either so numerous or so violent, as to call for the drastic measure of "muzzling the pulpit." Besides, a prince who desired Heidegger's *Diatribē* circulated (Herzog, 5, 656) can hardly be taken seriously when he declares his sensitiveness with regard to such a designation as Calvinist.

Palmer, too, misstates the scope of the Electoral edict. The edict seems to treat both the Lutheran and the Reformed Church alike, but there is an unmistakable effort made to bring the Lutherans over to the *Confessio Marchica*. The Elector cites the example of his predecessors, especially John Sigismund, who first introduced the Reformed Church in the Mark, and declares that he purposes to continue their work. The edict of 1614 was therefore reiterated in 1662. Moreover, the Elector minimizes the doctrinal differences between Lutheranism and Calvinism. "Unsere in etliche puncten dissentirenden Evangelischen Unterthanen," he styles his subjects. He pleads for "mutua tolerantia und vertraeglichkeit;" he desires to make "einen guten Anfang zum Evangelischen Kirchen-Frieden." Lastly, he takes a very decided stand in favor of those theologians in the Lutheran and in the Reformed Church "who have published irenic writings, and have proved that the *dissensus* among the Evangelical parties is not fundamental, and that a *tolerantia Ecclesiastica* might well be established." Accordingly, he will not permit these theologians to be called hypocrites, Calixtinians, and Syncretists. (See Loescher, *Alt. u. Neu.* 1736, p. 51—58.) What the Elector wanted was what the Hohenzollern dynasty has always wanted, and what it has succeeded in establishing in Prussia in 1820, — a state-church with more or less distinct Reformed coloring. Palmer also emphasizes that the Elector declared that he was not opposed to the proper use of the *elenchus*, nor did he wish to curtail the religious liberty of his subjects. True, this statement was made about the time when Gerhardt took his departure from

Berlin, at a time of great popular unrest. It was a diplomatic assurance,—oil upon the troubled waters. Contemporaneous events, however, seemed to justify the fears of the people. Rektor Rango makes complaint that a Lutheran preacher was haled before the magistrates because he had used the expression “the blood of God” (Acts 20, 28) in one of his sermons. The preacher had not referred to the Reformed doctrine at all, but this expression was regarded as in itself an attack upon Calvinism. Pastor Helwig reports to Dr. Titius at Helmstaedt that the sale of Lutheran literature is connected with some danger in Berlin, and that the booksellers are afraid to display Lutheran brochures, but Reformed writings are exhibited and sold without danger. With these *facts* before them, what value could to the Lutheran pastor attach to the Elector’s *words*? Besides, the very terms of the Elector’s assurance were indefinite, vague: he declared that he was not opposed to the “noetige tractirung der Controversien und des Elenchi.” Under the very terms of this assurance the Elector was free at all time to proceed against any preacher whose “tractirung” he regarded as not “noetig.”

These facts must be borne in mind, in order to enable us to understand Gerhardt’s action. The Lutherans in the Mark would simply have been blind if they had not interpreted the Electoral tendency as hostile to their church. They were not to renounce their faith, they were not to be coerced into adopting the Elector’s creed; they were to be tolerated, as long as they kept very quiet, and signed a formal statement to that effect. On the other hand, any one who inclined to adopt the Reformed faith was distinctly favored, and his example was commendably mentioned in high places. When the Elector informed the Berlin city council that he would not require Gerhardt to sign the statement, it seemed that Gerhardt had gained his point, and was free to continue his work as a Lutheran theologian without any restrictions. However, the messenger of the Elector who informed Gerhardt of the Elector’s action concluded his message by adding, that the Elector was

satisfied that Gerhardt would carry out the injunctions contained in the Edict, although he had not signed a statement to that effect. Gerhardt was not even asked to return a verbal reply to this statement. His silence would have been construed as consent. This proposal must have been revolting to a conscientious mind. There was but one course open to him, and that he took. He resigned, and any one else with a conscience must do the same under like circumstances.

But was it necessary, indeed, that Lutherans should oppose the doctrine of the Reformed church? Have they not overestimated the necessity of the elenchus? What does Scripture say with regard to the elenchus?

