

Concordia Theological Quarterly



Volume 79:1-2

January/April 2015

Table of Contents

Islam's Future in America Adam S. Francisco	3
How Do You Know Whether You Are a Man or a Woman? Scott E. Stiegemeier	19
God Our Mother?: Biblical and Philosophical Considerations in Feminist God Language Mark P. Surburg	49
Another Look at <i>Imago Dei</i>: Fulfilled in the Incarnate One Burnell F. Eckardt Jr.	67
The Divine Presence within the Cloud Walter A. Maier III	79
Not Just Proof-Texting: Friedrich Balduin's Orthodox Lutheran Use of Exegesis for Doctrine Benjamin T. G. Mayes	103

Confirmation, Catechesis, and Communion: A Historical Survey	
Geoffrey R. Boyle	121
Religious Freedom in America	
R. Neely Owen	143
Theological Observer	161
The Sanctity of Marriage	
Rev. Dr. Ronald R. Feuerhahn Remembered	
Book Reviews	165
Books Received	190

Islam's Future in America

Adam S. Francisco

Muslims have been present in the United States for over two centuries. The first were from Africa, brought over in the slave trade. We do not know how many there were; nor do we know much of their history. It is still being pieced together from the few extant records they left behind. We do know—and this should come as no surprise—that their influence on American culture was basically negligible. In fact, it seems that the folk Islam that was brought over failed to survive the first generation.¹

That changed in the late nineteenth century when the first Muslim missionary entered the United States. His name was Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb (1846–1916).² His story is interesting, for he was born in Hudson, New York, raised in a Presbyterian household, moved to Missouri for work as a journalist, where he became a materialist, toyed with spiritualism and the occult, and eventually joined the Pioneer Theosophical Society of St. Louis. In 1887 he was appointed to serve as the American consul to the Philippines. Between his arrival in Manila in 1888 and his resignation in 1892 he embraced Islam, established ties with Muslims in India, and received a commission from them to begin a mission to America.

It was called the American Islamic Propaganda. Already by 1893 it established a publishing company, opened a lecture hall, and created an organization called the American Moslem Brotherhood in New York City with the goal of disseminating information on Islam and creating the institution(s) necessary for the endeavors of future missionaries. In that same year, Webb was invited to address the World Parliament of Religions as the only representative of Islam, where he assured those gathered, “I have not returned to the United States to make you all Mussulmans in spite of yourselves But,” he continued, “I have faith in the American intellect, in the American intelligence, and in the American love of fair play, and

¹ Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9–94.

² Umar F. Abd-Allah, *A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 113–125.

will defy any intelligent man to understand Islam and not love it.”³ As it turned out, Americans in the late nineteenth century did not love Islam. By 1897, his mission was obsolete. Shortly thereafter he moved to New Jersey and lived there until his death in 1916.

Despite Webb’s failure, Islam still found a way into America in the late nineteenth century. It came with the thousands of immigrants who managed to circumvent the restrictions of the Immigration Act of 1891. They came from a variety of places; by the 1920s it is estimated that around 60,000 had settled in cities throughout the United States. Most of them kept their religion private and sometimes even lied about it. But a few were apparently emboldened to advance Islam. The first American journal to address Muslims affairs recounted some of the activities of these missionaries. One report described how an Indian Muslim named M.M. Sadiq experienced a good bit of success in winning converts amongst African Americans in Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, and St. Louis in just three years (1920–1923) by holding what are described as “Mosque meetings” where the “virtues of Islam were exalted and Christianity was severely criticized.” Another missionary named M.B. Bengali, who worked mostly amidst whites, is described as declaring the “plan” of Islam to “conquer America” to a company of Muslims.⁴

It is around this time that Americans started paying attention to Islam. The *New York Times* frequently reported on Webb, describing him as “the American Mohammedan whom the wealthy Mussulmans of India and the East have sent to introduce the faith of Islam—the Religion of the Sword, as some have called it—among the ‘civilized’ Christians of the West.”⁵ Toward the end of his short-lived mission he was even ridiculed.⁶ The *Syracuse Sunday Herald* reported on the “fanatical zeal” in which Muslims were attempting to bring Islam to Americans.⁷ And the *Chicago Tribune* described the work of Webb and others like him as “a new fad for those curiously constructed beings who are always chasing after new and strange doctrines.”⁸

³ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 119.

