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## Doctrinal Theology.

### CHRISTOLOGY.

(Concluded.)

#### II. THE OFFICE AND WORK OF CHRIST.

##### Christ the Prophet.

A prophet is an official spokesman of God. Thus said the Lord to Moses, "Aaron shall be *thy spokesman* unto the people: and he shall be, even he shall be to thee *instead of a mouth*, and thou shalt be to him *instead of God*."<sup>1)</sup> And in this capacity Aaron was a *prophet*. The Lord said unto Moses, "See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be *thy prophet*."<sup>2)</sup> It was not Aaron who of his own accord stepped in to supply the deficiency of which his brother Moses complained;<sup>3)</sup> but by divine appointment he was made a spokesman of God, and thus was he constituted a prophet. *Prophecy came not by the will of man*.<sup>4)</sup> The prophet does not appear in his own name, but comes with a commission from a superior, whose agent or public officer he is in his capacity of a prophet, a spokesman by divine commission, uttering the thoughts and will and very words of him from whom he has his commission.<sup>5)</sup>

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1) Exod. 4, 16.

2) Exod. 7, 1.

3) Exod. 4, 10.

4) 2 Pet. 1, 21.

5) Matt. 1, 22. Acts 1, 16; 3, 18. Amos 3, 1. Jer. 1, 2. al.

## Exegetical Theology.

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### LEVITICUS XVIII.

The opening verses of this chapter mark a section of the Mosaic record of divine legislation for Israel, the chosen people of God. *And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, I am the Lord your God.*<sup>1)</sup> Jehovah, the Lawgiver, charges Moses, the mediator, the spokesman of God, to announce to the children of Israel the will of their God. The framers of human laws are careful to state the will of those in whom the legislative power is vested, and to state it in such terms as will enable those who are subject to the law, and those who are to administer the law in courts of justice, to know precisely what the law demands. And if clearness and distinctness is a property of holy Scripture generally, it should certainly be presumed where God publishes his will as the Legislator of his people. Or, in other words, if in the interpretation of language the terms employed by an author should be supposed to have a definite sense, unless the contrary be proven, then this supposition is all the more reasonable in the interpretation of law, and, by excellence, of divine law.

In the present instance, there was particular reason for clear and distinct legislative enactments on the subject with which the Lawgiver was about to deal. Israel had been for generations surrounded by a lewd and dissolute people, and was on the way to a country inhabited by lewd and lascivious nations. Hence the prohibition: *After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do: and*

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1) Vy. 1 f.; cf. Lev. 1, 1 f.; 4, 1 f. 14; 6, 1. 8. 19. 24; 7, 22. 28; 8, 1; 11, 1 f.; 12, 1 f.; 13, 1; 14, 1; 15, 1; 16, 1 f.; 17, 1 f.; 19, 1 f.; 20, 1 f.; 21, 1; 22, 1 f.; 23, 1 f.; 24, 1 f.; 25, 1 f.; 27, 1 f.

*after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do, neither shall ye walk in their ordinances;*<sup>1)</sup> and the general admonition: *Ye shall do my judgments, and keep mine ordinances, to walk therein: I am the Lord your God. Ye shall therefore keep my statutes, and my judgments: which if a man do, he shall live in them: I am the Lord.*<sup>2)</sup> There is a peculiar solemnity about this preamble not found in like measure in any of the preceding or subsequent sections of Leviticus. The Lawgiver is evidently intent upon making this section particularly impressive, and for obvious reasons. By the evil examples indicated in verse 3 and their own propensities the Israelites were in particular danger of offending against the precepts promulgated in this chapter. Besides, the experience of all ages to the present time has shown that to regulate the sexual relations is a matter of extreme difficulty, that when men have set their hearts upon a certain union, they are apt to disregard or defy whatever would prevent the achievement of their purpose. Matrimonial and kindred causes are by far the most numerous class of *casus conscientiae*. And thus the Ruler of his people and the Governor of mankind appears concerned about the welfare of his subjects when he enacts statutes which are in form and substance subservient to the happiness of the governed, of individuals and human society, manifestations of the wisdom, the holiness, and the goodness, of God, of the Lord, before whom our own wisdom is foolishness, and our own will, if opposed to his, is rebellion the most heinous. The question in all cases coming under the law here about to be promulgated is not, What is expedient? or, What is customary? or, What is reasonable? or, What says this man or that man? but, What says the Lord? To do, also in these things, in reverent and willing obedience what the Lord would have us do, is to do what is good and right and truly expedient.

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1) V. 3.

2) Vv. 4 f.

Here, too, it is true wisdom to *understand what the will of the Lord is,*<sup>1)</sup> and *proving what is acceptable to the Lord, we walk as children of light.*<sup>2)</sup>

Having, then, as in a preamble, disposed his people to willing and reverent obedience to his will, the Lord now proceeds to declare his will. The law which he is about to promulgate is a marriage law. The term גְּלוּת עֶרְוָה, to *uncover nakedness*, is another euphemism for *carnal knowledge*. It is presumed that uncovering a woman's nakedness is but a preliminary act to be followed by sexual intercourse. But it is further understood that such intercourse is lawful in wedlock only.<sup>3)</sup> When, as in this and the subsequent verses, sexual commerce within certain degrees of kinship is prohibited, the scope of the law cannot be the prohibition of fornication, which is lawful in no degree: but it must be the prohibition of unlawful marriage. We do not find such divine legislation as: *Thou shalt not murder thy mother, for she is thy father's wife. Thou shalt not murder thy sister, for she was born of thy mother. Thou shalt not murder thy daughter, for she is thy flesh and blood. Thou shalt not murder thy wife, for thou hast promised to love her, etc.* Just as little may we understand the Lord to say: *Thou shalt not commit fornication with the flesh of thy flesh. That is to say, thou shalt not commit fornication with thy mother; she is thy mother. Thou shalt not commit fornication with thy sister, the daughter of thy father, or daughter of thy mother, whether she be born at home or born abroad; thou shalt not commit fornication with them. Thou shalt not commit fornication with thy son's daughter or with thy daughter's daughter; even fornication thou shalt not commit with them, etc.* The head line of the English Bible is correct when it says: *Unlawful marriages.*

In formulating this marriage law, the Lord first lays down the general prohibitory rule:

1) Eph. 5, 17.

2) Eph. 5, 10. 8. Cf. Rom. 13, 2.

3) Gen. 2, 24; 4, 1.

