

THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY.

10'1.377

VOL. XVII.

JANUARY, 1913.

No. 1.

“MECHANICAL INSPIRATION” THE STUMBLING-BLOCK OF MODERN THEOLOGY.

Again and again voices are raised in our day in protest against the old teaching of the Protestant churches in the age of the Reformation, that the human authors of the various books of the Bible composed their writings under a divine influence which made them “the penmen of the Holy Ghost,” and their products “a divine dictation.” Men profess themselves shocked at the statement that “God directed the hand of the sacred writers;” they are scandalized by hearing the prophets and apostles compared to strings of a harp or reeds of an organ from which the Spirit drew various notes at His will. Statements like these, which the older dogmaticians, both in the Lutheran and the Reformed churches, have made *secundum quid*, and for the sake of illustrating a mysterious fact, are taken up with avidity in our day, and pilloried as extreme literalism, bibliolatry, superstition, or as necessitarian fatalism and rationalism. • It is claimed that no person can read his Bible with profit to himself, nor convey its teachings intelligently to others, while holding the “mechanical inspiration”-theory.

1.

In order to understand, in a measure, the reason for this antagonism to the verbal, or plenary, inspiration of the Scriptures,—for it is really this that is being attacked,—it is necessary to observe the manner in which the antagonists char-

acterize what they term "mechanical inspiration." They assume that the dogmaticians who hold this view have "affirmed that the sacred writers were impassive instruments in the hands of God," that they spoke "with the mantic frenzy of sibyls and soothsayers," that their "normal powers were suspended or neutralized in the process of their writing," that they were "impassive machines, controlled by another Person." They imply a belief on the side of those whom they oppose that Isaiah, for instance, when he wrote his oracles, was not "in the full exercise of all his personal faculties, and within the limits of his own human thought," or that, when Jeremiah dictated to Baruch, "his normal intellectual activity was temporarily arrested or neutralized by divine power."¹ Again, we hear the inspirational action of God as viewed by the old dogmaticians spoken of as "a divine *fiat*," "a sudden miracle of transformation" by which "an ordinary man was transformed into an angel or some perfect creature quite unlike what he was," a "coercing of the will and changing the man into a superhuman — a virtual abandonment of genuine human agency," "such a miracle as to unman man, to deprive him of his human nature and make him a superhuman automaton."² Cremer-Beckwith place Calov's statement that nothing can be in the Scriptures "which was not to the writers divinely suggested and inspired" alongside of the assertion of the Buxtorfs that the Hebrew vowels, and of Voetius, that the punctuation in the Bible was inspired, and say: "If the idea of ecstasy had been included, it might have seemed a revival of the mantic theory of Philo and the old apologists; but the lack of this conception made the process purely mechanical, not only without analogy, but in direct contradiction to the other operations of the Holy Spirit. The self-preparation of the writers, required on the ecstatic theory, was no longer necessary; nor was there any place for the personal witness which the apostles

1) Prof. Milton S. Terry, D. D., in *Biblical Dogmatics*, pp. 8—20 *passim*.

2) John Monro Gibson, M. A., LL. D., in *The Inspiration and Authority of the Holy Scripture*, pp. 150—156 *passim*.

claim to give. The logical consequences of the doctrine were not, indeed, drawn by its supporters, but they are none the less inevitable.”³⁾ This statement seeks to be more just to the old dogmaticians by the admission that certain views were *not* held, and certain conclusions *not* drawn, by them; nevertheless, it fastens the “mechanical” inspiration on them, and in the excursus of Beckwith which follows, pp. 16—18, the thought is emphasized that inspiration, when it is properly taught, must be so taught as to make an ethical action of the inspired writers while writing their accounts possible. Dr. Charles F. Aked, in a popular magazine,⁴⁾ a few years ago, heaped ridicule and scorn upon the notion “that the Bible came down from heaven, cleanly printed, nicely bound in morocco, and gilt-edged, with a book-marker against that text which has been erroneously made to declare that every Scripture is inspired of God,” and that even in the English version every sentence, word, and punctuation mark is “guaranteed by the Holy Ghost.”

2.