⁴ Andrew T. Hoffert, “The Moslem Movement in America,” *The Moslem World* 20, vol. 3 (1930): 209–210.

⁵ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 120.

⁶ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 120–124.

⁷ Daniel Pipes, *Militant Islam Reaches America* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), 113.

⁸ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 120.

It was evangelical Christians who took Islam the most serious. For them, "Islam was Christianity's only serious rival for the religious 'conquest of the world'" and "Christians' most aggressive evangelistic competitors on the world stage."⁹ They thus began to develop plans for the "direct evangelization of Muslims where they might live."¹⁰ Arabic and Islamic Studies were offered at an American seminary for the first time, beginning with the professorship of Duncan Black Macdonald (1863–1943) in Hartford, Connecticut.¹¹ Eventually an institute for the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations was established in his name. In 1911, the American apostle to Islam, Samuel Zwemer (1867–1952), established an academic journal primarily for missionaries entitled *The Moslem World*.

The interest of evangelicals in Islam and missions to Muslims continued and in some ways increased in the wake of the World War I, as did the interest of Muslims in settling in and influencing America. The most comprehensive study of Islam's history in America to date suggests that this was a pivotal stage "... in which American Muslims' institutions and community building efforts took root."¹² The activity of the Sudanese immigrant Satti Majid (1883–1963) provides a useful example of such endeavors.¹³

Satti, who appointed himself the Shaykh of Islam in America, arrived in 1904 and stayed until 1929. Estimating the national population of Muslims to be around 100,000 (20,000 of which he claimed were converts), but noting that there was not a single mosque, Muslim charity, or any national Muslim organization, he began to establish institutions designed to serve American Muslims. In Detroit he helped begin the Red Crescent, formed an organization called the Islamic Union, acquired plots for Muslim burials at Roselawn cemetery, and claimed to have even established the first mosque in America (though there is no extant evidence for it). Similar projects were pursued in other cities. Beyond this, he also worked to promote Islam in the public sphere by writing editorials for the *New York Times*. They never published them, and so—perhaps in the first

⁹ Thomas S. Kidd, *American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 62.

¹⁰ Kidd, *American Christians and Islam*, 64.

¹¹ Willem A. Bijlefeld, "A Century of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Hartford Seminary," *The Muslim World* 83, vol. 2 (1993): 103–117.

¹² GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 165.

¹³ Patrick D. Bowen, "Satti Majid: A Sudanese Founder of American Islam," *Journal of Africana Religion* 1, vol. 2 (2013): 194–209; cf. GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 172–178.

instance of struggling to silence opposition to Islam through litigation—he attempted to sue the paper for not publishing his articles and what he described as its “anti-Islamic propaganda.”¹⁴ At the same time that Satti Majid was working to support and promote a fairly orthodox form of Islam in the United States, heterodox or—by normal Sunni standards—heretical Muslim groups like the Moorish Science Temple, Nation of Islam, and Ahmadiyya movement were taking root and began to thrive, particularly amidst African Americans.¹⁵ The first verifiable mosques serving orthodox Muslims were also established in a variety of cities and towns like Ross, North Dakota, and Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The former, built around 1929, was torn down in the 1970s and rebuilt in 2005; the latter—the so-called Mother Mosque—was built in 1934 and still stands today.

Around the time that Majid was working in America, forces were at work in the Muslim world that would increase the number of Muslims and strengthen the presence of Islam in America. The Ottoman Empire came to an end after World War I. The caliphate—a 1300-year old institution believed to be divinely instituted—was abolished. European powers—primarily the British and the French—began their supervision of the region under the League of Nations mandate system. New states were created, governments established, and economies reformed.¹⁶ While many benefitted from these changes, some Muslim thinkers concluded that Islamic civilization had finally lost its soul. After centuries of decline under the Ottomans, it was now dead and a new secular order had emerged. Nowhere was this view more pronounced than in the rhetoric of Hassan al-Banna (1904–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁷

The Brotherhood began in 1928. Its early activities centered on preaching and social welfare, but it soon turned to violence. Because it was seen as the only really legitimate Islamic group that resisted the expansion and dominance of secular influences within Muslim societies, it grew quickly.