*None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness: I am the Lord.*

The original Hebrew is:

אִישׁ אִישׁ אֶל-כָּל-שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ לֹא תִקְרְבוּ לְגִלּוֹת עֲרֻה אֹתָהּ אֲנִי יְהוָה:

This is the authentical text, the letter, of the law. Every translation is, strictly speaking, not the letter of the law, but an interpretation of the law in the briefest terms. The translation is true when it conveys to its readers or hearers, who understand its language, precisely the same sense which was intended by the legislator in framing the original text. No interpretation or application of the translation is admissible which is incompatible with the original, and a translation which cannot convey the sense of the original must be discarded as a false interpretation. Thus, when the English text is to serve as a restatement of the law, the sense of the English words must be identical with that of the Hebrew words which constitute the letter of the law, and compliance with the law is conformity with the sense of those Hebrew words. If it were otherwise, the translators of the English Bible would be the lawgivers of the English people, and Luther would be the legislator of the Germans who use his version. Thus, to determine who those persons are, with whom a man, according to Lev. 18, 6, must not be joined in marriage, it is not final to show what, according to English usage, is the sense of the words, "*any that is near of kin to him*," or what, by German usage or etymology, is signified by "*seiner nächsten Blutsfreundin*." The question is what these words must signify according to the original Hebrew text, the sense of which they are to convey, the words, כָּל-שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ. A closer literal translation of these words would be, *all flesh of his flesh*. This translation is still short of being fully adequate to the original. The Hebrew text has two different words for *flesh*, שָׂאֵר and בָּשָׂר. But as both words stand for all the significations of *flesh*, and we have no two English words covering all the meanings of *flesh*, *meat* standing only for flesh as food, our

word *flesh* answers for both שָׂאֵר and בָּשָׂר. That these words jointly and severally signify kinship is out of question. The question can only be, what manner or degree of kinship, whether consanguinity, or affinity, or both, and if either or both, in what degree or degrees of either or both. As to שָׂאֵר, it appears from the subsequent context that it denotes the consanguinity existing between a brother and his sister and a woman and her sister, the father's sister being termed his שָׂאֵר,<sup>1)</sup> and the mother's sister, her שָׂאֵר.<sup>2)</sup> Both are related in the first degree. Likewise, a woman's granddaughter is called her שָׂאֵר.<sup>3)</sup> Thus, also, a man's mother, father, son, daughter, and sister, are subsumed under the term שָׂאֵר, *his flesh*.<sup>4)</sup> In all these instances, שָׂאֵר denotes the first degree of consanguinity. בָּשָׂר is similarly employed when Adam calls Eve בָּשָׂר בְּבָשָׂר, *flesh of my flesh*, inasmuch as they were related by a peculiar manner of consanguinity, the woman being *taken out of man*.<sup>5)</sup> But they were also related by affinity, as husband and wife, and of this relationship and that of all future husbands and wives, Adam says, הֵיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד, *they shall be unto one flesh*.<sup>6)</sup> This is quoted by Christ, ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν,<sup>7)</sup> and St. Paul, accordingly, calls a man's wife τῇ ᾧ ἑαυτοῦ σάρκα, *his own flesh*.<sup>8)</sup> Here, then, בָּשָׂר, σὰρξ, *flesh*, stands for the first degree of affinity. In other instances, בָּשָׂר denotes remoter degrees of consanguinity, as when Laban says to Jacob, his sister's son, בָּשָׂר אֶחָד, *thou art my flesh*,<sup>9)</sup> or when David calls all Israel, בָּשָׂר, *my flesh*<sup>10)</sup> in the same sense in which he calls them אֶחָד, *my brethren*;<sup>11)</sup> when Isaiah says, *Hide not thyself from thine own flesh*,<sup>12)</sup> a man is supposed to look upon all his fellow-men as his בָּשָׂר, as coming from the same first parent. Together, the two words, as they appear in our

1) שָׂאֵר אֶחָד הוּא, v. 12.

2) שָׂאֵר אֶחָד הוּא, v. 13.

3) שָׂאֵרָה, v. 17.

4) Lev. 21, 2. 3. Cf. Numb. 27, 11.

5) Gen. 2, 23.

6) Gen. 2, 24.

7) Matt. 19, 5.

8) Eph. 5, 29.

9) Gen. 29, 14.

10) 2 Sam. 19, 12.

11) Ibid.

12) Is. 58, 7.

text, שָׁאָר בְּשָׂרָא, are elsewhere employed to denote near kinship in general, as in Lev. 25, 49 and Numb. 27, 11.

These being the various *usus loquendi* of the words שָׁאָר and בְּשָׂרָא jointly and severally, the question arises, what these words, בְּלִי-שָׁאָר בְּשָׂרָא, say in our text. Being undoubtedly words of a law, a divine statute, which is to serve as a rule for man's conduct, they must have a definite meaning, enabling those who are under the law to know when they keep within the limits of the law. To take בְּשָׂרָא in the widest sense, in which it seems to appear in Is. 58, 7, would make Lev. 18, 6 tantamount to a total prohibition of marriage, contrary to Gen. 2, 19—24. 1 Cor. 7, 2 ff. al. While the widest sense of the terms is, therefore, clearly inadmissible, the assumption of any narrower sense except the strictest would be an arbitrary supposition unwarranted by the text or its context, and every interpreter would be free to draw his own limits, instead of following out the limits of the law. This would run counter to the very nature of a law, and to the first principle of interpretation, that the true meaning of a word of a text can be but one.<sup>1)</sup> A law thus framed or interpreted could not serve as a norm of right and wrong either to the subjects of the law or to those who are to administer the law. When God says, *Ye shall do my judgments, and keep mine ordinances, to walk therein: I am the Lord your God. Ye shall, therefore, keep my statutes, and my judgments;*<sup>2)</sup> and when he then proceeds to promulgate his statutes, he will certainly use such words and use them so that those who would walk in his statutes may not grope in the dark, but say with the psalmist: *Through thy precepts I get understanding. . . . Thy word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path.*<sup>3)</sup>

Again, it is a principle of the interpretation of law that the purpose of a law is to guide us in its interpretation.<sup>4)</sup>

1) *Sensus literalis unus est.* 2) Vv. 4. 5. 3) Ps. 119, 104 f.

4) *Diligenter attendendum est ad scribentis scopum* is a general rule of Hermeneutics. Cf. Lieber, *Legal and Political Hermeneutics*, III ed., p. 159.