Paul enumerates, in 2 Tim. 3, 16, four uses of Scripture. They may be viewed as two pairs, arranged in the order of chiasmus, thus: doctrine and reproof, the first pair, represent the instructive qualities of Scripture, the former from the positive, the latter from the negative side. Scripture furnishes the Christian teacher both the thesis and the antithesis. Correction and instruction in righteousness, the second pair, represent the educative qualities of Scripture, the former from the negative, the latter from the positive side. Scripture furnishes the Christian teacher the antidote for ungodliness and the stimulant for godliness. Doctrine and life, faith and practice, the premises and the conclusions of Christianity, are drawn from Scripture, which have been made "able" (v. 15) and "profitable" (v. 16) for these very ends. As to the doctrine and faith, Scripture states both what is truth and what is error; as to life and practice, Scripture states both what is vice and what is virtue. Thus constituted Scripture is the adequate means for the accomplishment of the work of "the man of God" (v. 17), *i. e.*, the Christian teacher, the pastor, the theologian. (Comp. 1 Tim. 6, 11.) The latter is "thoroughly furnished" for his entire work only when he employs Scripture in this fourfold manner.

As regards the theologian in his capacity of teacher of the divine Word, it is plain that the apostle desires him to act both

as instructor (*πρὸς διδασκαλίαν*) and as censor (*πρὸς ἔλεγχον*). These are distinct functions. *Διδασκαλία* is not *ἔλεγχος*, and vice versa. It is true, indeed, that the mere statement of a truth *implies* and even *necessitates* the rejection of the contrary error. But the statement of the truth is not in itself and in due form that rejection. It is also true that opposition to an error presupposes the previous acceptance of the contrary truth. The mere lust of strife is never a justifiable propelling cause to a theological controversy: the Christian polemist must not so much have something to fight against as rather something to fight for. The separate mention, therefore, of doctrine and reproof as standing *usus Scripturae* amounts to the service of notice upon the theologian that he must, indeed, do the former, but not leave the latter undone; that his function as teacher of men embraces both *Lehren* and *Wehren*; he must wield the trowel and the sword, or to borrow the beautiful imagery of Luther, the theologian must be both shepherd and watchdog: he must pasture his flock and resist the raiding wolf. Dumb dogs that cannot bark are declared unfit for the office of watchmen in the Church of God. (Is. 56, 10.)

The only pertinent question in this connection can be as to the mode of the reproof, the proper occasions for it, and the extent to which it should be applied. **Ἐλεγχος* denotes a convincing argument, a proof. The Septuagint renders Job 23, 4: *τὸ στόμα μου ἐμπλήσει ἐλέγχων*, "I would fill my mouth with arguments." The impatient sufferer longs to take his cause before the judgment seat of Jehovah and argue his innocence to God. He would also refute and censure the charges and insinuations of his mistaken friends, Job 6, 26; 13, 6; 16, 21. **Ἐλεγχος*, then, is that which shows truth to be truth, and error, falsehood, evil to be such; it is that which hushes the gainsayer. The verb *ἐλέγχειν* is used, in classical Greek, to denote an investigation with hostile intent, and hence, the conviction of an opponent. (See Cremer, *Woerterb.*, and Stephanus, *The-saurus*, sub voce.) It has retained this meaning in the New

Testament: *ἐλέγγειν* denotes convincing a person of error or wrongdoing and reprehending him for it. Witness the following: James 2, 9: "If ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors," *ἐλεγγόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ὡς παραβάται*. In the instance here assumed the elenchus embraces the statement of a distinct fault, the charging of that fault to a distinct person, and the branding of that person with a name that is to carry just reproach. These features of the elenchus appear likewise in Matt. 18, 15 f: "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and *ἐλεξον αὐτόν*," etc. Our Authorized Version has rendered this phrase excellently: "Tell him his fault," thus making both the deed and the doer the objective of the elenchus. This elenchus is not a deduction which someone makes from another's statement, not the personal application of a general censure, not an inference, not a vague hint, but a direct charge. The whole context, moreover, shows that the elenchus is a very personal and earnest procedure. It begins with a private *tete-a-tete*; but the censor, conscious of the justice of his cause, arraigns the trespasser also before witnesses, giving his reasons and meeting the counter-reasons of his opponent, and finally carries his complaint before the spiritual supreme court for final adjudication. The aim of the elenchus is to gain the brother. This implies that the brother is in danger of being lost, *i. e.*, that he is in a damnable state, that he is on the point of sacrificing his salvation. Hence the result, when the elenchic effort miscarries: "Let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican," v. 17, *i. e.*, brand him and treat him henceforth as an infidel and a profligate. This extremely reproachful verdict is still a part of the elenchus, which began at the personal encounter. Such a verdict whenever uttered carries on its face the declaration that the parties rendering it regard the person against whom it is rendered as one who sins against better knowledge, who has stifled his own conscience, and has placed himself outside of the pale of the Christian brotherhood. In 1 Tim. 5, 20 we find mentioned as the objective of the elenchus "them

