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Doctrinal Theology.

CHRISTOLOGY

Christology is the doctrine of the holy Scriptures concerning the Person and the Office and Work of Christ, the Redeemer and Savior of mankind. The doctrine of Christ is not a product of human speculation, or of a process of evolution from the consciousness of the church. *Search the Scriptures*, says Christ, *for they are they which testify of me,*¹⁾ and the risen Lord himself taught his disciples from the same source; *beginning at Moses and at all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself.*²⁾ Christ is also the central subject of the New Testament. *The Gospels were written, that we might believe that Jesus is the Christ.*³⁾ The modern distinction between the historical Christ and the Christ of Scripture is a delusion. The Christ of Moses and the prophets, the apostles and evangelists, and no other, is the historic Christ, that was, and is, and shall be. All other Christs, the Christs of Ebionites and Docetists, of Gnostics and Manichaeans, of Nestorians and Eutychians and Apollinarians, of Monophysites and Monothelites, of Socinians and other Unitarians, of Schleiermacher and Strauss and Schenkel and Renan, are caricatures or fictions,

1) John 5, 39.

2) Luke 24, 27.

3) John 20, 31.

Practical Theology.

THE PASTOR AND THE LABOR QUESTION.

The labor question is one of the burning questions of the day. It is one of the great social problems with which many a busy mind has been grappling, and which is to-day as far from a satisfactory solution as it ever was at any previous time, a problem which, it is safe to say, will never be satisfactorily solved in this world of sin and selfishness. But the day may come, and may not be far distant, when this Gordian knot will be violently cut asunder, not with the sword of a Macedonian ruler, but with axes and cleavers in the callous hands of laboring men.

As a social problem, the labor question concerns every member of human society, the Christian pastor not excluded, and if superior intelligence and a wider field of vision are advantages which he enjoys before many of his fellow-men, it would seem proper that the Christian minister should be better informed concerning the various phases and the present status of the labor question than many who feel that they and the like of them were holding a lease on the interests of labor and all the ways and means therewith connected. It is therefore eminently proper that the minister as a citizen and an intelligent member of the community should make himself in a fair measure familiar with the fundamentals of social science, the great leading principles underlying the phenomena of industrial life and with these phenomena as related to such principles.

On the other hand, in his official capacity of a spiritual adviser, as a teacher and guide whose proper task and purpose is to lead immortal souls through the kingdom of grace to the kingdom of glory, the pastor should consider the secular interests of the labor question and of every other

social problem entirely foreign to his peculiar sphere. The kingdom for which, in war and in peace, his official services are enlisted, is not of this world. The doctrines which he is to promulgate and inculcate are not those of political economy and social science, but of theology. His authorities are not Smith and Ricardo and Say and Carey, but Moses and the prophets, the apostles and evangelists. It is not his business to discuss the expediency of trade unions, of strikes and boycotts, of walking delegates and traveling cards, from secular points of view, any more than it is within his pastoral province to preach on the merits or demerits of Swiss or Elgin watches, animal or vegetable diet, beer, wine, or soda water, brass or stringed instruments, single or double entry bookkeeping, or the management of a newspaper.

And yet it may become a pastor's duty to take a member of his congregation to task for mismanagement of his paper, for malfeasance in bookkeeping, for the use or abuse of his violin, for his consumption of beer or wine, for his dealings in watches or jewelry. If the importer of watches or diamonds defraud the government of its revenues, if wine or beer be taken or dispensed to others to excess, if the violinist furnish music for the orgies of a riotous company, if the bookkeeper make fraudulent entries to conceal his own or other people's thefts, or if the publisher of a newspaper prostitute his sheet to the interests of a lascivious stage and ungodly societies and amusements, the pastor must not shirk his duty by ignoring these things as foreign to his proper province, or allow himself to be silenced by the sinner's objection that other people's watches and beverages, fiddles and account books, and publications, were none of the pastor's business. Thus, also, when business corporations or trade unions pursue their aims or choose and use their ways and means in violation and defiance of the law of God, and members of his congregation are in danger of fellowship with such unfruitful works of darkness, a faithful pastor,