¹⁴ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 173.

¹⁵ Ahmed I. Abu Shouk, J.O. Hunwick, and R.S. O’Fahey, “A Sudanese Missionary to the United States: Satti Majid, ‘*Shaykh al-Islam* in North America,’ and His Encounter with Noble Drew Ali, Prophet of the Moorish Science Temple Movement,” *Sudanic Africa* 8 (1997): 137–191.

¹⁶ On the significance of World War I on the Middle East and Islam, see James L. Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 180–231.

¹⁷ See Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Barry Rubin, ed., *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

By 1948, it had a half a million members, and branches could be found throughout Egypt. It did experience some setbacks, though. For example, the Egyptian government arrested much of its leadership, and al-Banna was assassinated in 1949. But the Brotherhood would receive renewed vigor a year or two later when a man named Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) returned from a two year visit to America and began writing some of the most influential texts informing what is often described as Islamism.¹⁸

Islamism is Islam viewed as an all-encompassing worldview or ideology. Governance, politics, law, morality, and every other aspect of life is ordered by the Qur'an and Islamic tradition.¹⁹ For every real or perceived problem, Islamists claim, "Islam is the solution." Qutb described the world as suffering from the same basic condition. It was mired in *jahiliyya* or ignorance of Islam. This included the Muslim world in the mid-twentieth century, as well as the Western world. Muslims, thus, had a global mission that included bearing witness to Islam in or outside of Muslim majority lands. This played some role in the increasing number of Muslims who migrated to the United States on student visas shortly after the end of World War II. Many of them, being too radical for the secularized Muslim states in the Middle East (the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, was and still is routinely outlawed), moved here and took advantage of American ignorance of their totalitarian ideology and began to make their way into and influence American Muslim organizations. In the mid-twentieth century, GhaneaBassiri observes that they soon began purposely working toward having "Islam recognized as an American religion."²⁰

An opportunity presented itself with the rise of American civil religion before and during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961). In 1948, the National Education Association began promoting the advancement of a universal vision of moral and spiritual values that were "shared by the members of all religious faiths."²¹ This enabled the newly established Federation of Islamic Associations to begin efforts at defining "Islam as yet another of the monotheistic religions upon which American

¹⁸ See John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); for an essential collection of primary texts illustrative of Islamist thought in the twentieth century, see Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to bin Laden* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

¹⁹ On the distinction between Islam and Islamism from the perspective of a liberal Muslim, see Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

²⁰ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 228.

²¹ Educational Policies Commission, *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools* (Washington, DC: National Education Association, 1951), 6.

values were founded.”²² They were largely successful. By 1957, their work led to the building of the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., where, at its inauguration, President Eisenhower praised what Islam had allegedly “contributed to the building of civilization” and “contributed to the advancement of mankind.” He then acknowledged Islam’s place in the American religious landscape as “many from the Muslims lands—students, businessmen, and representatives of states—are enjoying the benefits of experience among the people of the United States,” and assured Muslims that “Americans would fight with all their strength” for the right of Muslims to assemble at their mosques (he called them churches) and worship according to their conscience.²³

Just how many Muslims were in America in the mid-twentieth century is unclear. There were enough, though, that mission agencies and Middle Eastern governments began to take notice. In 1959, for example, the Federation of Islamic Associations was invited to establish formal ties with Egypt and Syria (under the auspices of the short-lived United Arab Republic). Its leadership was brought out to Cairo for meetings, solidifying their ties, which included generous donations for the building of an Islamic Center in Detroit. Two years later, in 1961, the Saudis got involved and began their efforts to exert control over Muslim institutions in the United States, efforts which still continue today.²⁴

The 1960s, in general, were productive years for the strengthening of Islam in America. The number of students sent here on scholarship from places like Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia was over 10,000. A little more than a decade earlier there were not even 3,000.²⁵ Also at the same time, American Muslim students began to receive scholarships to study at Muslim universities, though numbers on this are unknown.²⁶ Some received more than just a university education; they also received an education in Islamism. For example, in 1964 when Malcolm X (1925–1965) went on pilgrimage to Mecca, he was trained in Sunni Islamic ideology and provided with guarantees for scholarships to American Muslims at the University of Medina. All of this

²² GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 238.