The purpose of this law is restrictive. The Egyptians and the Cananites and others were licentious, as the people before the flood had been, *taking them wives of all which they chose.*<sup>1)</sup> This was a violation of the will of God. For though the divine blessing pronounced upon the first couple, *Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth,*<sup>2)</sup> implied that it was the will of God that the sons and daughters of Adam and Eve should intermarry, and thus *of one blood all nations of men* should come,<sup>3)</sup> yet such intermarriage of near kinsmen was not to continue in order for all times. The intermarriage of the first brothers and sisters was within the plan of creation, which provided for one common ancestor of mankind and one mother of all living,<sup>4)</sup> and for the propagation of the race from this common stock, the marriage of brothers and sisters in the first generation was a necessary means to the end. Such marriage and sexual intercourse is, therefore, not absolutely a violation of the creative order and the law of nature, and to dispose such marriages was not simply incompatible with the holiness of God, who might have avoided their necessity by creating two human couples, whose children might have intermarried to replenish the earth. But it was not the will of God, not within the creative order and the law of nature, that brothers should marry their sisters after such intermarriage had ceased to be a matter of necessity. Long before the promulgation of the written law, Abraham and the Egyptians and the Cananites knew that it was an abomination to marry one's own sister. For Abraham correctly presumed that the Egyptians and their king as well as Abimelech the Cananite would hold that if Sarah was Abraham's sister she could not be his wife.<sup>5)</sup> We read of no positive legislation or special revelation whereby they knew such marriage to be prohibited. The natural law inscribed in their hearts sufficed to teach them that what had been permitted to Cain was not lawful

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1) V. 3. Cf. Gen. 6, 2.

2) Gen. 1, 28.

3) Acts 17, 26.

4) Gen. 3, 20.

5) Gen. 12, 11—19; 20, 2—12.



in Abraham. But the time had come when the Egyptians and the Cananites had set aside this natural law and married regardless of consanguinity and affinity, though the law was still in force and binding upon them, and, as we shall see later on in this chapter, the nations not under the special law of Israel were looked upon by God as defiled by such abominations, and the iniquity thereof was to be visited upon them.<sup>1)</sup> Now, lest Israel, too, should be misled into such ignorance and sinful practices and incur the righteous wrath of God, the Lord republishes his holy will by promulgating these restrictive statutes, the written law of prohibited degrees. And the words which mark the sacred limits between prohibited and lawful marriage are, כָּל-שֹׁאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ, *all flesh of his flesh*. To assume for these words a vague and undefined meaning would be to frustrate the very end and purpose of the law, which is to define who may and who may not intermarry. In Lev. 25, 49 and Numb. 27, 11 we have *enlarging* statutes,<sup>2)</sup> the nature of which is to extend the limits of the law, and the terms, שֹׁאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ, are there used, accordingly, in a wider sense compatible with the scope of the law. Here, in a restrictive statute, the terms, to answer their purpose, must be taken in a stricter sense, the sense in which they determine within its narrowest limits what is here to be determined, the limits without and up to which marriage shall be lawful, but within which, as within a sacred circle, men must not penetrate in intermarriage. Hence the terms שֹׁאֵר and בָּשָׂר must, in our text, signify either nothing at all to the purpose, or the nearest kinship, the first degree of consanguinity or affinity, any person who, either by direct or common propagation, or by marriage, is one's flesh, one's father or mother, son or daughter, brother or sister, husband or wife. And the limit determined by the rule is that of כָּל-שֹׁאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ, *all flesh of one's flesh*, the nearest kin to one's nearest kin, as, the

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1) Lev. 18, 24 f.

2) Vid. Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 87.

father's daughter, the mother's daughter, a son's wife, a wife's mother, the father's sister, the mother's sister, a brother's wife, a wife's daughter, a wife's sister. All degrees within this limit are prohibited, be they שָׂאֵר, or בָּשָׂר, or שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ. What is beyond this limit, as far as this rule is concerned, is free. A man may not marry his sister or his natural mother or daughter; for they are his flesh. He may not marry his brother's or sister's daughter, for they are the flesh of his flesh. But he may marry the daughter of his father's brother or of his mother's sister; for they are the flesh of the flesh of his flesh, שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ בָּשָׂרוֹ.

It should, furthermore, be noted that the law says, בָּשָׂרוֹ כָּל-שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ, ALL *flesh of his flesh*. It is immaterial whether the kinship have arisen in wedlock or out of wedlock. A man's illegitimate sister is as truly *his flesh* as a sister born in wedlock. A son's concubine is as truly that son's flesh as his wife is, since *he which is joined to an harlot is one body; for two, saith he, shall be one flesh*,<sup>1)</sup> and a father who would marry his son's concubine would approach *the flesh of his flesh*. The degrees are the same, whether by whole or half blood. Thus, a man's sister is his flesh, whether they come from the same mother or from different mothers, if they have the same father, or from different fathers, if they have the same mother, and the man who marries a half brother's daughter or a half sister's daughter approaches *the flesh of his flesh*. But a wife's son by a former marriage may marry her husband's daughter by a former marriage; for she is the flesh of the flesh of his flesh, his father's wife's daughter.

The Hebrew wording of the rule, Lev. 18, 6, decides still another point. We hold that valid betrothal, the expressed mutual consent of marriageable parties to be husband and wife, constitutes the essence of marriage, according to the maxim that *consensus, non concubitus facit*

1) 1 Cor. 6, 16.

*matrimonium*. Parents call their son's betrothed bride their daughter before the consummation of the marriage. Yet this relationship does not constitute or create a prohibited degree under the law; for by betrothal the two are not made *one flesh*, as by sexual intercourse; the one is not yet the other's שָׂאֵר or בֶּשֶׁר, and a man is not barred from marrying his deceased brother's betrothed bride, who, having not yet become one flesh with his brother, is not the *flesh of his flesh*. For the same reason a deceased bride's sister is not within the prohibition, but may be taken in marriage according to the letter and spirit of the law. On the other hand, according to the terms of the law, affinity being an impediment not because of the *vinculum matrimoniale*, but because of sexual coition, the impediment by affinity remains in force, though the *vinculum* have been dissolved by death or divorce. For such dissolution does not undo the fact that carnal knowledge has taken place between the parties so related. Hence, to marry one's own father's or brother's or son's widow is still approaching to *the flesh of one's flesh*, and, therefore, prohibited under the general statute.