whom God has *made a watchman unto the house of Israel*,¹⁾ will not hesitate to *warn the righteous man, that the righteous sin not*.²⁾ If in consequence of a pastor's neglect of duty in this point any member of his flock go astray and lose his soul, his blood shall be required of the pastor's hand.³⁾ Where danger threatens the fold, a sleeping watchman is worse than no watchman at all. Hence, when a social movement is fraught with a multitude of sins, it is incumbent upon the Christian minister to have an eye on that movement and to warn his people in due time to beware of the snares of Satan, lest they be entangled and come to grief. And as a thing may be sinful in its nature, or, while good in itself, may be so bound up with sinful circumstances that it cannot be used without sin, it is the pastor's duty to inform himself on the nature of industrial organizations, their aims and methods, on the nature, the theory and practice, of strikes and lock-outs and other measures employed by these organizations for the accomplishment of their purposes. And this is by no means an easy task. This knowledge cannot be acquired by an occasional talk with laborers or their employers, nor by the perusal of a popular work on trade unions, or some treatise on political economy, nor from "what the papers say." Even a painstaking investigation from what may be looked upon as the most reliable sources accessible may lead to not very satisfactory results. In 1867 a Royal Commission was appointed in England "to inquire into the organization and rules of Trade Unions and other Associations, whether of workmen or employers, and into the effect produced by such Unions and Associations on the workmen and employers respectively, on the relations between workmen and employers, and on the trade and industry of the country." The investigation was carried on in 1867, 1868, and 1869. The commissioners scrutinized the constitutions and laws of

1) Ezek. 3, 17.

2) Ezek. 3, 21.

3) Ezek. 3, 20.

the Societies, directed a series of questions to 332 secretaries of Trade Unions, and examined a number of witnesses of more or less authority. The results of the inquiry were recorded in eleven blue-books and several supplementary documents. And yet the reliability of the information thus obtained was questioned or denied by both sides; the inquiry and the legislation subsequent thereto had not been completed more than a few months, when a new investigation proved necessary and a second Royal Commission was appointed. "This Inquiry," says an author, "simply brought up anew the critical questions that had been investigated to the core by the Royal Commission of 1867; and there was little or nothing to be expected from it but some amendments of statutory detail, in which the plank of reform was so narrow that, in giving an inch of right in one direction, there might be danger of giving an ell of wrong in another to the working man."¹) And when we come to treatises, to books and pamphlets and articles, based upon such and similar investigations, the result is even less encouraging. One author asserts what the other denies. One author makes statements as these: "There is not a particle of evidence to the present hour that this beaver-like activity has had the smallest appreciable effect in accomplishing any of their prime objects, either of advancing wages or shortening the hours of labor."²) "Nothing is more difficult than to discover in the voluminous evidence of 1867—9 or later facts, any advantage gained to the men by the costly proceedings of their Unions. The failures of strikes, with all their heavy loss of wages and funds, are much more numerous than the partial successes and compromises by which these disastrous events have sometimes been terminated. Thus Mr. Robinson of the Atlas Works, Manchester, on being asked, 'Whether the Unions have substantially altered the rate of wages?'"³) re-

1) R. Somers, the Trade Unions, p. 9.

2) Ibid. p. 69.

3) Question 18,988.

plied, 'I think not.' This witness laid before the Commission a table of rates of wages paid to all classes of skilled workmen in his branch of trade from 1851 to 1866; from which it appeared that the advances during that lengthened period were immaterial in all classes save one.'¹⁾ "While it is thus clear the Unions cannot permanently advance wages, it might have been supposed that they would have had some success in making wages more uniform in their respective trades over all parts of the kingdom where they exerted any influence. Even this moderate effect, however, cannot be traced to their action in any perceptible degree."²⁾ Another author says, "It seems so natural that combination should raise wages, that one is amazed such a position can be questioned."³⁾ "Throughout the length and breadth of the land the trade unions have, during the past thirty or forty years, forced wages up."⁴⁾ "Their fitness to attain that object is abundantly proved by the brilliant success which has characterized their efforts."⁵⁾ Statements as contradictory as these might be multiplied, that they are irreconcilable is evident. But how is the reader to decide which is true and which is false? The average reader cannot even let the majority decide; for the majority of works on the subject are not within his reach. And if they were, a decision reached by such a process would be a very precarious basis of action; for majorities have often been wrong and minorities right. And yet the matter is of such importance that action under false supposition may lead to mistakes of far-reaching consequence, a drifting and stumbling into positions to hold or to abandon which would be equally, though in various ways, disastrous to all concerned. Under these circumstances the wisest or only wise thing to do might seem doing nothing at all and letting the whole subject severely alone. And this is precisely what

1) Somers, *ibid.* pp. 69 f.

2) *Ibid.* p. 73.

3) William Trant, *Trade Unions*, p. 68.

4) *Ibid.* p. 71.

5) *Ibid.* p. 125.

many, perhaps most of us, have been doing and are doing to-day.

Still it is not the proper thing to do, and for various reasons. In the first place the case is not so hopeless as it would seem to be in view of what has been submitted in the premises. Great as the difficulties are with which we have to cope, they are not insurmountable. That a task cannot be accomplished in a day is no reason why we should let it alone when we have weeks and months and years to work in. The present writer has given a fair share of his time during twenty years to the study of the social problems of which the labor question is one, and it has been his good fortune to have most of the more eminent works on these subjects within easy reach. But while his observation has been that there is probably no province of human speculation, except, perhaps, so-called scientific theology, as amazingly loaded down with fallacies and false conclusions as social science, he has, on the other hand, learned that all the social problems ultimately rest upon a comparatively small number of fixed principles, and that the most careful scrutiny of social phenomena will invariably substantiate the maxim that what comes nearest to full conformity with the moral law is also most conducive to the temporal welfare of human society and its individual members.