These statements are in line with what Van Oosterzee used to call “the dark side of the old theory. . . . The Sacred Writers were conceived of as having become wholly different beings as soon as a Divine ‘Write’ sounded in their ears.”⁵⁾ Dr. Foster, too, used to characterize “the mechanical theory” of inspiration as that “which holds that the sacred writers were as mere machines, or amanuenses; mere passive recipients and recorders of what was dictated by the Holy Spirit.”⁶⁾ Summers’ description of the mechanical theory was: it “virtually ignores the human element in inspiration, as the rationalistic virtually ignores the divine. It teaches that the Holy Spirit acted on men in a passive state. Those who were

3) *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia*, 6, 15.

4) *Appletons’ Magazine*, for September, 1908.

5) *Christian Dogmatics*. Transl. by Watson and Evans, I, 201.

6) *Systematic Theology*, by Robert Verrell Foster, D. D. (Cumberland Presbyterian Theol. Seminary at Lebanon, Tenn.), p. 123.

under the power of the inspiring Spirit were acted upon as mere machines, mechanically answering the force which moved them." By means of a quotation from Knapp he has fastened this theory on Musaeus, Baier, Quenstedt.⁷⁾ Dr. Strong has denominated the mechanical inspiration "the dictation theory." He describes it thus: "This theory holds that inspiration consisted in such a possession of the minds and bodies of the Scripture writers by the Holy Spirit that they became passive instruments or amanuenses—pens, not penmen, of God." As representatives of this theory he names Quenstedt, Hooker, Gaussen, Cunningham, and concludes with the facetious remark: "This reminds us of the old theory that God created fossils in the rocks, as they would be had ancient seas existed."⁸⁾

3.

In keeping with this characterization of the doctrine of inspiration as held by the old dogmaticians are statements by these same critics as to the source from which the "mechanical inspiration"-theory has sprung, and as to the deplorable effects which it needs must have produced. As to the source, Dr. Terry claims that the inerrancy of Scripture, which is a correlate of the plenary, or verbal, inspiration of Scripture, is a dogma of necessitarian philosophy. "Its habitual bent is either to conceal or to pervert the undeniable human element conspicuous in the sacred writings. . . . Once accept the theory of supernaturally secured human volitions, and our thoughts, words, and deeds become as mechanical and necessary as the movements of the planets and the tides. We reject this hypothesis, and regard its conclusions as a mischievous leaven in the realm of Christian thought. The synergistic theology—(Dr. Terry has characterized the "mechanical inspiration" as

7) *Systematic Theology*: a complete body of Wesleyan Arminian divinity, by Rev. Thos. O. Summers, D. D. (Vanderbilt Univ.) Edited by Rev. J. J. Tigert. I, 462.

8) *Systematic Theology*, by Augustus Hopkins Strong, D. D. LL. D. (Rochester Theological Seminary.) I, 208 f.

monergistic) — is the opposite of this, and the only tenable alternative.”⁹⁾

Gibson has traced the “mechanical inspiration” to rationalism. Offering his advice as to the best method of ascertaining the character of the Bible, he says: “Shall we first settle in our own minds the precise nature and extent of inspiration according to our ideas of what God ought to do, or is likely to do; then diligently seek out all that can be found in the Scriptures themselves which seems to confirm our view, and when anything is observed that seems to conflict with it, either leave it out of account or ingeniously explain it away? This is the method which has till quite recently been most popular with the defenders of the authoritative inspiration of the Scriptures. They have postulated as a necessity of the case the emancipation of all the writers of Scripture from the effects of human weakness and limitation. They have said that if we cannot have the guarantee that every word these holy men of old have written expresses accurately and only the mind of God, the whole thing is useless, because if these people who are the vehicles of revelation cannot be trusted in everything, they can be trusted in nothing. This is what may be called the rationalistic method of proceeding, for it starts with a theory framed in accordance with what the theorist regards as reasonable, and deals with all the facts in the case in the light of that theory.”¹⁰⁾

4.

The matter being of sufficient moment in itself, and besides, the prestige of the old dogmaticians, — though one need not swear to every word or term of theirs, — being in a manner connected with orthodox teaching, it is worth while to investigate the theory of “mechanical inspiration” with which they are being charged. Since Quenstedt is most frequently brought forward as an exponent of this theory, an examination of what he actually has held regarding the nature and contents of the

9) p. 23 f.