that sin," and in Eph. 5, 11. 13 "the unfruitful works of darkness," hence, particular men and particular actions. But the latter text indicates a more indirect form of the elenchus. In v. 11, indeed, the apostle demands a personal separation of consistent Christians from certain other persons, but in v. 13 he ascribes elenchic force to the common preaching of God's Word, when he says: "All things that are reprov'd are made manifest by the light." It is to the same point when the Lord, in John 3, 20, says: "Every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reprov'd," and when Paul writes in 1 Cor. 14, 24: "If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or one unlearned, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all" (*ἐλέγχεται ὑπὸ πάντων, ἀνακρίνεται ὑπὸ πάντων*). Error and vice love darkness, and those that are addicted to them shun an open and honest contest with truth and virtue. Meanwhile the preaching of God's Word goes on, and the light streams automatically, as it were, into the haunts of falsehood and wickedness, and men feel the force of the elenchus, though they were not personally arraigned by the preacher. The Word of God, quick and powerful, penetrates the hearts of men independently of any special aim of its proclaimers; it follows error into its hidden recesses, uncovers its subterfuges, and drives it out of a sheltering ambiguity, and men know that they have been discovered in their lies and shame, though the human instrument in this successful chase may not be conscious of his success.

The Scripture texts cited embrace every essential part of the elenchus. One feature, however, deserves special attention. It was shown that 2 Tim. 3, 15 ff. is primarily addressed to a theologian. God has made it the special duty of the called teachers of the Church to wield the elenchus. It is one of their official functions. In the same epistle (2, 14) Paul urges Timothy to "put his hearers in remembrance, charging them before the Lord that they strive not about words to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers." Paul knew the dangers of a wordy warfare, the strife of tongues in theology. He was

no friend of the eristic, the disputatious controversialist, the theological dare-devil to whom controversy is an end in itself. Unprofitable and subversive of faith he calls such practice, but he points the earnest theologian to the profitable elenchus (3, 16) which is a part of Scripture. This elenchus, too, is inspired truth, and Scripture cannot be fully taught without it. Whoever omits this elenchus which the Spirit has put into Scripture robs the Church of a blessing which God has designed for her. Yea, the Spirit of God, who speaks in and through the written Word, Himself is engaged in elenchic work, according to the Lord's promise. "When the Comforter is come," says Christ, "He will reprove (ἐλέγξει) the world." Christ is pointing to the day of Pentecost. When the Spirit was poured out upon the believers, the Church of the New Covenant was dedicated for its great work on earth. The Pentecostal Visitor from on high brought the elenchus. The first apostolical oration was directed against a coarse jest. God proved that He will not be mocked. When Peter had ended his sermon from Joel and the Psalms, there stood before him a smitten assembly of men. They were pricked in their hearts and inquired anxiously: "What shall we do?" Peter had not minced words; he had bluntly charged them with the murder of the innocent Jesus. He had wielded the elenchus with such great force and such good results that three thousand souls professed Christ. Thus the elenchus is connected with the very beginning of the Christian Church, and that it was constantly and deliberately employed throughout the apostolic era, the Acts and Epistles of the apostles witness.

The Word and the Spirit are the informer and guide of the theologian. It is impossible, in a world of error and vice, for a teacher of the Church to follow these heavenly guides and yet avoid using the elenchus. "A bishop," says Paul, "must hold fast the faithful Word, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers" (τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐλέγχειν), Tit. 1, 9. A bishop, then, who does not favor the elenchus is not a bishop after the heart of

God. He incapacitates himself, by his timidity or indifference, for a penetrative study of the Scriptures; his theology will be tinged with doubt and skepticism. For the Word which he is to preach is a faithful, *i. e.*, a sure and reliable Word. If he holds it fast, he is himself assured. In that case there can be no question as to his mode of procedure whenever his teaching is contradicted. His conscience, informed by the Word of God, will not suffer him to remain silent; for the Word bids him speak and "convince the gainsayer." More than this, the faithful Word makes him "able to convince" his opponent. The bishop, then, who on such an occasion prefers a dignified silence to a frank refutation of his opponent, places his carnal wisdom ahead of the wisdom of the Lord. Or if he agrees to forego the use of the elenchus because his opponent declares that that is to him the only objectionable feature, he is a credulous fool who does not see that the opponent objects to the means and mode of attack only because he does not like to be attacked at all.