²³ “Eisenhower’s 1957 Speech at Islamic Center of Washington,” (speech, June 28, 1957), <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2007/06/20070626154822lnkais0.6946985.html#axzz3h8JYVpgQ>.

²⁴ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 254–263.

²⁵ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 264.

²⁶ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 263.

was provided by the Muslim World League, an organization founded in 1962 by Hassan al-Banna's son-in-law Said Ramadan (1926–1995). It was designed to unite Islamist groups from around the Muslim world in the common cause of advancing Islam across the globe.

Those who came under its spell and the general spell of Islamism established the Muslim Student Association in 1963 on the campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This organization, which now has hundreds of chapters across North America, laid the foundation for the subsequent history of Islam in America. It "saw itself as the provider of [the] 'means and methods' of maintaining a Muslim way of life for earlier established mosques and American Muslim organizations [like the Federation of Islamic Associations]." ²⁷ It also saw the "United States as a blank slate for the realization" of an authentic Islamic lifestyle in accordance with the Qur'an and classical traditions of Islam. ²⁸ Secularized autocratic governments in the Muslim world had begun to clamp down on Islamism and for good reason, as many of them were increasingly turning towards violence in their struggle or *jihad* against the corruptions of Islam in the Muslim world.

America became, in a way, a land of promise for Muslims, especially those with Islamist commitments, in the 1960s. A study of the Muslim World League even expressed that despite "the sorry state of affairs prevailing in the Muslim countries," they were optimistic for the future of Islam. Their source of hope was found in the Muslim minorities of America and Europe that "might one day produce those sons and daughters of Islam who might change the whole course of events of the entire Muslim *ummah* [global community]." ²⁹

At about the same time that Islamism established its base, organizationally, other expressions of Islam began to appear as a wide array of Muslims began to immigrate here in droves after passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished national origins quotas from immigration law. With this came a tremendous amount of diversity where the increasing Muslim population became a "microcosm of Muslims in the 'Old World.'" ³⁰ Sunnis, Shia, and Sufis of every confession and practice began to appear alongside some of the indigenous American Muslim organizations like the Nation of Islam. The problem, at least for the

²⁷ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 270.

²⁸ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 268.

²⁹ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 260; M. Ali Kettani, *Muslim Minorities in the World Today* (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1986), xvii–xviii.

³⁰ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 295.

historian, is that they did not leave much of a verifiable record before the 1980s. Most, as they still do today, are assimilated Americans who practice some spiritualized or watered-down version of Islam and do so in private.

Those who did leave a distinct record were, of course, the Islamists, committed as they were to advancing Islam in American culture. And the record is clear that they intended to increase their efforts. For example, in 1975 the Muslim Student Association published its priorities for the future of “Islamic work” in the United States. Along with strengthening institutions that already existed, they listed as their first priority the “[p]roduction and dissemination of Islamic knowledge . . . in its purity in all fields necessary for building an Islamic civilization.”³¹ Muslims affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which by the 1970s had become a global organization with millions of members, saw this as commensurate with their goals and began to consider how the Muslim Student Association and other similar American Muslim organizations might be used to achieve their broader socio-political goals. In a document not intended for public dissemination entitled “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal of the Group in North America,” the Brotherhood outlined a fairly comprehensive strategy that would use the MSA and over twenty other similar organizations overtly tied to or at least friendly to the Islamists’ cause that could be used to fundamentally transform America by uniting Muslims who had settled in America. Here’s how the memo puts it:

The Ikhwan [Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions . . . It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes.³²

How is this jihad to be performed? The document goes into pretty comprehensive detail but names the presenting of Islam as a “civilization

³¹ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 305.