10) p. 32 f.

inspirational act may serve as a fair illustration of what all dogmaticians of renown in his age believed regarding inspiration. In his *Theologia Didactico-Polemica*¹¹⁾ the fourth chapter of the First Part, "De Sacra Scriptura," takes in one hundred and eighty-seven closely printed folio pages (p. 53—240). Gerhard, in his *Loci Theologici*,¹²⁾ devotes ninety-one pages (Tom. I, 1—91), and if one adds the respective portion of his *Exegesis*, four hundred and fourteen additional pages quarto, including the notes of Cotta, (Tom. II, 13—427), to the subject of the Scriptures. These facts deserve mention, because a popular idea which is usually found to be connected with the aversion to the "mechanical inspiration" is, that the dogmaticians holding this theory had a comparatively easy task before them when explaining the origin of the Scriptures. All they had to say was: God wrote it all by human instruments, — every word and letter of it. A modern writer on the subject is thought to have a far more laborious task, and, what is more, to take his task more seriously. This idea is incompatible with the facts in the case. Whatever else may be said in criticism of the method of work pursued by the old dogmaticians, it is certain that superficiality and mental nonchalance cannot be charged against them. They could, on the contrary, be charged with overscrupulous, microscopic minuteness, and tediousness in their endless comparisons and distinctions. *E. g.*, when Quenstedt remarks that the *mandatum scribendi explicitum speciale* occurs twelve times in Revelation alone, the impression which the reader receives from a passing remark like this is that the man who makes it, and submits the evidence at once, must have turned the pages of the Book many times, and must have sat poring a long time over its each and every statement. Or when the same author suggests that there must be a sufficient reason why the *ἄνθρωποι* in 2 Pet. 1, 21, in addition to being called *ἄγιοι*, and *ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι* are designated as *ἄνθρωποι θεοῦ*, — that

11) Wittenberg Edition of 1685.

12) Ed. Cotta. Tuebingen, 1762.

is, that this qualifying genitive, besides the qualifying adjective and the qualifying participial phrase, must be intended to teach us something concerning the character of these men while speaking God's Word that we are not taught by the adjective nor by the participial phrase, we are compelled to say that here is an earnest effort to exhaust the meaning of Scripture. Or when we follow this author in his research as to the force of *λαλεῖν* and *γράφειν*, *λαλία* and *γραφή*, and look over the list of texts which he has accumulated, and compared, for his thesis, that speaking God's Word and writing God's Word are equivalent, we are forced to admit that his thesis has cost him an immense amount of work before he could write it down in his dry, matter-of-fact way. However, this merely by the way; we shall probably have occasion again to exhibit the conscientious workmanship of the "mechanical inspirationists" in detail.

5.

Quenstedt belongs, indeed, to that class of theologians who call the writers of the sacred books "*Dei amanuenses, Christi manus, et Spiritus S. tabelliones, sive notarii et actuarii,*" that is, "penmen of God, hands of Christ, recorders, or secretaries, or clerks of the Holy Spirit." (p. 55.) He views them as under "*immediato Spiritus Sancti impulsu ac afflatu,*" that is, under "an immediate, or direct, impulse and afflatus from the Holy Spirit." (p. 53.) When they wrote, it was "*a Deo ad scribendum movente et impellente,*" "from God, who moved and urged them on to write." (p. 65.) And so as to leave no doubt that he views this action of God as altogether unique, *sui generis*, without a parallel in the domain of human experiences, he proceeds to distinguish the divine concursus by which God cooperates with the actions of His creatures, under three heads. There is, first, the *conkursus generalis et communis*; this is an every-day occurrence, yea, an occurrence of every hour, minute, and second, for God concurs with every action of every agent throughout the universe, at least, so far as the *materiale* of that action is concerned. This, however,

is not that impulse, or influence, which He puts forth when inspiring holy men to write His Book. There is, secondly, the *concursum specialis seu gratiosus*. This is the gracious and particular presence which God vouchsafes all His faithful people whenever they are engaged in meditating or writing upon sacred matters. Thus, Luther composed many a stirring treatise, and Paul Gerhardt many a noble hymn. This, again, is not the impulse with which we must credit God when we say: He inspired the Book. For that impulse is adequately described only by the third kind of divine concurrence, the *concursum specialissimum et extraordinarium*. This impulse came "only to the sacred writers," and embraced a) an internal illumination, b) a peculiar "*motus, instinctus, afflatus et impulsus Spiritus S.*" (p. 65.).

Statements like the foregoing, though in slightly varying terms, could be produced in great number from Quenstedt's treatise. But there is not a single place to which his modern critics can point that would prove that Quenstedt regarded the inspired penmen of God as "impassive instruments," "machines," dehumanized, or "superhuman humans." This is a turn which Quenstedt's critics have given to Quenstedt's thought. This thought Quenstedt himself declines.