In view of all these applications of the rule it appears that, while, with the assumption of any but the strict signification of the terms, Lev. 18, 6 would be of no use at all as a restrictive statute and, in fact, of no real use in any sense, the rule properly understood is a perfect masterpiece of legislation, so simple in its application that every man and woman of average intelligence can, by this rule, determine in every given case, whether a marriage is lawful or prohibited by the statute, and so sure in its operation that all the cases are covered, a veritable lamp unto our feet and light unto our path. Thus, and thus only, we have here a statute which sheds forth the glory of the wisdom and goodness of Him who has affixed his signature thereto, אֲנִי יְהוָה, I JEHOVAH. By this solemn mark of authority the Lord would say, Let every man heed what I here enjoin,

and beware of trespassing beyond the limit I have here defined!

We are aware that there are those who hold different views concerning the import of the text, v. 6. They may be divided into two classes. Some would have *שאר בשרו* to denote only relatives in the first degree, as parents, children, brothers, sisters, or even restrict the meaning of the term to the kinship between parent and child. They look upon verse 6 as the first of a series of special statutes, the prohibition of a man's marriage with his daughter. But they cannot point to a single instance where *שאר בשרו* is used in this sense. And if they could, they would still fail to make their point, which is the refusal to accept certain arguments based upon the computation of degrees. For there is no prohibited degree which is not represented in kind by some one or several of the special statutes following what we consider the general rule. Others maintain that *שאר בשרו* as well as *שאר* must be taken for *relatives* generally, and look upon verse 6 as something akin to a caption in a statute book, stating in a broad way the subject matter of the ensuing paragraphs. But verse 6 is more than a caption; it is a statute in form and substance, a prohibitory, restrictive statute, if it is anything at all. That *שאר בשרו* anywhere else in the Hebrew Bible stands simply for *שאר* is an assertion which has not been and cannot be proved.<sup>1)</sup> And if it could, an *usus loquendi* according to which *the flesh of his flesh* might signify relationship of every degree, however near or remote, would be inadmissible *here*. It is excluded by the word *כָּל*, which demands that *שאר בשרו* should be taken in its *whole* compass. Hence this compass *must be definite*. And this compass cannot extend to all relatives. That there are some relatives, also by consanguinity, such as first and second cousins, with whom mar-

1) In Lev. 20, 19 the pronoun *his* may refer and probably refers to *father*, the masculine noun next preceding the word having the personal suffix י. Cf. Lev. 18, 12, 13.

riage is not prohibited, is conceded on all sides. Hence, when God says: "Every man shall, in marriage, abstain from ALL *flesh of his flesh*," the words *flesh of his flesh* must be used in a sense which does *not* comprise first and second cousins and other relatives avowedly unprohibited.

What has been said concerning the general statute, v. 6, is in all its parts and details borne out by the subsequent context. Here we have a series of special statutes, by which the general rule is applied and exemplified. This series extends from v. 7 to v. 17 of the chapter. All these special statutes are, as the general statute, prohibitions of intermarriage within certain degrees of carnal relationship. The series comprises degrees of consanguinity and degrees of affinity enumerated promiscuously, the cases mentioned in vv. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 17 being of the former, and those in vv. 8, 14, 15, and 16, of the latter class. In every instance but one we have a relationship that comes within the compass of the general statute, carnal kinships included in the limit of שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂר, kinships of the first or the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. All these cases but the exceptional one are distinctly referred to the general statute, inasmuch as in each case the reason given for the prohibition is a proximity of kinship encompassed within the terms of the general statute. And this is all the more apparent, since in the only instance which exceeds that limit the same reason is not given, but another.

The relationships mentioned as precluding intermarriage are those of a man and his mother,<sup>1)</sup> his stepmother,<sup>2)</sup> his sister or half sister,<sup>3)</sup> his son's daughter,<sup>4)</sup> his daughter's daughter,<sup>5)</sup> his stepmother's daughter,<sup>6)</sup> his father's sister,<sup>7)</sup> his mother's sister,<sup>8)</sup> his uncle's wife,<sup>9)</sup> his daughter-in-law,<sup>10)</sup> his brother's wife,<sup>11)</sup> his wife's daughter or granddaughter.<sup>12)</sup>

1) v. 7.

2) v. 8.

3) v. 9.

4) v. 10.

5) v. 10.

6) v. 11.

7) v. 12.

8) v. 13.

9) v. 14.

10) v. 15.

11) v. 16.

12) v. 17.

Other kinships, also covered by the general rule, but not mentioned in the special statutes, are those of a man and his daughter, his mother-in-law, his brother's daughter, his sister's daughter, and his deceased wife's sister, all of whom are within the limit of *the flesh of his flesh*, and are, therefore, excluded from marriage with him by the general statute and by special statutes covering like degrees and stating a ground of prohibition applicable to both. That the specification was not intended to be exhaustive, and that the omission of a case is not a license, appears also from the fact that of marriage with one's mother-in-law, which is not specified in Leviticus, we read in Deuteronomy, *Cursed be he that lieth with his mother in law. And all the people shall say, Amen.*<sup>1)</sup>

What we have gathered from a survey of the series will further appear as we examine the special statutes seriatim.

In verse 7 we have a prohibition of marriage with one's natural mother: *The nakedness of thy father, or the nakedness of thy mother shalt thou not uncover: she is thy mother; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness.* It has already been pointed out that *to uncover nakedness* in these statutes cannot primarily mean *to commit fornication*, there being no reason why God should, in prohibiting this sin, take such special care to define the various kinships within which a sin should be avoided which is simply unlawful everywhere. For a similar reason the scope of this verse, as also of verses 8, 14, 15, 16, and 17, cannot be to prohibit adultery or adulterous marriages as such, the union with a person who has a husband living, as this sin is specially prohibited in verse 20: *thou shalt not lie carnally with thy neighbor's wife*, and is a heinous sin everywhere and under all circumstances, kinship or no kinship. What the statute would prohibit is incestuous or quasi incestuous marriage, marriage in a prohibited degree of kinship. A man, according

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1) Deut. 27, 23.

to v. 7, must not marry his natural mother, also where no adultery would be committed, i. e., after his father's death. By such marriage and the consummation thereof in carnal coition he would uncover not only his mother's, but also his father's nakedness. Hence it is clear that under the divine law the kinship created by affinity is in force also after the death of the one party.