The chief fundamental principles upon which the labor problem must be based are chiefly two, JUSTICE and CHARITY. That the labor question is in the deplorable state in which we have it before us to-day is due chiefly to the violation of these principles by those who have made the solution of the labor problem their peculiar business. Justice and charity are being set aside by all the contending parties in the industrial struggles of the age, and when injustice is fought by injustice, and selfishness by selfishness, the victory, whose ever it may be, is little cause of rejoicing. *Righteousness exalteth a people.*¹⁾

1) Prov. 14, 34.

There is a difference, however, between incidental injustice in practice and injustice by principle. Employers of labor have been and are in many cases unjust in practice, taking undue advantage of their laborers, and they have their judgment in such dicta as Jer. 22, 13 and James 5, 4. But the Trade Unions of our day must be charged with injustice by principle, and by practice consistent with unjust principles, false practice in accordance with false doctrine.

To fully understand this it is necessary that we go back to the theory of industrial production.

Every effect produced within this world of created things is determined by the sum of its concurrent causes and by the difference between these causes and the sum of all the agencies counteracting them. To exemplify: the motion of a loaded wagon drawn by two horses is an effect produced by various causes concurring in its production. There is the power applied by the two horses; not the power applied by the one horse only but that *plus* the power applied by the other horse, both acting concurrently, drawing in the same direction. But the horse-power applied is not sufficient to account for the motion of the wagon. If it were, the same power would secure the same velocity of all wagons, loaded or empty, up-hill or down-hill, on a paved road or in mud up to the axle. As the wagon moves onward, the velocity increases without an increase of the horse-power applied, because of the *vis inertiae* and the *momentum* of the wagon and its load. When the wagon moves down an inclined plane, the motion is accelerated by the force of gravitation, whatever that may be, acting upon every particle of matter in the wagon and its load. And while this power remains practically the same, the velocity of the wagon increases as it rolls down the incline, because of the concurrence of the continued power of gravitation, the *vis inertiae* of the wagon and load, and the increasing *momentum* of the descending bodies. These causes may even render the application of horse-power as

a moving force entirely superfluous or even render its employment in a contrary direction necessary, lest the wagon and its load and the horses themselves be hurried to destruction. And this leads us to another series of considerations. The causes concurring in the production of its forward motion are by no means the only causes by which the motion of the wagon is determined. There is a number of agencies which are in conflict with those impelling causes, acting in a contrary direction, tending to retard and finally arrest or even reverse the motion produced by the opposite causes. There is the inertia which must be overcome in setting into motion a body at rest. Gravitation counteracts at a right angle every power acting in a horizontal line, and thus what we call the weight of the wagon and load tends to bring both to a standstill. Friction may retard the motion of the vehicle in various degrees; it is always present, even where it is reduced to a minimum by lubricants or ball-bearings and well paved streets, and is greatly increased by rough roads and creaking axles. The cohesion of clay and its adhesion to the wheels of a loaded wagon may prevail over a span of horses and keep the wagon planted in the road until it can be lifted or dug out of its predicament. And when the road leads up-hill, gravitation, which would concur with the horse-power in propelling the vehicle forward on a down-hill road, now acts as a retarding power of great force and persistence, fighting every inch of the vehicle's progress, and only where the balance of power between the retarding causes and the force applied by the horses is on the latter's side, they will be able to draw the wagon to the top of the hill. If the sum of conflicting powers are equal on both sides, the wagon will stand still. To prevent this, the driver may add his muscular strength to that of the horses by putting his shoulder to the wheel, and thus keep the balance of power in his favor. But should one of the horses or both of them give out on a steep incline, the balance of power may go to

the other side, gravitation may reverse the motion of the wagon and draw it downward even to the foot of the hill, unless the driver succeed in arresting this downward motion, which he may do by applying the brakes to his wheels and thus bringing about another conflict of causes, of friction and gravitation, and counterbalancing the latter by the former. Of course, he cannot propel the wagon up-hill by the brakes; but he can prevent it from moving down-hill until his horses have recovered and he can again pit his horse-power against the power of gravitation and the rest of the retarding causes. It is by the difference between these conflicting powers, with the *plus* on his side, that he will finally reach the top of the hill.