6.

We can show, first, by inferences that this thought is foreign to his view of the inspirational act and to his manner of describing that act. It was noted that he embraces under this act, as an essential part, "*internam illuminationem*." He also speaks of the holy writers as "*per divinam inspirationem edocti*," "fully informed by divine inspiration." (p. 54.) The action of the sacred writers while under the inspirational impulse is, to Quenstedt, an intelligent action into which the writers entered personally with their own mind, and in which they exercised the powers of their mind. Accordingly, Quenstedt beholds in the inspired writers both a *PERCEPTIO* and a *RELATIO rerum revelatarum*. (p. 55.) They understood first,

they wrote next, what was revealed to them. If this is machine-work, activity of an impassive automaton, we shall have to revise our dictionaries.

Again, Quenstedt distinguishes "*inter causam impulsivam principalem,*" *ac inter causas scriptiois secundarias et accidentales.*" The principal impelling cause for writing Scripture is "*Dei voluntas et mandatum,*" the will and order of God. But there are also secondary causes, accidental reasons, why holy men of God wrote. Various occasions suggested to the apostles that they ought to write. "*Variae occasiones apostolis suppeditae.*" These occasions came to the apostles from without; the state of this or that congregation, the need of the Church in general, the spiritual interest of a particular person, like Theophilus or Philemon, may have seemed to the respective writer to call for a statement or treatise from him. And the writer may have revolved in his mind for some time the matter on which he intended to write. Such occasions the Holy Spirit employed for higher purposes than the apostles perceived. He was present with them when the task of composition began, suggesting the exact matter and the exact words, and thus guiding a previously conceived purpose of the writer to answer the greater ends of God. "*Occasiones apostolis exterius oblatae non tollunt internum scribendi mandatum, sed illud potius stabiliunt, cum de suavi divinae Providentiae dispositione tententur,*" says Quenstedt. That is, "The occasions for writing which were suggested to the apostles from without, do not overthrow the inward command to write, but rather establish the same, because they witness to us the kindly disposition of divine Providence." This last remark is especially noteworthy. Quenstedt does not feel dismayed in the least, as he would be, if this statement had been wrested from him as an unwilling concession. He rather is pleased with it, because it "establishes" his general proposition. The *mandatum scribendi* is in his view a *suavis dispositio*, not a stern *fiat*, hurling itself with irresistible force upon the human intellect and will, and by sheer elementary power coercing its victim into obedience.

Frequently in his treatise Quenstedt uses the term "*influit*" to describe the manner of the divine approach to the human mind of the writer. As the writer sits down to write, there comes flowing into his mind a stream of thoughts and words. Softly, silently, the current flows. Exalted matters, deep mysteries, bold utterances, sweetly solacing words are written down in a most natural, yet altogether supernatural, manner. If this is necessitarian philosophy, we shall have to reconstruct our views of Calvinism and irresistible grace.

7.

However, it is not by inference alone that we can clear Quenstedt of the charge that he makes the inspired writers impassive instruments, but we have also direct statements in which he purposely declines the idea of machine inspiration. There is a remark in Quenstedt cognate to what has just been stated, which fairly caps the climax. He says: "*Distinguendum inter abreptitios, qui mente alienati et inscii aliquid agunt, et ignorant, quid dicant, aut scribant, et inter apostolos, quos Spiritus S. ita movebat, ut intelligerent, quae loquebantur, aut scribebant.*" "We must distinguish between men in a trance, who are out of their mind, unconscious of their actions, and ignorant of what they are saying, and the holy apostles, whom the Holy Spirit so moved that they understood what they spoke or wrote." (p. 65.) The very idea of mental frenzy, hallucination, mantic state which has been charged against the "mechanical inspiration," is here repelled. The reader of Quenstedt has a sensation when reading this statement as if the sober dogmatician at this point had become impatient of the criticism directed against his position, and as if he had turned with disgust from it; for he heaps his terms rather unnecessarily in describing this false view. We can now understand the wary remarks of Cremer-Beckwith, who are evidently somewhat uneasy when hearing Quenstedt's teaching charged with a mantian tendency. Their American repeaters have not been as careful, or rather more naive, in their indictment of

the old dogmaticians. (Query: Are not some plerophoric utterances of certain American theologians rather machinelike reproductions of statements made on the other side of the Atlantic?) To load a discriminating, painstaking student of Scripture like Quenstedt even with the insinuation that he leans toward a mantic conception of the inspirational act, is not far short of criminal recklessness.