³² Mohamed Akram, “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” memorandum of the Muslim Brotherhood, May 22, 1991, 21; this is available online at the Investigative Project on Terrorism web site, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/20.pdf>. On this document in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood’s operations in the United States, see Andrew C. McCarthy and others, *Sharia: The Threat to America* (Washington, DC: The Center for Security Policy, 2010), 107–168.

alternative" as the chief means. In other words, rather than some show of force or even overt political activity, the Islamist group in America—and we do not know all who were and continue to be involved—sought (and seeks) to pursue the advance of Islam slowly, patiently, and even peacefully and, while doing so, to portray Islam as a legitimate and rational alternative to the hedonistic, relativistic, and materialistic culture that dominates the West. They were and have been pretty good at it, too. In 1980, for example, while federal employees were being held hostage by Muslims in Tehran for over a year, the United States Congress saw fit to recognize the 1,400-year anniversary of Muhammad's call to prophethood.³³

The success of the revolution in Iran and especially the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union had the curious effect of emboldening and increasing Islamic activism in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. A good percentage of Islamic organizations like the Islamic Society of North America were established then. The Muslim city of Islamberg in rural New York was founded; and a number of mosques were constructed. The Muslim population increased at this time as well. Some of it was simply the result of natural, biological unions between a Muslim man and his wife or wives. A good portion of it—well over a million, in fact—came from an increasing number of immigrants from every walk of life and represented every disposition in Islam. This included Islamist jihadists. Bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri (b. 1951), for example, toured Silicon Valley in the early 1990s raising funds to support the fighters and organizations that would soon become al-Qaeda. On the East Coast, mosques in New York and New Jersey used by the CIA in the 1980s to support the Afghan jihad were also used to recruit the jihadists who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993.

Some Muslims who were publically active moved in a different direction. Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) began explaining Islam to non-Muslims in a number of publications from his post at the University of Chicago. His perspective was conservative yet, at the same time, progressive. He believed Islam—an Islam ordered by the Qur'an and not historical interpretations of it—could thrive in American culture without being at odds with it. He was even optimistic that Muslims and Christians in America and beyond could be brought together in some way "by way of positive cooperation, provided that Muslims hearken more to the Qur'an than to the historic formulations of Islam and provided that," what he called,

³³ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 309–310.

“recent pioneering efforts continue to yield a Christian doctrine more compatible with universal monotheism and egalitarianism.”³⁴

It is interesting that, despite the increasing presence of Islamists in the United States and even more so across the globe during the last two decades of the twentieth century, there was still much ambivalence towards Islam. There was some anti-Arab sentiment as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian issue—the most extreme example being the murder of the Muslim scholar Isma’il al-Faruqi and his wife in Pennsylvania in 1986. The Council on American-Islamic Relations was even established to defend Muslims against perceived and sometimes real discrimination. But, particularly among the political elite, Islam was not seen as posing a challenge or threat. It was accepted and perhaps even embraced by them as a legitimate American worldview. In 1991, Siraj Wahhaj, an imam of a large mosque in Brooklyn and leader of the Muslim Alliance in North America, who has numerous ties to Islamists, was invited and opened a session of the House of Representatives with a prayer to Allah. Warith Deen Muhammad (1933–2008) offered a prayer to Allah on the Senate floor less than a year later. In 1993, the first Muslim chaplain, Abdul Rasheed Muhammad, was appointed to the U.S. military. In 1996, Hillary Clinton began the tradition of celebrating *‘Id al-Fitr*, the end of the month of Ramadan, at the White House. And her husband, President Bill Clinton (1993–2001), established what seems like the American doctrine of Islam-is-a-religion-of-peace, despite any stubborn facts that might suggest otherwise. For example, at a meeting of the Jordanian Parliament in 1994, he affirmed Islam as a religion that embodies values in “harmony with the best of American ideals.”³⁵ Muslims pursuing violent jihad, he continued, “cloak themselves in the rhetoric of religion and nationalism, but behave in ways that contradict the very teachings of their faith.”³⁶

The two subsequent presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, have continued to reinforce this doctrine of disassociating Islam from violence. However, especially after September 11, 2001, many average Americans began to see things differently. But even before, during the 1990s, men like Daniel Pipes and Steven Emerson were warning Americans in print and other media about the deleterious influence and potential violent

³⁴ Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur’an* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 170.

³⁵ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 339.