The motion of a wagon is thus seen to be quite a complicated affair, and to ignore this complicity may lead and has often led to serious loss. Many a good horse has been ruined because the driver persistently and brutally acted as if the moving of a wagon loaded with coal, stone, or lumber were determined solely and wholly by the power of his horses, utterly ignoring that to overcome the combined forces of inertia, friction, adhesion and gravitation in the given case was a physical impossibility, and all the more so, the more he weakened his horses by fruitless exertions to perform what was possible only by increasing the propelling force by the addition of another horse, or by diminishing the retarding forces, say the power of gravitation, by hoisting a part of his coal or lumber overboard. But instead of resorting to the one or the other of these measures and then, without unnecessary loss of time and fruitless abuse of his horses, performing his task by the difference of conflicting causes changed in his favor, the teamster will frequently resort to a copious outpouring of profanity and obscenity, as if that could work as a concurrent cause toward moving a coal wagon.

But let many a leader in the social conflicts of to-day beware of throwing stones at that blaspheming teamster.

Driving a coal wagon is a complicated affair; but the labor problem is more so, and mistakes in the management of labor interests must lead to results far more disastrous than the loss of a horse. Yet the great watchword of organized labor and its leaders to-day is, *Labor is the creator of all wealth*. This is an error precisely for the same reason that it is false to suppose the movement of a load of coal determined only by a span of horses. It is not true that labor is the creator of all wealth. Wealth is the product of concurrent causes of which labor is but one, and the production of wealth is determined by the difference of the sum of causes concurring in its production and the sum of the causes retarding its production and preservation. Where the causes of the latter class prevail, no wealth is produced, but loss or a diminution of wealth is the outcome. All the labor in the world by itself cannot produce a particle of wealth, a match or a carpet tack. The labor of an entire year may under adverse circumstances, prove unprofitable. A farmer may plow and sow and cultivate in the sweat of his brow and have little or nothing to reap; or he may even reap and feed his corn into hogs and cattle, and then lose both his hogs and his cattle, or the value of them, and, when the year is around, be possessed of far less wealth than he was a year ago. A mining company may sink a shaft and spend thousands of dollars and, finding no ore or anything else worth taking out, finally abandon the enterprise, having produced no wealth but lost all their investments. But was not the labor of the diggers profitable? Did not they make their wages? No; they may have received them, but certainly did not make them by their labor. If they had, their pay must have come out of the pit in which nothing of value was found. They were paid in wealth produced by others, and to take their pay in what their labor had produced, they must have taken stock in the mine, which was worthless as the mine itself, the entire product of their labor.

The primary causes which work together in the production of wealth are *nature*,¹⁾ *human labor*,²⁾ and *the blessing of God*,³⁾ to which must be added *capital*⁴⁾ as a secondary, intermediate, or instrumental cause, whereby the productivity of labor is largely increased. The wood and sulphur and phosphorus in a match are materials which no amount of human labor could produce; they are the contributions of nature. All the forests and sulphur and phosphorus in the world did not constitute a single friction match before human labor took the materials from nature's store and made them into matches. And without the protecting and prospering power of God there could not be a man with ingenuity enough to make matches, nor a factory to make them in, nor a people to pay for them and use them; for in Him we live and move and have our being,⁵⁾ and He upholds all things by the word of His power.⁶⁾ Yet in the face of all this we are told that labor is the creator of all wealth; and this false statement is not only whispered in an unguarded moment, but is loudly proclaimed in declarations of principles; it is in fact the fundamental error and falsehood upon which the theory and practice of industrial organizations are professedly based. Can it be surprising that theory and practice based upon so flagrant a falsehood should lead to dire confusion and endless injustice and infringement of rights? Is it surprising that labor, the purported creator of all wealth, should claim all wealth as its rightful possession, and that discontent and bitter complaints should permeate the masses who deem that withheld from them which their toil is supposed to have created?

1) Gen. 1, 28; 2, 15; 3, 23; 4, 2, 22; 6, 14; 9, 20; 10, 9; 26, 12.

2) Gen. 2, 15; 4, 2, 22. Eph. 4, 28. 1 Thess. 4, 11. 2 Thess. 3, 10—12.

3) Ps. 127, 1, 2. Gen. 26, 3 ff. 26. Deut. 16, 15. Prov. 10, 22. Ps. 65, 10—12; 104, 13—27. Deut. 8, 11—14. 27. Hagg. 1, 6, 9—11. Matt. 6, 11. Luke 11, 3. Ps. 146, 15, 16; 104, 27.

4) We reserve the discussion of the significance of capital in industrial production to a later section of this article.

5) Acts 17, 28.

6) Hebr. 1, 3.