8.

Quenstedt speaks of an illumination of the sacred writers. He calls it an *ἐλλαμψις, sive supernaturalis quaedam et extraordinaria mentis illuminatio*, and then describes this supernatural and extraordinary illumination of the mind further by adding: "*quae instar coruscationis et irradiationis alicujus fiebat, et quidem non ad modum habitus permanentis, sed actus transeuntis.*" The truth to be uttered was momentarily flashed upon the mind of the holy writers. They saw it before them in noonday brightness. It may have been a fact absolutely unknown to them before, or it may have been a new bearing, or a new relation which a known fact had to some other fact. Or it may have been nothing more than the clear perception that God desired them to make a definite record of something which they themselves as well as others knew. The illumination terminated as soon as the divine will in the particular instance had been perceived and executed. To speak reasonably in reference to a miraculous occurrence, this is exactly what we should expect to have happened. Miracles are not amenable to reason as regards their occurrence, but reason admits that a miracle, to be a miracle, must possess miraculous qualities. When Isaiah saw the throne of glory and heard the Tersanctus, when the Man of Sorrows, stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted, entered into his prophetic vision, and he beheld Him being led out as a lamb to the slaughter, being placed in the tomb, and afterwards gathering about Him many who were made righteous because he had borne their sin, we are compelled to say that, if the prophet at all saw,

understood, and was able to speak of these things, it must have been by just such an *ἐλλαμψις* as Quenstedt has assumed. Consistent thinking would require that, if this illumination be denied, the product which sprang from it, and which is before us in plain writing, or, in other words, the miracle of prophecy must also be denied. And the grievance of the critics of "mechanical inspiration" will then be seen not to have been caused by the *manner* of the inspired utterance, but by *the actual fact* that there is such an utterance. But if that is the real cause of the offense, what can be done to remove it? Can we rule a fact out of existence? If Isaiah did not come into possession of his wonderful knowledge by such an act as Quenstedt has described, how did he obtain it? Is there any "less offensive" way imaginable?

Or when Paul speaks of the "working of the mystery of iniquity," and follows it to its blasphemous consummation in the "man of sin," or when he declares that the survivors at the second coming of Christ shall be "changed as in the twinkling of an eye," that "the trumpet shall sound" for the rising of the dead, and the believers shall be "caught up into the air" to be with the Lord, is there any more reasonable explanation for such knowledge and such language than by saying, God conveyed both to Paul? If Paul, on being asked, How do you know, and how dare you speak these things? had said anything less than: God speaks through me, we should be inclined to doubt the man's sincerity and truthfulness.

Peter says that "of the salvation of our souls the prophets have enquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you, searching what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow," 1 Pet. 1, 9—11. It has ever seemed to us that the objectors to the so-called mechanical inspiration must get a clearance from this text before they can proceed on their voyage. What is easier than to conceive, on the basis of this text, a situation somewhat like this: The Spirit enters

the prophet. The prophet speaks. The prophet is amazed at what he has spoken. "Mechanical inspiration." *Quod erat demonstrandum*. If Quenstedt must be found guilty of the charge brought against him, let us, in all honesty and consistency, proceed at once to indict Peter, and charge him with having grossly and vulgarly misunderstood what happened to him and other holy men when they were "moved by the Holy Ghost."

When the Delphic Pythia ceased speaking, when the spell under which the diviner muttered his incoherent oracles was broken, they were not conscious of what they had done. Quite frequently there is no memory in such persons of what has transpired. In all cases of this kind which may be assumed to be genuine, there has been a suspension of self-consciousness. The person really was "beside himself" in saying what he said, or doing what he did. Somebody else's personality had been substituted for his own. It was not merely his *alter ego* speaking in the moment of frenzy, but an altogether foreign being. Not thus did Isaiah speak of the Virgin's Son, Emmanuel, the Babe that is given to Israel, nor Joel of the outpouring of the Spirit and deliverance in Jerusalem, nor Micah of the Ruler that should come forth from Bethlehem-Ephrath, nor Zechariah of the thirty pieces of silver that were cast unto the potter, or of the sword that is flashed against the Man that is the fellow of the Lord of hosts. The messages which these men bore to their people had roused their intensest interest. They knew, and were conscious of, the wonderful character of their utterance; but they had no misgivings as to their genuineness. The Spirit had employed them as bearers of marvelous news, but they were wideawake and sympathetic messengers. They began to study the very prophecies which they had uttered. *Ἐξεζήτησαν καὶ ἐξηρέβησαν προφηταί*, says Peter. They thoroughly investigated and explored what they had uttered. They knew that they had spoken of the Messiah, and particularly, of His suffering and glory. But in the details which they had predicted of the passion of the Christ,