The same appears from the 8 verse: *The nakedness of thy father's wife shalt thou not uncover: it is thy father's nakedness.* Here a man is prohibited from marrying his stepmother, who is not his natural mother, but his father's wife by later marriage. The reason assigned in the statute is, again, not that such marriage would be adulterous, but that it would be incestuous, in a prohibited degree of affinity, שָׂאֵר בָּשָׂרוֹ, the stepmother's nakedness being also the father's nakedness, as the two are one flesh and the father's wife or widow is to his son the *flesh of his flesh*. That the prohibition refers also to the deceased father's wife, further appears from Lev. 20, 11: *The man that lieth with his father's wife hath uncovered his father's nakedness: both of them shall surely be put to death.* For this statute is immediately preceded by another, saying: *The man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbor's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death.* This statute would fully cover, penalty and all, the subsequent statute if the latter only referred to adultery with the living father's wife, and not to incest with the father's widow. This is the form of incest of which St. Paul speaks 1 Cor. 5, 1—5, describing it, not as *porxia*, adultery, but *porneia*, fornication, illicit carnal commerce, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the Gentiles.<sup>1)</sup> Of such incestuous connections the Roman Lawyer Severus says: *Si quis viduam . . . cognatam, cum qua nuptias contra-*

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1) 1 Cor. 5, 1.

*here non potest, corruperit, in insulam deportandus est;*<sup>1)</sup> i. e., "If any man has defiled a widow akin to him, with whom he cannot contract marriage, he shall be deported to an island."

The following verses refer to degrees of consanguinity.

V. 9. *The nakedness of thy sister, the daughter of thy father, or daughter of thy mother, whether she be born at home or born abroad, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover.* The sister here mentioned is the half-sister born in the common parent's former wedlock, either at home, in the common father's family, by his deceased wife, or abroad, in a different, viz. the common mother's family, by her former husband. The sister is, in either case, an elder sister, yet her brother's שׂוֹרֵר, and hence akin to him in a prohibited degree.

In verse 10, marriage with one's grandchildren is prohibited: *The nakedness of thy son's daughter, or of thy daughter's daughter, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover; for theirs is thine own nakedness.* The difference between this relationship and the preceding one is that the former was in collateral lines, while the present one is in the direct line. Thus we see that both lines of consanguinity are covered by the law. And there is no difference, whether the grandchild be the son's daughter or the daughter's daughter; the degree being the same, the effect is the same. The grandchild's nakedness is said to be the grandfather's nakedness; for the one is the other's flesh. But in v. 16, the wife's nakedness is said to be her husband's nakedness; for they, too, are one flesh. This shows that the effects of consanguinity and of affinity are the same under the law of prohibited degrees.

The 11 verse says: *The nakedness of thy father's wife's daughter, begotten of thy father, she is thy sister, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness.* This case differs

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1) Instit. I. II.



somewhat from that mentioned in v. 9. There it was an elder sister, here it is a younger sister, with whom marriage is prohibited, a daughter whom the man's stepmother bore to his father. The degree being in both cases the same, the effect is again the same. Brother and sister, though variously conceived, are each other's flesh and must not intermarry.

That a sister is her brother's *flesh* is expressly said in verse 12: *Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's sister: she is thy father's near kinswoman*, or, his שׂאָר, *his flesh*. But being the father's *flesh*, she is to the son the *flesh of his flesh* and therefore prohibited to him in marriage because of this near kinship by consanguinity.

The same degree, though of a different genesis, is specified in verse 13: *Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother's sister: for she is thy mother's near kinswoman*. Here again the near kinship, that the mother's sister is her שׂאָר, *her flesh*, and hence to that mother's son the *flesh of his flesh*, is given as the reason why a man should not marry his mother's sister, even as he should not marry his father's sister, and for the same reason. In this instance, and also in the preceding case, another reason might have been given. The father's sister as well as the mother's sister is an aunt, and thus a superior relative, whom the nephew should, accordingly, respect. But in neither case does the Lawgiver say, *For she is thine aunt*. In both instances, v. 12 and v. 13, the prohibition of intermarriage is based upon the sameness of *flesh*, whereby the case comes under the general statute, *None of you shall approach to the flesh of his flesh, to uncover their nakedness*.

But there was an *aunt* who did not come under this rule, and whom, for another reason, the Lawgiver deemed it proper to mention in this connection as prohibited from marriage with her nephew. The Lord proceeds, verse 14: *Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's brother; thou shalt not approach to his wife: SHE IS THINE AUNT*.

Here we have a degree of affinity which is not covered by the general statute, v. 6. The wife of one's father's brother is not the nephew's *שָׁאֵר בְּשָׂרִי*, but the *flesh of the flesh of his flesh*, one degree beyond the kinship defined in the general rule and exemplified in the preceding special statutes. Hence the Lawgiver does not here base the prohibition on the degree of kinship, but gives a different reason, saying, *For she is thine aunt*, a person who, because of her relationship with thy father, should rank above thee, while, as thy wife, she would be subordinate to thee, her head and lord. Hence, though in this case the degree of kinship would be no bar to the marriage, the conflict between the respect due to the father and aunt on the one hand and the respect due to the husband on the other hand should be avoided, and a marriage involving such conflict is for this reason prohibited. It is, of course, the *deceased* uncle's wife who is here denied to the nephew; for to marry a living uncle's wife would be adultery and for *this* reason prohibited. On the other hand, the marriage of a niece with her deceased aunt's husband is not prohibited for any reason, neither for the degree of kinship, which is beyond the prohibited degrees, nor for the *respectus parentelae*, which is not in conflict but agrees with the respect she owes her uncle. But the niece in the nearer degree, the brother's or sister's daughter, is prohibited, being to the uncle the *flesh of his flesh*, related in the same degree as the father's or mother's sister prohibited in vv. 12 and 13.

Having thus disposed of the exceptional case where it was suggested by the context, the Lord proceeds, verse 15: *Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy daughter in law: she is thy son's wife; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness*. As fornication and adultery is prohibited in every case and form, and, hence, no special prohibitions are annexed to the general prohibition of adultery, verse 20, the present special statute, which also deals with a degree of affinity, presumes the death of the son whose wife is here

denied to the father-in-law, being the *flesh of his flesh*, the *flesh*, by marriage, of him who is his *flesh* by direct propagation.