³⁶ GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America*, 340.

consequences of Islamism left unchecked.³⁷ Now there is a whole industry dedicated to fighting it, from The Investigative Project on Terrorism to The Center for the Study of Political Islam to Robert Spencer's numerous books, just to name a few.

Muslims have responded to this in a variety of ways. Some perform what is called *taqiyya* and *iham*, dissimulation and deception.³⁸ The activity of Anwar al-Awlaki (1971–2011) is a case in point. As a young and articulate imam serving in mosques from southern California to northern Virginia he was invited to lead prayers for Muslim congressional staffers and lobbyists in Washington, D.C., serve as chaplain at George Washington University, and lecture on moderate Islam in the Pentagon. He was described by the *New York Times* a month after 9/11 as a leading example of a new generation of Muslim leaders “capable of merging East and West” or reconciling Islam with American culture.³⁹ In a *National Geographic* article on Muslim responses to the recent attacks, he is quoted as saying, “There is no way that the people who did this could be Muslim, and if they claim to be Muslim, then they have perverted their religion.”⁴⁰ In 2002, however, he left the United States and by 2004 he had settled in Yemen where he took up leadership in the branch of al-Qaeda there until he was killed in a drone strike in 2011. The Clintons' preferred consultant on all matters Islamic, Abdul Rahman Al-Amoudi, is another good example. For years he enjoyed special access to and privilege amidst leaders in both the Democrat and Republican parties, acted as consultant to the Pentagon, and was involved in the selection of Muslim chaplains. At the same time, he was raising funds to finance terrorist operations and even took part in a plot to assassinate the then-crown prince and now recently deceased King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (1924–2015).⁴¹ He is now serving a 23-year prison sentence.

³⁷ See Daniel Pipes, “The Muslims Are Coming! The Muslims Are Coming!” *National Review* 42, no. 22 (1990): 28–31; available online at the Middle East Forum web site, <http://www.danielpipes.org/198/the-muslims-are-coming-the-muslims-are-coming>, as well as Steven Emerson's PBS documentary *Jihad in America* that aired on November 12, 1994.

³⁸ See Tibi, *Islamism and Islam*, 152.

³⁹ James Taranto, “Moderate Meets Maker’: Anwar al-Awlaki, Then and Now,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 30, 2011, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204138204576602984278140322>.

⁴⁰ Brian Handwerk and Zain Habboo, “Attack on America: An Islamic Scholar's Perspective—Part 1,” *National Geographic News*, September 28, 2001, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/09/0927_imampart1.html.

⁴¹ Steven Emerson, *Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in America* (Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books, 2006), 347–352, 389–390.

This list could go on. But chances are, unless you are a student of counterterrorism, you will not have heard much about these cases. What you no doubt have heard quite a bit about, though, are the efforts of Muslims to, as it is sometimes put, take back Islam from those who have allegedly corrupted it. These are people like Zuhdi Jassar who have fully assimilated into American culture and maintain a private, spiritualized view and practice of Islam. Some of them have even made remarkable contributions toward efforts to educate and expose the proliferation and danger of Islamist ideology amidst a significant number of American Muslims and their organizations. The *Third Jihad*, a documentary film released in 2008 featuring Zuhdi, is a great example of such a project. The problem with some of these moderate, assimilated Muslims is that their knowledge of and credentials to speak on Islam are either weak or lack credibility with Muslims. Muslims who strive to align their beliefs, practices, and activities with traditional orthodoxy view them as misguided Muslims at best, who select passages from the Qur'an or Islamic tradition regardless of context or legitimacy and use them to support a novel or historically and legally marginalized view of Islam.

Other moderate Muslims are attempting to reform Islam from within the basic parameters of historical Islam, looking for pieces of evidence that might support a re-envisioned Islam suitable for contemporary socio-political and cultural norms. They justify their revision of Islam by appealing to *ijtihad*,⁴² generally understood as the contextualizing of Islam using reason to reconsider the tradition of Islam, and have experienced some success at changing the way some American Muslims think about and express their faith.⁴³ This does hold some promise at the very least in pacifying Islam and legitimizing the assimilation of Muslims, but contemporary *mujtahids* (those who practice *ijtihad*) face an uphill battle given the closing or proscribing of such practices in the classical period of Muslim jurisprudence.⁴⁴ They are also viewed with suspicion by observant Muslims and charged with capitulating to non-Islamic standards and innovation (*bid'a*)—a sin in Islam.