there were matters that they did not exactly understand. They could not see what special event the Spirit pointed to, εἰς τίνα ἐδόξλου, or when the event would take place. David had no such view of the Christ hanging on the tree with parched lips and distended limbs, the soldiers beneath Him casting lots for His garments, as we have who have read the Gospels. He heard the cry of distress from the cross, but he could not picture to himself that scene of awful grandeur when the earth was wrapped in the gloom of an unnatural eclipse, as we can to whom Matthew and Luke have depicted Golgotha. Isaiah and Micah had no view of the Christ-child in the manger, Zechariah no view of the despairing traitor hurling the blood-money into the sanctuary and then passing out into the eternal night, or of the jubilant procession that met the Lord at Bethany and brought Him into the city as Zion's King. But they studied these matters just because they were aware that something remarkable had been stated by them. Human machines, impassive instruments, are not known to do, or to be able to do, such searching or inquiring.

9.

Quenstedt introduces another of his famous distinctions in answering the question, Whether all things contained in Scripture were written by divine inspiration. "*Res Scripturæ sunt in triplici differentia.*" The materials of the Bible fall into three parts. First, "*quædam fuerunt S. Scriptoribus naturaliter prorsus incognitæ.*" There are some things in Scripture which were wholly unknown to the holy writers. Quenstedt assumes three reasons for this ignorance of the divine writers: "*vel propter suam excellentiam, ut fidei mysteria, vel propter non-existentiam, ut futura contingentia, vel propter absentiam a sensibus, ut cordis secreta.*" [The entire economy of grace, the contents of the Gospel, its fortunes among the men to whom it is brought, the eternal decree of the gracious election, etc., are mysteries and contain mysteries.] 1 Cor. 2, 7; Eph. 3, 9; Col. 1, 26 f.; Acts 10, 34; Matt. 13, 11; Eph. 1, 9;

6, 19; Rom. 11, 25; 1 Cor. 15, 51. Paul's preaching of these things was "according to the revelation of the mystery which was kept secret since the world began," Rom. 16, 25. Prophecies of future events have been noted in the foregoing paragraphs. Portions of Second Peter, Jude, and nearly all of Revelation might be added to the references above given. And as to secrets of the heart, Paul has expressed an accepted fact in 1 Cor. 2, 11. It is plain that if any reliable statement is to be made to men about matters of this sort, the information to be put into such a statement must be conveyed to the party making the statement from without. But it is not necessary at all that, in receiving the information, the person's intelligence, self-consciousness, personal judgment, etc., be crushed, or suspended. On the contrary, in order intelligently to convey intelligence to others, there must be an intelligent transmitter. It is not necessary that the inspired writers, in order to become suitable organs for speaking and writing the entire counsel of God for man's salvation, should all first be reduced to the intellectual level of Balaam's ass. If the critic of the theory of "mechanical inspiration" cannot imagine how the human mind can be made to take in, and the human tongue to give out, or repeat, intelligently mysterious truths, let him watch a mother teach her child to pray. This is a very inadequate illustration; but it aids our purpose to this extent: If a mother, in order to make her child repeat words which she has suggested to the child, does not have to stamp out, neutralize, the child's mind, but actually puts it in operation by teaching the child to say and to understand what it is saying, why cannot God in a more elevated manner be able to do the same?