Paul, moreover, is very explicit in impressing upon the bishop the duty of employing the elenchus. He characterizes the gainsayers with whom Titus is to deal as "unruly," persons who will not submit to any order, heady, "vain talkers and deceivers," "liars, evil beasts." He says that their "mouths must be stopped," v. 11, and they must be "rebuked sharply," *ἀποτόμως*, v. 13, *i. e.*, without any untimely leniency, promptly and effectually, so that all their subterfuges and pretenses may be cut off. Language like this shows that the elenchus is, indeed, no pleasant affair, neither to him who is using it nor to him against whom it is used.

To cite only one more passage, Paul writes to Timothy: "Preach the Word; be instant in season, out of season, reprove (*ἐλεγξον*), rebuke (*ἐπιτίμησον*), exhort with all longsuffering and doctrine. For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine; but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears," 2 Tim. 4, 2. 3. The two terms which the apostle in this place joins with the com-

mand to employ the elenchus have reference to the manner in which it is to be used. Solemn earnestness, on the one hand, and patient persistence, on the other, should characterize the use of the elenchus. The preacher should reiterate the threatenings of God's righteous anger, and thus shake the false confidence of the sinner, and by repeating and continuing his efforts and presenting the divine doctrine possibly from a new point of view each time, he should endeavor to show the sinner with increasing clearness his error, so that, in the end, the sinner stands convicted, even though he refuses to be convinced. The apostle also names a time when the elenchus is especially applicable and necessary: when sound doctrine is not endured, when teachers arise who adapt their teaching to the fancies of men, tickling either men's reason or their flesh, when error is being preached for truth, or immorality is given shelter within the Church. In such times the elenchus is to be sounded, clear and sharp like a bugle-call to action, that the enemy may be frightened and the secure aroused.

The prophets, Christ and His forerunner, the holy apostles, and all successful teachers of the Church have used the elenchus. It can be shown that periods of keen theological warfare have been seasons of decided inward and outward growth to the Church, while long seasons of peace and ease have been marked by spiritual torpor and decay. When properly employed, the Church has always use for the elenchus. The confessors at Augsburg very decidedly stated what they held in regard to particular doctrines, and did not hesitate to add that their adherents "*damnant secus docentes.*"

Gerhardt had been reared in the faith of the above Scripture and of the confessions which followed the lead of Scripture also with regard to the elenchus. He was not a reckless disputant. The testimony of his contemporaries pictures him as a modest, peace-loving person. Such a person the Christian polemist should ever be. Nor is there anything coarse, any buffoonery, any trickiness, any dragging in of irrelevant matter, any witticisms that are intended to hurt the feelings, — in

short, anything of the nature of carnal weapons discernible in his polemics. He states his dissent calmly and in objective form, but is very decided and unyielding against any unscriptural position that he has begun to combat. He appeals to his opponent's conscience, and he does not shrink from holding up to the opponent the ultimate consequence of his error, — damnation.

The generation of Lutheran theologians of whom Gerhardt was a representative has long passed away, and with them has passed away, as a distinct discipline of theology, that of polemics. Pelt records the change that has come thus: "Meanwhile an irenic spirit had taken the place of the former lust of strife, and this spirit endeavored, especially since the publication of Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*, to do justice to an opponent. This accounts for the movement which arose to exhibit scientifically the peculiar mode of reasoning of the various churches as seen in their confessions. These efforts have developed, since Bernh. v. Sanden, Walch, Fr. Boerner, and others, into the science of symbolical theology, which latter began to drain polemics of its heart blood, until the younger discipline, known as History of Dogma, arose, and completely finished polemics, causing it to disappear almost entirely." (Herzog, R. E. 11, 793.) This is true, in the main. There have still been polemicists in the Church, and even textbooks on polemics have been written as late as our present age. But polemical theology of the type of the Reformation era is distinctly under popular disfavor. A new sort of polemics has arisen, and strange to say, is indulged in just by such theologians as pose as representatives of a liberal Richtung. As between the two brands, we very much prefer the old kind, with its rugged plainness, its straightforward attack, and scrupulous application of Scripture. And just from a theologian like Gerhardt our age may learn how to avoid the two extremes in polemical theology, viz., to sin neither *in excessu* nor *in defectu*.