The statute of verse 15 refers to a case in which one of the connections was by lineal consanguinity and the other by affinity. The following statute describes a case where one of the connections is by collateral consanguinity and the other, again, by affinity, verse 16: *Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife: it is thy brother's nakedness*. For the reasons stated above, the death of the brother is here assumed, and the marriage prohibited is with a deceased brother's wife, who is to her brother-in-law the *flesh of his flesh*. That marriage produces oneness of flesh is here expressly stated as the reason why marriage is in this case prohibited; the wife's nakedness is her husband's nakedness; they are one flesh.<sup>1)</sup> This decides also the parallel case, that of marriage with the deceased wife's sister. According to verse 13, a woman's sister is her *flesh*. Both the brother's wife and the wife's sister are sisters-in-law; the kinships are equidistant, made up, in each case, by two connections, one by collateral consanguinity and one by affinity. And as in the one case, marriage with the sister-in-law is prohibited expressly because of the existing kinship, marriage with the sister-in-law in the other case, the kinship being equidistant and made up of the same elements, is also prohibited. In like manner the prohibition of marriage with the daughter-in-law, v. 15, implies also the prohibition of marriage with the mother-in-law, the two kinships being likewise equidistant and made up of the same elements of consanguinity and affinity. To deny that the marriage with the deceased wife's sister is prohibited, because that prohibition is not expressly mentioned in a special statute, though covered by the general

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1) Cf. v. 8 where the nakedness of the father's wife is said to be the father's nakedness.

statute and the special statute in verse 16, is as groundless as the denial of the prohibition of marriage with the deceased wife's mother would be on the plea that such marriage is not expressly prohibited by special statute in Leviticus. Now we know that the latter marriage, which is also covered by the general statute and the special statute concerning the daughter-in-law, v. 15, is a damnable abomination, from what we read in Deut. 27, 23. This conclusively shows that a marriage is not admissible because it is not specially prohibited in Lev. 18, where the prohibited degrees are enumerated. Where in Lev. 18, or where from Genesis to Revelation, is a father's marriage with his daughter expressly and by special statute proscribed? We know that such marriage is forbidden, because it comes within the compass of the general rule, v. 6, and the same degrees are covered by special statutes, as vv. 7 and 10, stating the nearness of kinship as the reason of the prohibition. And in like manner we know that marriage with the deceased wife's sister is prohibited, because such marriage comes under the general prohibitory statute, v. 6, and is covered by special statute, referring to the same degrees and elements of kinship, v. 16, and also giving this nearness of kinship as the reason for the prohibition.

All this is in accordance with the rules governing the interpretation, construction, and application of laws everywhere. In England, wherever the word "king" occurs in a law, it is understood that the word "queen" is to be assumed when the monarch is a woman, and the term "queen's bench" at once takes the place of the term "king's bench" as soon as a female succeeds a male royal ruler of the realm. The statute of the Roman Twelve Tables, *Si pater filium ter venum duit filius a patre liber esto*,<sup>1)</sup> certainly included daughters and grandchildren, though they were not expressly named, according to the legal maxim, *Filii appel-*

1) "If a father sell his son thrice, the son shall be free from the father."

*latione omnes liberos intelligimus*, and when Roman jurists restricted the effect of the statute to the sons, they knew that they were not interpreting the law according to its genuine sense, but taking advantage of the letter of an unpopular law to weaken its effect by declaring daughters and grandchildren emancipated after a single sale. They did very much as many theologians, and others who are not theologians, do in the interpretation or application of Lev. 18, who also take undue advantage of what they consider the letter of the law. An example of marriage legislation also comprising an enumeration of prohibited connections which was not intended to be exhaustive we have in the Institutions of Justinian, Tit. X, *De Nuptiis*. Here we read: § 11. *Sunt et aliae personae, quae propter diversas rationes nuptias contrahere prohibentur*, i. e., "There are still other persons who are, for various reasons, prohibited from contracting marriage." As an instructive point of coincidence we mention that Justinian too, treating of degrees of affinity, speaks of the "stepdaughter," the "daughter-in-law," the "step-mother," and the "mother-in-law," where the *vinculum matrimoniale* by which that kinship was superinduced no longer exists but the effect of the kinship as a bar to inter-marriage remains. He says: § 6. *Adfinitatis quoque ratione quarundam nuptiis abstinere necesse est: ut ecce privignam aut nurum uxorem ducere non licet, quia utraeque filiae loco sunt*; i. e., "By reason of affinity, too, marriage with certain women must be abstained from. Thus, it is not permitted to take in marriage the stepdaughter or the daughter-in-law, because both hold the place of daughters." This is the law: a man must not marry his stepdaughter or his daughter-in-law, because of their near kinship by affinity. And where this reason is given, the bond of wedlock which brought about the kinship by affinity is, also according to Justinian, supposed to be dissolved, either by death or divorce. This appears from the explanatory words which follow; viz.: *Quod ita scilicet accipi debet, si fuit*

*nurus aut privigna tua. Nam si adhuc nurus est, id est, si adhuc nupta est filio tuo, alia ratione uxorem eam ducere non possis, quia ea duobus nupta esse non potest. Item si adhuc privigna tua est, id est si mater ejus tibi nupta est, ideo eam uxorem ducere non poteris, quia duas uxores eodem tempore habere non licet; i. e., "which must be understood thus: if she has been your daughter-in-law or stepdaughter. For if she is still your daughter-in-law, that is, if she is still married to your son, you cannot take her in marriage for another reason, because she cannot be married to two men. Likewise, if she is still your stepdaughter, that is, if her mother is married to you, you cannot take her for a wife because you are not allowed to have two wives at the same time."* Then follows the next paragraph of the law with a similar explanation: § 7. *Socrum quoque et novercam uxorem ducere prohibitum est, quia matris loco sunt. Quod et ipsum dissoluta demum adfinitate procedit. Alioquin, si adhuc noverca est, id est, si adhuc patri tuo nupta est, communi jure impeditur tibi nubere, quia eadem duobus nupta esse non potest. Item si adhuc socrus est, id est, si adhuc filia ejus tibi nupta est, ideo impediuntur nuptiae, quia duas uxores habere non possis; i. e., "To take in marriage a mother-in-law or a stepmother is also prohibited, because they hold the place of a mother. And this, too, obtains when the affinity has been dissolved. Otherwise, when she is still your stepmother, that is, when she is still married to your father, she is by common law prevented from marrying you, because she cannot be married to two men. Likewise, if she is yet your mother-in-law, that is, if her daughter is still married to you, the marriage is hindered by this reason, that you cannot have two wives."* Here, again, the Emperor calls attention to the fact that when affinity and the kinship accruing therefrom is considered as the reason for the prohibition of marriage in certain cases, the supposition is always that the marriage itself by which the affinity and kinship was super-

induced no longer exists, that the *vinculum* has been, by death or otherwise, dissolved, while the effect still operates as a bar to the parties so related. Otherwise, the previous marriage still existing, the offense committed by the illicit marriage under consideration would come under the common head of adultery, which is a sin and crime anyway, kinship or no kinship. Indeed, the clamor for proof that in Lev. 18, 16 the *deceased* brother's wife is meant, or the bold assertion that it is the *living* brother's wife, is an absurdity which, but for its evil tendency and dangerous consequences, would be hardly worthy of serious consideration.