The perverseness and injustice of the doctrine that labor is the creator of all wealth will appear with still greater clearness when we remember that labor is but one of several *concurrent* causes in the production of wealth. A concurrent cause is not an independent cause of a part of the products of several causes, but a cause which together with other causes is productive of one joint result of all the causes working together. When A builds a house and B builds another house, A and B are both house-builders, but they are not concurrent causes, and if A builds a good house and B a bad one, A's house is good and B's bad. But when A is a mason and B a carpenter, and both are occupied in building the same house, they are concurrent causes of that house, and the joint product of their work will be what they have conjointly made it. Wealth is the product of nature and labor and the blessing of God concurring in the production of a joint result. Each of these causes is a variable quantity. The output of a mine may be rich in one month and poor in the next month with the same amount of labor applied, simply because the rock blasted in one month was richer in ore or native copper than the rock blasted in the subsequent month. With the same amount of labor a rich crop may be reaped from the same soil from which a scanty crop was reaped the previous year, because God blessed the one year with rain and sunshine in due season, which he withheld in the previous year. Cotton is scarce at one time and plentiful at another. A failure of crops in large districts will affect the farmers, the trades, the railroads, the commerce, the banks, the professions, the schools, especially the higher institutions of learning, throughout and beyond those districts, and the result is a diminution of wealth, not the wealth of the farmers only, but of thousands who never handled a plow and could not tell oats from barley. When, during the civil war in America the production of cotton in the South was suspended, thousands upon thousands of people employed in the manu-

facture of cotton fabrics in England were thrown out of work and suffered intensely for want of the necessaries of life. Why? Not because of increased consumption; for consumption is diminished at such times. Nor because of a scarcity of labor power; for at such times labor power is abundant and many hands are idle. Why does not labor make up for the deficiency? Because labor cannot produce independently, but only as a concurrent cause, and when one of the concurrent causes fails, the joint product must suffer. The miller cannot produce more flour than he has grain to grind it from, and to run his mill without anything to grind would result, not in an increase, but in a decrease of wealth. The baker cannot produce wealth in the form of bread without sufficient flour to bake it from, and to operate his bakery and heat his ovens without anything to bake would again result in loss, not in gain, of wealth. A fisher may dip or drag his nets through a pond all day and catch no fish if there are no fish in the pond; he cannot produce wealth without the concurrence of nature. There was an abundance of fish in the lake of Gennesaret; yet Peter with his partners had toiled all the night and taken nothing, because he had not enjoyed what he was granted later, the blessing of God, and the concurrence of nature and divine blessing and honest toil resulted in a great draught of fish. Labor is not the sole producer of wealth; nor is it one of several independent producers, bringing forth certain objects, while other objects were produced by the rest of the likewise independent agents respectively. Labor alone and by itself can produce nothing.

Even the share which labor may claim in the joint product called wealth is not a fixed quantity, because, as has been already remarked, the causes which concur in the production of wealth are not fixed, but variable quantities. No two fields are precisely the same, and there is no possibility of telling precisely, how much of a bushel of wheat in a given case is due to nature and how much to labor.

From no two acres of timber land the same amount of lumber of the same quality can be taken to the same market at the same expense, and there is no possibility of telling how much of the value of a given hundred feet of lumber is due to nature and how much to labor. No ton of copper sold at the market price has been mined and marketed under precisely the same conditions as every other ton sold at the same price, and no individual laborer can determine his proportionate share of the money turned over by the purchaser to the owners of the mine, especially since labor itself is also a variable quantity, and no two laborers can justly claim to have contributed precisely the same amount toward the production of a given ton of copper or of its market value. In short, it is simply impossible to determine with accuracy the share which any human individual or his labor has had as a concurrent cause in the production of a given value as a joint effect.

But an effect is not only determined by its concurrent causes, but also by contrary agencies counteracting the productive causes and retarding or even frustrating the effect. The wheels of industry move under an immense amount of friction, and much, perhaps most of the work of production is up-hill work. Dangers of land and sea, damage by fire and water and wind, theft and defraudation, natural and forced fluctuations of the market, the influence of politics, international complications, and other causes, not the least of which are certain measures of industrial warfare, work together in counteracting the causes of production. By such adverse causes, large industries may be brought to a standstill, or even reverse the direction of their wheels. Manufacturing and other enterprises may work with little or no profit, even with serious loss, and end in bankruptcy at the foot of the hill. Profit and loss, success and failure, and their various degrees, are determined by the difference of conflicting causes. Where the two sides are equally balanced, there is standstill, neither increase nor decrease