The second class of Bible-materials are thus described by Quenstedt: "*Quaedam naturaliter quidem cognoscibiles fuerunt, sed Scriptoribus S. actu incognitae, ob vetustatem et remotionem temporum, aut locorum, nisi aliunde forte illis innotuerint, sive per famam, sive per traditionem, sive per Scripturam aliquam humanam; ut historia diluvii, excidii*

Sodomitici, a Mose descripta." Quenstedt here grants the possibility of the existence of sources of information available to the holy writers other than the "*dictamen Spiritus Sancti.*" He does not affirm that such sources were actually drawn upon, but he evidently does not think that, if they were, the act of inspiration which he has described before would have been impossible. The explorations made in recent times in Bible lands have established the fact that there were records kept of events which are narrated in Scripture. Moses was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," Acts 7, 21. It is more than likely that he had access to those records, the discovery of which in our days has excited the world of learned men. If he had, he was probably in a position, too, to point out errors, inaccuracies, defects in those records, about in the same way in which this is done in our day. He may have been more able to do this than the modern student of archeology. For it is certain that those ancient records contain some hoary lies. The inspirational impulse did not wipe out all knowledge which Moses possessed beforehand, but enabled him to write an authentic account, both as regards contents and form. And this account was not written under a silent protest whenever it did not coincide with the information which the writer possessed previously. For such a protest one would have to assume, not previous knowledge, but previous bias. The mind open to truth is always grateful to receive the account of a person better informed than himself, and feels unconstrained to write it down as offered.

If, however, the matter was not known to the writer, while it was known to others, it is not necessary in this case either to reduce the mind of the writer to the blank record that is placed in a graphophone, or the receiving plate in telegraphy, in order to explain how he obtained his information. The account of the Flood, or of the overthrow of the cities in the Vale of Siddim, is written in a natural style. True, the phenomena recorded are wonderful, but our business is not with the events, but with the record of the events. To write records

like those in Genesis, must the writer be assumed to have been in an ecstatic state, or must he be turned into a grind-organ? On what known, or palpable, grounds? The account which he gives of events have a proper start and finish, and between these the record proceeds in a very orderly fashion. Any human being who had been commissioned to communicate to others an account entrusted to him would relate the event in the same manner.

But Quenstedt notes a third class of Bible materials. "*Quaedam non tantum naturaliter cognoscibiles, sed et naturaliter actu ipso cognitae fuerunt publicis Dei notariis, per propriam experientiam et sensuum ministerio, ut exitus Israelitarum ex Aegypto, et iter in deserto, Mosi; historia Judicum, Samueli; vita et facta Christi, evangelistis et apostolis.*" There are in Scripture records of the personal experiences of the writers, as in many of the psalms; autobiographical notes, as in the prophets, the Gospel of John, and the Epistles of Paul; there is contemporary history, as in Exodus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, etc., the Gospels and Acts. The recorders of these events were either the actors, or partners with the actors, of the events, or lived so close to the scenes of these events that they had personal knowledge of the events. [When the divine *afflatus* came to these writers, when they understood that God would have them make a true record of the events which they had witnessed, upon what sane theory are we to assume that in order to produce an authentic record these men had to first have their memory, next their natural intellect, and third, their will-power put out of commission, and when they had thus been put into a hypnotic state, the Spirit considered them fit instruments for inspired activity? He took their hand, placed the pen into it, and guided it across the chart, actually Himself doing the writing with these men, not through these men.] Quenstedt taught the *afflatus*, the *instinctus*, the *impulsus* of inspiration, he held the *dictamen Spiritus*, the writers were to him *calami Spiritus S.*, pens of the Holy Ghost, and the Spirit's action as directed toward

them was "*in calamum dictitare*," dictating to a clerk. Yet Quenstedt has held that the memory, mind, will of the writers were wide awake while the divine impulse was upon them causing them to write things "which they had seen, and heard, and handled." The divine *afflatus* did not wrestle with their previous knowledge of events as with a hostile element, and the writers did not squirm and shift uneasily while they were writing what they had lived to see; they coincided most heartily with the impulse, and were grateful to the Power actuating them toward and during their composition, for they were made to see how apt and purposeful, how simple and yet noble, their account had become because of the inspirational impulse behind them.

Of all three kinds of Bible-materials just mentioned Quenstedt says: "*Non tantum res primi, sed etiam secundi et tertii ordinis in ipso actu scribendi, a Spiritu S. immediate sunt dictatae et inspiratae S. amanuensibus, ut his, et non aliis circumstantiis, hoc, et non alio modo ac ordine, quo scriptae sunt, consignarentur.*" (p. 68.) This statement asserts the verbal, or plenary, inspiration also for accounts of matters known to the writers. The entire form and contents also of such accounts were under the direction of the Holy Spirit. But this statement does not assert that the writers had become impassive instruments.

(To be continued.)