⁴² See David R. Smock, "Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Islamic Principles for the Twenty-First Century," Special Report 125 (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004).

⁴³ See Paul M. Barrett, *American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a Religion* (New York: Picador, 2007).

⁴⁴ See Robert R. Reilly, *The Closing of the Muslim Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern Islamist Crisis* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2010).

The work of Abdulaziz Sachedina, Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Virginia and George Mason University, provides a good example of this. He is often viewed as one of the leading academic figures in the reinterpretation and pacification of Islam. He was even brought in by the State Department in 2005 to help draft the constitution of Iraq with high hopes that the proposals he made in his books, like the peculiarly titled *Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (2001), would establish Iraq as a model for other Muslim-majority nations to follow. Sachedina has tried to advance what he calls an Islamic theology for the twenty-first century that is established "within the sacred boundaries of the Islamic revelatory sources."⁴⁵ He sees this task as essential, for among the world's religions "Islam provides the sole coherent worldview of any political significance" that also has the potential to build a "just society in which peoples of different religions would coexist in peace and harmony."⁴⁶ And it alone can help "to deepen the West's self-understanding in its liberal project of a public international order."⁴⁷

How does he do this? He deconstructs the classical (and exclusivist) politicized theology of Islam and reconstructs in its place an Islam that has never existed—one that champions constitutional government, tolerance, pluralism, etc. He does so by assigning new meaning to the quranic text. For example, he contends that *jihad* is not physical warfare with religious significance, as Muslim tradition has almost universally held;⁴⁸ it is a "moral endeavor to work for peace with justice."⁴⁹ And as far as the exclusive nature of Islam goes, he essentially sees all people who, in their own way and in accordance with their own religion, submit to God as *ipso facto* Islamic. Passages that encourage the killing of polytheists, Jews, and Christians are all the result of particular historical circumstances. Religious pluralism is, he contends, the universal norm and doctrine of the Qur'an. He even suggests that the first religiously-inspired pluralist democratic political order was promoted by Muhammad in Mecca. Sachedina's method is very postmodern, and that is probably the reason he has only really

⁴⁵ Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 41.

⁴⁶ Sachedina, *Islamic Roots*, 136.

⁴⁷ Sachedina, *Islamic Roots*, 42.

⁴⁸ For the best treatment of *jihad*, see David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

⁴⁹ Sachedina, *Islamic Roots*, 113.

been well received by liberal academics but Muslims have been instructed by their authorities not to listen to him.⁵⁰

What seems to be the wave of the future in Muslim thought on their role in America (and the west in general) is the perspective advanced by Tariq Ramadan, the so-called Martin Luther of Islam. He makes his home in the West, teaching in Europe and also America (since Hilary Clinton lifted the ban on him despite his donations to Hamas). He appeals to Islamists and moderate Muslims alike, for he is a conservative who grapples with what it means to be Muslim in societies that are not. This is a huge question, for historically and legally Muslims are required by the sharia to reside in what is deemed *dar al-Islam*, or the abode of Islam.⁵¹ For only in the abode of Islam, where Muslims dominate the population and Islamic law informs the institutions and preserves the mores of society, can Muslims properly submit to Allah. Islamic law has allowed for some exceptions. Muslims can engage in commerce, diplomacy, and of course fight in jihad outside of the abode of Islam, but only temporarily. After all, that territory—outside of the abode of Islam—is deemed the domain of war or *dar al-Harb* in classic Muslim jurisprudence. It is the territory into which the abode of Islam is to expand in what Muhammad described as a perpetual jihad that should take place until the day of judgment.⁵²

In *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, Ramadan argues that Muslims need to rethink this classic bifurcation of the world into essentially two warring camps. For, as he put it, there is no real *dar al-Islam* or properly constituted Islamic state that exists. “It is high time to define the responsibilities of Muslims in the West,” he writes, “Our world is now, whether we like it or not, *an open world*.”⁵³ He does not follow his Muslim Brotherhood ancestors (his grandfather is Hasan al-Banna and father Said Ramadan) in calling the whole world the domain of jahiliyya, but rather refers to the West, as well as the heartland of Islam, as the *dar al-shahada*,

⁵⁰ See Sachedina, “What Happened in Najaf?” available online at the University of Georgia website, http://islam.uga.edu/sachedina_silencing.html.