of wealth. But the equipoise is never of long duration. Besides, it is frequently impossible to estimate the conflicting causes, and the struggle assumes the character of a game of chance, where no party knows what cards the other holds or intends to play, and dishonest dealings and bluffs are oftentimes resorted to. Under more favorable circumstances the various industrial factors can be approximately computed; but only approximately, and the omission of one factor, no matter on what side of the problem, will vitiate the computation to the extent of the importance of the factor omitted. What then are we to expect of a solution based upon one factor only, omitting all the rest? If labor is the creator of all wealth, then it is a matter of course that labor should decide all industrial questions and form the standard of all industrial interests. And this is precisely what the trade unions of our day maintain. They presume to dictate the rate of wages, the hours of labor, the material to be used, the men to be employed, the markets to be supplied, the means of transportation, and whatever else they may deem it proper or possible to control in the interest of labor. Let the employer refuse to accept a scale of wages prescribed by a trade union, and the men will strike. Let him decline the eight hour day, and they will strike again. Let him insist upon using stone or brick tabooed by the union, and they will strike once more. Let him employ a "scab," and the walking delegate will call out the union men to strike. Let him ship over a railroad proscribed by the union, and he must face a strike. Quite recently Illinois coal miners prohibited the sale of coal to Missouri at the penalty of a strike because of a difficulty between miners and operators west of the Mississippi. A witness before the Royal Commission in England gave the following occasions of strikes. 1. Advance in one degree or other of wages. 2. Reduction of hours. 3. Objection to foremen. 4. Objection to non-Union men. 5. Objection to Union men in arrears to the Union. 6. Objection to work

receiving extra wages for efficiency. 7. Objection to machine work. 8. Objection to work imported from other districts of the country, such as quarry-worked stone. 9. Objection to machine-made bricks and bricks made by non-Union men. 10. Objection to Clerk of Works taking plumb-line in his hand to try if a wall be plumb, the Unionists contending that they have the right to use the plumb-line, and that the Clerk of Works has the right only to look on. 11. Objection to the number of apprentices. 12. Objection to two ladders, one for laborers to ascend and the other to descend. 13. Objections to piece-work. 14. Refusing to allow tile or brick floors by any but brick-setters. 15. Objections by laborers to the employer appointing his own foreman. *Et cetera.* The inquiry further showed that Unions had prescribed "that all bricks must be carried in a hod, and no bricks carried in a wheel-barrow, and the number of bricks in a hod must not exceed a limited number." In all this the Unions are only consistent with their ruling principle that labor is the creator of all wealth. If they are the producers, why should they not dictate the means and methods of production? The disregard of employers by the Unions was asserted by Mr. Connolly, of the Operative Stonemasons, before the Royal Commission thus: "We do not take masters into account at all in our arrangements."¹ Of course not. And the consumer? Let him too take care of himself. Production is one thing and consumption is another. If the contractor must pay higher wages for shorter hours, he need not be the loser; let him put a profit on what he pays to his men, and let the owner for whom the house is being built pay the cost.

That such theory and practice must lead to and implies gross injustice is all the more apparent in view of the modern methods of production in the manufacturing industries in which the great masses of workmen are employed. In

1) Q. 1349.

earlier centuries, the shoemaker, though he was not the creator of boots and shoes, but added his labor to the materials he had not produced and could not produce, yet contributed far more toward the production of a pair of shoes than a workman in a modern shoe factory. As a rule, the shop was his own, so were the tools, so was the leather, and so was the customer; and if the customer was not satisfied and refused to pay for the shoes, the loss was his. Nowadays, the employer furnishes the shop, the material, the tools and machinery; he must see that he finds a market for the product of manufacture, and suffer the loss if the goods remain on his hands or payment is withheld or inadequate. But even in the face of all this, the employees of a shoe factory will play the part of creators of all wealth, will dictate to the employers whom they shall employ in their factory, put at their machines and to handling their materials, what wages they shall pay, how many hours their machinery shall run, and if their demands are not complied with, they will not only refuse to work themselves, but do what is in their power to prevent others from working in an establishment over which they have no rightful control and in which they have no interest save one, the opportunity of securing the greatest amount of wages for the least amount of labor. "The action of unions," says an English jurist, "so far as it excludes non-unionists from work, and requires for unionists wages to a certain amount, is founded on a supposed monopoly of a given kind of work in a given district. All such work is assumed to be the property of the union: if all the workmen who can supply the work are in the union, the monopoly is secured; and the usual action has been to increase wages and decrease work until a maximum amount of wages has been extracted from the employers, and the equal distribution of the minimum amount of work secured for each member."¹⁾

1) The law relating to Trade Unions, by Sir William Erle, formerly Chief Justice in the Common Pleas. London 1869, p. 45.

That this practice of disposing of other people's labor and other people's capital is an unjust infringement of other people's rights is manifest even in the light of reason and natural morality. "Every person," says the same author, "has a right under the law, as between him and his fellow subjects, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or his own capital according to his own will. It follows that every other person is subject to the correlative duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstruction to the fullest exercise of this right which can be compatible with the exercise of similar rights by others."¹⁾

This doctrine has found its application in the courts of this country, and the dicta of judges defining the law and its principles are very explicit.