After this digression we return to the exposition of our chapter. The series of special prohibitory statutes is continued, verse 17: *Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter, or her daughter's daughter, to uncover her nakedness; for they are her near kinswomen; it is wickedness.* Here as before the purpose of the lawgiver cannot be to proscribe polygamy or adultery. For in this case there would be no sense in describing a particular kinship and pointing out the sameness of flesh, as this statute does. The statute, by the words *שֶׁאֵרָהָ הֵנָּה* *they are her flesh*, brings the case under the general rule and states the reason for the prohibition, the kinship existing between a man and the daughter or granddaughter of his wife, the *flesh of his flesh*. Hence the marriage here prohibited is not the contemporaneous polygamous marriage of a man with a woman and her daughter or granddaughter, but the consecutive marriage of a man with the daughter or granddaughter of his deceased wife. This union is termed *וְיָקָר*, a lewd *design*, because of its eminently repugnant character, and, perhaps, to mark the end of the series of special statutes under the general rule laid down and placed at the head of them in verse 6. For with verse 17 the line of special prohibitions begun in verse 7, in which certain degrees of kinship are described and such kinship is pointed out as the reason for the pro-

hibition of marriage, is brought to a close, and the epithet added to the last in the series may be fitly referred to all the rest, they being all essentially of the same kind, though not all of the same gravity. This is clear from the difference in the penalties imposed by the Lawgiver. For the offenders against verses 7, 8, 9, 15, 17 the penalty was death, according to Lev. 20, 11. 12. 14. 17. Of the offenders against verses 12, 13, 14, 16, the Lord says, they shall bear their iniquity, they shall die childless, Lev. 20, 19—21. Such marriages, when once contracted and consummated, were not to be dissolved.

These, then, are the degrees of consanguinity and affinity within which consecutive marriages are prohibited according to Lev. 18, 6—17. The subsequent statute, v. 18, is this: *Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her life time.* This prohibition does not speak of marriage with the deceased wife's sister, either expressly or by implication; but, as is clear from the words, *beside the other in her life time*, a man is here prohibited from being the husband of two women at the same time. Whether the two women be two sisters as the word is commonly understood among us, or אִשָּׁה אֶל-אֲחֹתָהּ, *a woman to her sister*, stands for *a woman to another woman*, may be a matter of dispute. The constant usage of the phrase אִשָּׁה אֶל-אֲחֹתָהּ or the corresponding masculine form, אִישׁ אֶל-אָחִיו, appears from the following quotations:—Gen. 13, 11: *And they separated themselves, THE ONE FROM THE OTHER.* Exod. 16, 15: *And when the children of Israel saw it, they said ONE TO THE OTHER—.* Exod. 26, 5: *That the loops may take hold ONE OF THE OTHER.* Exod. 26, 6:—*and couple the curtains TOGETHER with the taches.* Exod. 26, 17: *Two tenons shall there be in one board, set in order ONE AGAINST ANOTHER.* Exod. 37,—*with their faces ONE TO ANOTHER.* Numb. 14, 4: *And they said ONE TO ANOTHER, Let us make a captain.* Jer. 23, 35: *Thus shall ye say every one to his neighbor, and EVERY ONE*



TO HIS BROTHER. Jer. 25, 26: *And all the kings of the north, far and near, ONE WITH ANOTHER*—. Ezek. 1, 9: *Their wings were joined ONE TO ANOTHER*. Ezek. 1, 23: *And under the firmament were their wings straight, THE ONE TOWARD THE OTHER*. Ezek. 3, 13: *I heard also the noise of the wings of the living creatures that TOUCHED ONE ANOTHER*. Joel 2, 8: *Neither shall ONE trust ANOTHER; they shall walk every one in his path*. In all these instances, the words we have given in capitals stand for the Hebrew *אשה אל-אחיה* or *איש אל-אחיו*, a woman to her sister, or a man to his brother. According to this uniform *usus loquendi*, the meaning of our text, Lev. 18, 18, would be: *Neither shalt thou take one woman to another*, etc. This interpretation, according to which the import of verse 18 is simply a prohibition of polygamy, has in its favor the constant and uniform *usus loquendi* of the Hebrew scriptures, from Genesis to Malachi, and the interpreter should ask for good and sufficient reason why the present text should be looked upon as the only exception from this general usage before rejecting what would be the sense of the text according to such usage. The statement that the phrase in question means "one to another" only when preceded by a plural noun is not tenable in view of Numb. 16, 4. Jer. 23, 35 and Mal. 2, 10. The objection that the text cannot be a prohibition of polygamy because polygamy was permitted by the Mosaic law is an argument involving a *petitio principii*; for the chapter and verse of the Mosaic law where polygamy is licensed can not be shown. That polygamy was practiced by David and Solomon and others, while monogamous marriage was certainly the rule in Israel, is no more conclusive proof of polygamy being permitted by the law, than the open and extensive sale of intoxicants on Sunday in a city like St. Louis, where such traffic is prohibited by the existing Sunday law, is proof that such law cannot mean what it says, but requires an interpretation according to which it would not say what it says, and say what it does not say.

That the ancient versions agree with the rendering of the English Bible is not a decisive argument for the correctness of such rendering; for the ancient versions are no more authoritative than the English version is, while the Hebrew Bible is authoritative for the interpretation of a Hebrew text, and the meaning of Hebrew words and phrases must be determined by the Hebrew Bible, not by a Greek, Latin, or English version, or by all three combined. There is but one objection which is of weight and seems to speak in favor of the English wording of the text. It is this, that in all the preceding context the Hebrew words for *woman*, or *wife*, and *sister*, are employed as these words are taken in the English version of verse 18. This argument loses some of its weight when we consider that with verse 18 a new series of statutes begins, and therefore the bearing of the previous context upon this verse is not what it would otherwise be. The reason for the prohibition of the union described in verse 18, as given in this verse, is not that given in the previous verses, the near kinship existing between the two wives, and the marriage here prohibited is not consecutive, as in the previous cases, but contemporaneous, as appears from the words, *beside the other in her life time*. And if, as we have shown above, the prohibition of the *deceased* wife's sister is implied in the prohibition of marriage with the deceased brother's wife, the degrees being equidistant and composed of corresponding elements, the prohibition of marriage with the *living* wife's sister is certainly not a continuation of a series of homogeneous prohibitory statutes, but, whatever its import may be, certainly introduces a new species of prohibitions, such as the prohibition of polygamy would be. There is but one consideration which would account for a special statute covering the contemporaneous marriage of a man with two sisters in the Mosaic law as particularly intended for the people of Israel. It is the consideration of the fact that this people was sprung from just such a union, that of Jacob with the two sisters Leah and