⁵¹ See Bernard Lewis, “Legal and Historical Reflections on the Position of Muslim Populations under Non-Muslim Rule,” in *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 43–57; Yahya Michot, *Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule* (Oxford: Interface Publications, 2006).

⁵² See Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, *Sunan Abu Dawud*, trans. Ahmad Hasan (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1984), 2:702; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 207.

⁵³ Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 73–75.

the domain of testimony wherein Muslims are called, whether they are in America or Egypt, to bear witness and promote the will of Allah and vision of Muhammad. In other words, Islam is again in a formative period, and Muslims are called to help if not lead the charge in shaping it wherever they might be.

Muslims concerned with confessing and promoting orthodox Islam do not see this as something that can or should be done willy-nilly. Rather, it is to be done in accordance with what Muslims across the world almost universally subscribe to as Allah's clear and perfectly preserved revelation, the Qur'an, alongside—in one way or another—the traditions (Sunna) passed down concerning Muhammad and the first Muslim polities.

In light of all this, it is time to ask the question implied in the title: What might Islam look like in America in the future? It is hard to say, but the trends of the past that continue to shape the present will most likely persist into the future. Islam will continue to assert itself and even enjoy greater influence. There are currently about five million Muslims in America, give or take a million or two; we still do not have good data on this. Expect that number to rise though. Muslims typically have larger families than your average American and certainly the average European.

We should also expect a great bit of diversity amidst Muslims. There will be Twelver, Sevener, Fiver, and every other sort of Shia Muslim alongside Sunnis who are progressivists, secularists, Islamists, and even jihadists. However, the institutions representing American Muslims and public discourse on the character of Islam in America will be predominantly Islamist of one sort or another. These Islamist organizations have learned to contextualize their speech. They say one thing but mean another. For example, Islam means peace, it has been said, and in a way—though not literally—it does. But it is a peace defined by Islam and one that will not be realized until all individuals, their institutions, and societies submit entirely to Allah.

Amidst America's Muslims there will be and already is a contest for the soul and posture of Islam. Moderates and progressives are already battling with conservatives. This is mostly an internal debate, though it has been suggested non-Muslims should seize any opportunity to promote a moderate Islam. Perhaps. But Mark Steyn offers a word of caution as well as a corrective in which Christians could certainly participate. He has argued that promoting moderate Islam is a quick fix to the challenges posed by radical Islam and, in the end, will be ineffective as it is virtually impossible to get around the injunctions to violence in the Qur'an. "[T]he

most effective strategy against the resurgence of Islam," then, he suggests, "may be the oldest of all—an evangelizing Christianity."⁵⁴

Nevertheless, we should expect more of the violence happening across the globe to find its way here. It already has. What to do with it or how to preempt it, though, is still the question. Muslims have the right to practice their religion and—according to popular notions of what liberty or freedom means—order their life as they see fit. For religions committed to a distinction between religion and politics or theology and civil law the first amendment poses little to no problem to the integrity of that religion or the state. For Islam—at least classical orthodox versions of it—it does. Herein lies one of the most basic problems associated with Islam in the West, particularly in a secular and pluralist democracy like America.

Regardless of all the trends, debates, policies, and postures associated with the problems of Islam and its future in America. We can count on the fact that Islam is and will continue to become a part of mainstream American culture. Whether it gets stirred up in the melting pot or not is anyone's guess at this point. Whether it succeeds in influencing the broader culture or not will probably not be determined by Islam itself, though. Rather, the future of American culture will be determined by those, as it has been said, who show up for it. Muslims are poised to do just that. So are secularists. Are Christians? Only the future will tell.

⁵⁴ Mark Steyn, "Apostasy in Moderation," *National Review* 60, vol. 7 (2008): 64.