In *State v. Stewart* 59 Vt. 273, Judge POWERS of the Supreme Court said, "In England and here, it is lawful, and it may be added, commendable, for any body of men to associate themselves together for the purpose of bettering their condition in any respect, financial or social. . . . But while the law accords this liberty to one, it accords a like liberty to every other one; and all are bound to so use and enjoy their own liberties and privileges as not to interfere with those of their neighbors. . . . To-day in England as here, workmen stand upon the same broad level of equality before the law with all other vocations, professions or callings whatsoever, respecting the disposition of their labor and the advancement of their associated interests. There, as here, it is unlawful for employers wrongfully to coerce, intimidate or hinder the free choice of workmen in the disposal of their time and talents. There, as here, it is unlawful for workmen wrongfully to coerce, intimidate or hinder employers in the selection of such workmen as they choose to employ. There, as here, no employer can say to a workman he must not work for another employer,

1) *Ibid.* p. 12.

nor can a workman say to an employer he cannot employ the service of another workman.

“By the law of the land these respondents have the most unqualified right to work for whom they please, and at such prices as they please. By the law of the land, O'Rourke and Goodfellow have the same right. By the same law the Ryegate Granite Company has the right to employ the respondents or O'Rourke on such terms as may be mutually agreed upon, without let, hindrance or dictation from any man or body of men whatever.

“Suppose the members of a bar association in Caledonia county should combine and declare that the respondents should employ no attorney, not a member of such association, to assist them in their defense in this case, under the penalty of being dubbed a 'scab' . . . would the respondents look upon this as an innocent intermeddling with their rights under the law? . . .

“If such conspiracies are to be tolerated as innocent, then every farmer in Vermont, now resting in the confidence that he may employ such assistance in carrying on his farm as he thinks he can afford to hire, is exposed to the operation of some secret code of law, in the framing of which he had no voice, and upon the terms of which he had no veto, and every manufacturer is handicapped by a system that portends certain destruction to his industry. If our agricultural and manufacturing industries are sleeping upon the fires of a volcano, liable to eruption at any moment, it is high time our people knew it.”¹⁾ And further on the same Judge says, “The exposure of a legitimate business to the control of an association that can order away its employees and frighten away others that it may seek to employ, and thus be compelled to cease the further prosecution of its work, is a condition of things utterly at war with every principle of justice, and with every safeguard of protection

1) American Reports, Vol. 59, pp. 712 f.

that citizens under our system of government are entitled to enjoy." 1)

In *Old Dominion Steamship Company v. McKenna*, BROWN, J., said: ". . . Associations have no more right to inflict injury upon others than individuals have. All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex or annoy them in working or in obtaining work because they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members, or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination between the wages paid to the skillful and to the unskillful, to the diligent and to the lazy, to the efficient and to the inefficient, and all associations designed with the perfect freedom of employers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the terms upon which their business shall be conducted by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property and traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed to abridge any of these rights, are *pro tanto* illegal combinations or associations; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such means and accompanied by damage are actionable." 2)

In *State v. Glidden* Sup. Ct. Conn. Apr. 1. 1887 it was held that a "boycott," as that term is used by organizations or laboring men in this country, is a conspiracy at common law, and the means by which it is in general sought to be accomplished are not only unlawful, but in some degree criminal. CARPENTER, J., said, among other things: "Now if we look at these transactions as it appears in the face of this information, we shall be satisfied that the defendants' purpose was to deprive the Carrington Publishing Company of its liberty to carry on its business in its own way, although in doing so it interfered with no right of the defendant. The

1) *Ibid.* p. 716.

2) 59 Am. Rep. 721.

motive was a selfish one, to gain an advantage unjustly and at the expense of others, and therefore the act was legally corrupt. As a means of accomplishing the purpose the parties intended to harm the Carrington Publishing Company, and therefore it was malicious. It seems strange in a country in which law interferes so little with the liberty of the individual, that it should be necessary to announce from the bench that every man may carry on his business as he pleases, may do what he will with his own so long as he does nothing unlawful and acts with due regard to the rights of others. . . . If the defendants have the right which they claim, then all business enterprises are alike subject to their direction. No one is safe in engaging in business, for no one knows whether his business affairs are to be directed by intelligence or ignorance, whether law and justice will protect the business, or brute force regardless of law will control it; for it must be remembered that the exercise of the power, if conceded, will by no means be confined to the manner of employing help. . . .