Rachel, and the supposition that the descendants of an ancestor so married might be inclined to repeat what their great ancestor had done, to take two sisters in marriage. This might account for a special prohibition of a form of polygamy for which the history of this people might appear to afford a special inducement or excuse. But be this as it may; one thing is certain, that verse 18 has nothing to say concerning the legality or illegality of marriage with the *deceased* wife's sister. This marriage is prohibited by the general rule, verse 6, and by the special statutes covering the same degree, and if for some particular reason marriage with the living wife's sister is particularly prohibited, this prohibition does not as a matter of course nullify the previous prohibition of marriage with the deceased wife's sister. In the state of Missouri there was a particular reason for a statute that said: "All persons of color living or cohabiting together as husband and wife, without being married according to the provisions of this chapter, shall be liable to a criminal prosecution." This statute, which was made a part of the marriage law of the State in 1865, as section 16 of the chapter on *Marriage and Marriage contracts*, never implied that persons *not* "of color" might cohabit together as husband and wife, without being married according to law, even though no prohibition of such cohabitation of white persons was embodied in the chapter on Marriage. It is remarkable that we find no special penalty imposed on the marriage prohibited in verse 18. But this, again, does not indicate that a man might at his pleasure regard or disregard this law, which is a reassertion of a dictate of the natural law.

In verse 19 we read: *Also thou shalt not approach unto a woman to uncover her nakedness, as long as she is put apart for her uncleanness.*

Verse 20 is a statute against adultery: *Moreover thou shalt not lie carnally with thy neighbor's wife, to defile thyself with her.*

Verse 21 prohibits a species of spiritual adultery: *And thou shalt not let any of thy seed pass through the fire to Molech, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I am the Lord.*

And two more species of sexual uncleanness are prohibited in the subsequent verses: Verse 22: *Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: it is abomination.* Verse 23: *Neither shalt thou lie with any beast to defile thyself therewith: neither shall any woman stand before a beast to lie down thereto: it is confusion.*

These are the statutes of the section or sections marked by the opening verses of this chapter. And as they were preceded by a general admonition, so they are closely followed by a general admonition and warning. Verses 24—30: *Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things: for in all these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you. And the land is defiled: therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants. Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, and shall not commit any of these abominations; neither any of your own nation, nor any stranger that sojourneth among you:—(for all these abominations have the men of the land done which were before you, and the land is defiled;) that the land spue not you out also, when ye defile it, as it spued out the nations that were before you. For whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even the souls that commit them shall be cut off from among their people. Therefore shall ye keep mine ordinance, that ye commit not any one of these abominable customs, which were committed before you, and that ye defile not yourselves therein: I am the Lord your God.*

From the repeated reference to the Gentile nations who had practiced and still practiced the abominations mentioned and prohibited in the preceding statutes, and from the reference to the divine punishment imposed and inflicted upon such Gentiles for such abominations committed

by them, whereby they had defiled themselves and the land they inhabited, it is clear that the abominations thus censured and punished were, in the sight of God, offenses against a law not binding upon the people of Israel only, but sins against the moral law binding upon Israel and the Gentiles alike, a law which was in force before the laws of Moses were enacted and promulgated. And hence it furthermore appears that the statutes contained in Leviticus XVIII, also the laws concerning marriage within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity, are not specifically Jewish laws, binding upon the Israelites only, but reassertions and reenactments of precepts of the moral law, binding upon both Jews and Gentiles, and valid for all times, during and after the Mosaic dispensation. The Gentiles are nowhere said to have incurred divine punishment and defiled the land by not observing the Jewish Sabbath, by letting their cattle gender with a diverse kind, by sowing their fields with mingled seed or wearing garments mingled of linen and woolen,<sup>1)</sup> or by eating pork and other food denied to Israel.

The objection that Lev. 18, 16 and similar statutes could not be considered precepts of the moral law, inasmuch as the moral law admitted of no exceptions, while God himself had ordained an exception from Lev. 18, 16 in the levirate, Deut. 25, 5, is an argument based upon an erroneous view of the moral law. The moral law is not an absolute norm, superior even to the righteous will of God, so that even God must shape his legislative enactments in accordance therewith. God is righteous not inasmuch as he conforms his will and acts to the moral law, but as he is his own moral norm, and the ordinances of his holy will are the norm of right to his subjects. And while there is not in God a change of will,<sup>2)</sup> there may be in him a will to change.<sup>3)</sup> Certain mutual relations of created beings

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1) Lev. 19, 19.

2) Mal. 3, 6. 1 Sam. 15, 29. Ps. 110, 4. James 1, 17.

3) Gen. 6, 6 f.

were ordained and established by the Creator from the beginning and for all times, and in establishing these relations, God had certain general ends in view. But when for the achievement of these or other general or special ends and purposes he sees fit to ordain ways and means beside or beyond his general ordinances, this does not necessitate or justify the assumption of conflicting wills in God. It is not an inconsistency in God to ordain that brothers and sisters should not intermarry and that Cain should marry his sister, or to punish a brother and his sister for doing to-day what Cain did under divine sanction. And, likewise, the fact that God ordained that in Israel, for a certain end, "If a man died, having no children, his brother should marry his wife, and raise up seed to his brother," is by no means incompatible with the prohibition of marriage with a deceased brother's wife as we find it in Lev. 18, 16 for all cases not covered by Deut. 25, 2, whether among Jews or among Gentiles. The same God who willed the one also willed the other, though not by the same act of volition. And yet the moral law remains a revelation of the immutable will of God. God never willed otherwise than that, certain cases excepted, persons mutually related within certain degrees should not intermarry. And the same God never willed otherwise than that in those cases by himself excepted those whom his will concerned should act accordingly; God never willed otherwise than that Cain should marry his sister and that from the days of Moses to those of John the Baptist the law of the levirate should be observed by the people of Israel in all cases to which that law applied. And in each instance, the will of God was good and just and holy. To dictate to God that if he willed the one he could not will the other is a species of rationalistic presumption based upon crude, unscriptural notions of God and his attributes, and construed by faulty processes of reasoning as unlogical as they are untheological. A. G.

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