“Again, if the alleged right is conceded to the defendants, a similar right must be conceded to the promoters of the Carrington Publishing Company, and those with whom they may associate. Otherwise all men are not equal before the law. It logically follows that they in turn may control the business matters of the defendants, may determine what trade or occupation they may follow, whether to work in this establishment or in that or in none at all. Obviously such conflicting claims in the absence of law can lead to but one result, and that will be determined by brute force. It would be an instance of the survival not necessarily of the fittest but of the strongest. That would be subversive not only of all business, but also of law and of the government itself. The end would be anarchy pure and simple.”¹⁾

And again: “Neither will these defendants be permitted to advance their material interests or otherwise better their

1) 59 Am. Rep. 722 ff.

condition by any such reprehensible means. They had a right to ask the Carrington Publishing Company to discharge its workmen and employ themselves, and to use all proper arguments in support of their request. But they had not the right to say, 'you shall do this or we will ruin your business.' Much less had they a right to ruin its business. In such a case the direct and primary object must be regarded as the destruction of the business. The fact that it is designed as a means to an end, and that end in itself considered a lawful one, does not divest the transaction of its criminality.'¹⁾

In *People v. Fisher*, 14 Wend. 10; s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 501, a conspiracy of Journeymen workmen to raise their wages by entering into a combination to coerce journeymen employed in the same trade, to conform to rules established by such combination for the purpose of regulating the price of labor, and carrying such rules into effect by overt acts, was held indictable. In *Master Stevedores' Association v. Walsh*, 2 Daly 1, 3, it was said: "Convictions in this country have been in cases where coercive measures were resorted to, either to prevent master workmen from engaging below certain rates, or to intimidate journeymen from engaging below certain rates, or to compel them to become members of the combination. Every man has the right to fix the price of his own labor, to work for whom he pleases, and for any sum he thinks proper; and every master workman has equally the right to determine for himself whom he will employ, and what wages he will pay. Any attempt by force, threat, intimidation or other coercive means to control a man in the fair and lawful exercise of these rights is therefore an act of oppression, and any combination for such a purpose is a conspiracy."

In *Johnston Co. v. Meinhart* 9 Abb. N. C. 363; 24 Hun, 489 60 How. Pr. 168, the court said: "If he compels by assault or violence, by threats, by acts of coercion, a fellow-

1) 59 Am. Rep. 725.

craftsman to leave the employment of another, he commits an offense against the rights of such persons which is hardly distinguishable from an act which could itself injure or destroy the product of a man's labor. It is a direct injury to property rights."

In *State v. Donaldson*, 32 N. J. L. 151, it was held that it was an indictable conspiracy for several employees to combine and notify their employer that unless he discharges certain enumerated persons, they will in a body quit his employment, the court saying that "the alleged aim of the combination was unlawful, the effort being to dictate to the employer whom he should discharge from his employment, and that this was an unwarrantable interference with the conduct of his business."

In *Moque Steamship Co. v. Macgregor*, boycotting was shown to be actionable when private and particular damage is in evidence. In another boycotting case, *Baughman v. Richmond Typographical Union*, Judge WELLFORD said: "The declaration does not allege damage merely by the prevention of a probable future trade, but by the destruction of an existing profitable trade. . . . The circular of the defendants addressed every customer as a patron, and clearly contemplated his withdrawal of his dealing with the plaintiffs as an immediate damage to their business."

In a criminal case against the committee of the Richmond Typographical Union, decided in 1887, Judge ATKINS said: "Has any man, or set of men, the legal right to say to an American citizen: Do as we dictate, or we will ruin you? The enjoyment of life and liberty with the means of acquiring and possessing property is one of the inherent rights guaranteed to every citizen of this commonwealth by the bill of rights. The privileges cannot be taken away or abridged except in accordance with law. No class of men can take the law into their own hands."

In *Payne v. Railroad Co.* 13 Tenn. 521, it was held that "if the defendants, by means of threats and intimi-

dition, have driven away plaintiff's customers and thus destroyed his trade, they have injured him by an unlawful act, and are liable to him in damages, whether they did it wickedly and maliciously or not."¹⁾

And now we ask, is it right for a Christian to identify himself with principles and practices which are so many blows into the face of right and justice before God and man alike? Is it consistent that a Christian should pray to his Father which is in heaven, "Give us this day our daily bread," and at the same time endeavor to secure his daily bread on a principle and by methods based upon a principle which must inevitably lead to the curtailment or exclusion and denial of the rightful claims of others? *Woe unto him that increaseth that which is not his! how long? and to him that ladeth himself with thick clay,*²⁾ says the Lord. One of the fundamentals of all human justice is, *Sic utere tuo, ut non laedas alienum*, i. e., Use that which is yours so as not to violate that which is another's. Is it right for a Christian to be with those who in industrial life know of no interests but their own and utterly and by principle disregard the rights and lawful interests of others? There can be but one answer to these questions, and that is an emphatical *No!*

A. G.

(To be concluded.)

A FORM FOR THE ORDINATION OR INSTALLATION OF A MINISTER.

Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ said unto his disciples, Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have committed unto you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. And when he had ascended far above

1) 59 Am. Rep. 730.

2) Habak. 2, 6.