

Concordia Theological Monthly

Continuing
LEHRE UND WEHRE
MAGAZIN FÜR EV.-LUTH. HOMILETIK
THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY-THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY

Vol. III

November, 1932

No. 11

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
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Ein Prediger muss nicht allein weiden, also dass er die Schafe unterweise, wie sie rechte Christen sollen sein, sondern auch daneben den Wölfen wehren, dass sie die Schafe nicht angreifen und mit falscher Lehre verführen und Irrtum einführen. — *Luther*.

Es ist kein Ding, das die Leute mehr bei der Kirche behält denn die gute Predigt. — *Apologie, Art. 24.*

If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?
1 Cor. 14, 8.

Published for the
Ev. Luth. Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States
CONCORDIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, St. Louis, Mo.



ARCHIVES

die Gemeinde in Porto Alegre, als Kleingünther sein Amt niederlegte, sich keinen Pastor von dem Vorstand der noch auf dem Papier bestehenden Synode erbitten, sondern von einem sogenannten Protestantenverein, der dem modernen Zeitgeist in die Hände arbeitete. Kleingünther berief zwar noch die Pastoren zu einer Konferenz in Häsbärts Wohnung auf dem Hamburgerberge, aber Laien waren nicht zugegen. Auch setzten sich die Pastoren durch einen auf dieser Konferenz gefaßten Beschluß von neuem dem Spotte der Außenstehenden aus. Als Kleingünther auf dieser Konferenz meldete, daß der Vorstand der Gemeinde zu Porto Alegre keinen synodalen Pfarrer wünsche, und mitteilte, daß man gesagt habe: „Wenn man den Pfarrern nur mit Unzen [onça, eine Geldmünze im Werte von 64\$000] winkt, kommen sie schon“, beschloßen die Pastoren, daß niemand in der Vakanzzeit nach Porto Alegre gehen solle, um dort eine Amtshandlung zu vollziehen. Jetzt höhnte Koserik in der „Deutschen Zeitung“: „Porto Alegre mit dem Interdikt belegt!“ Dazu kam der Muckeraufstand, den wir leider wegen Raummangels jetzt nicht schildern dürfen. Koserik und Genossen wiesen jetzt beständig darauf hin, daß der Fanatismus der Mucker grell beweise, was das Bibellese für Folgen zeitige. Es regnete förmlich Schmähungen über die „importierte theologische Pforzheimer Ware“, über die „Dunkelmänner“ und „Heuchler“, deren „Pfaffensack“ nicht gefüllt werden könnte. Die Pastoren rührten sich nicht. Die Synode wurde sang- und klanglos zu Grabe getragen. (Schluß folgt.)

Porto Alegre, Brasilien.

Paul Schelp.

Gustavus Adolphus's Participation in the German War.

The Thirty Years' War was the armed effort by which Romanism was to be restored to its domination of Europe. This counter-reformation was to be effective not only in Central Europe, but also in France, England, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. In Sweden, Gustavus Vasa's son John, influenced by his Roman Catholic wife, a Polish princess, had sought the help of Catholic powers in his war against Russia and had published his *Red Book*, a liturgy composed in accord with the Council of Trent. Then he had invited the Jesuits to Sweden and had appealed to the Pope to order prayers everywhere for the restoration of the Roman Church in Scandinavia (but without naming Sweden). The Lutheran worship, which had been introduced through the efforts of Olavus Petri¹⁾ was to be

1) C. Bergendoff, *Olavus Petri and the Ecclesiastical Transformation in Sweden*, 1928. See R. Krebs, *Die politische Publizistik der Jesuiten und ihrer Gegner vor dem Dreissigjaehrigen Krieg (Hallesche Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschichte, 1890)*.

extirpated. Luther's Catechism was removed from the schools, and an explanation of Roman Catholic canon law was made the rule of discipline and government of the Swedish Church. This was in the sixteenth century. But in a letter which the Elector of Saxony sent to his envoys of the Diet of Ratisbon (Regensburg) in 1608, he complains of the disciples of Loyola, as they were notorious also in Sweden.²⁾ However, in Sweden the Counter-Reformation did not take root, and when John died and his son Sigismund, who had been elected King of Poland, had united Poland and Sweden for a time under his crown, John's younger brother Charles was made King of Sweden by his countrymen, and the Reformation was introduced anew. When Charles closed his eyes in 1611, his son Gustavus II (Adolphus) ascended the throne, in accord with the law of succession of 1607, at the age of not quite seventeen years.

His father had told him what the Vasa program for Sweden was. Under the first Vasa the nation had gained its freedom and independence from the Danes. Now it was to be safeguarded and expanded. Its most important asset was the Baltic Sea, in which it had to share in competition with Livonia, Lithuania, Poland, the German Hanse towns, Denmark, and Spain (through the Netherlands). The shibboleth of foreign policy for the dynasty therefore was *dominium Maris Baltici*. Young Gustavus Adolphus had been carefully trained for his royal office, with special attention to his power of decision. With determination, circumspection, and skill he continued the Vasa policy, and successfully, devoting his attention to the East Baltic states, Poland (including Prussia, which was a Polish fief to the Elector of Brandenburg), and Denmark, which might control the western entrance to the Baltic. This meant treaties and conquering by war, diplomacy and military prowess.³⁾ His subjects were heartily in accord with his policy and willingly bore the heavy burdens of taxation and battle losses of men, fired by the example of their king, who himself directed the Swedish armies on the continent, in Poland, and frequently was in the midst of battle.

In the mean time the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor, with Wallenstein and Tilly, had in nine years suppressed the Bohemian resistance to the Counter-Reformation, had frustrated the usurpation attempt of Frederick of the Palatinate, had scared Christian of Denmark into a dilemma, and by 1627—28 when Gustavus had ruled ten

2) "... since the Jesuits and their ilk are not only well enough known to the Protestants, but also to the Catholics, and what they have done in Sweden, Poland, France, and the Netherlands is more than notorious." (M. Ritter, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissigjaehrigen Krieges*, Vol. I, p. 635.)

3) Napoleon I reckoned Gustavus Adolphus among the eight most prominent military geniuses of history.

years (and was thirty-three years old), Wallenstein was beginning to bring the northern shores of German states along the Baltic and the North Sea into Ferdinand's hands and to build a fleet and navy, giving orders at the same time to destroy Swedish ships in those waters.⁴⁾

The Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was the head of this loose federation by election; but one territory of it, Austria, he ruled in his own right, as a Hapsburg. The mightier the emperor became, the more powerful became the ruler of Austria, the citadel of the Roman Catholic reaction. At this time Wallenstein was in hearty accord with Ferdinand's drift toward absolute power. But it was also clear to him that the attempt to make the Baltic a Hapsburg ocean would appear as a hostile step to Gustavus Adolphus. The ships that were being built were not to be transport ships to land imperial troops for an attack upon Germany from the north; they were men of war, meant to control the trade on the Baltic Sea. Wallenstein knew well enough that his actions in these regions would antagonize Swedes and induce Gustavus to join the enemies of the emperor.⁵⁾

He was right: already at this time Gustavus was convinced that sooner or later he would be attacked by the imperial government.⁶⁾ In his opinion, the danger was drawing nearer and nearer, and Sweden would not be able to avoid being drawn into the continental war.⁷⁾ Chemnitz relates that the king in the winter of 1627—28 met with a committee of the estates of the realm to consider, "not publicly," some important matters and received from them the opinion that, "unless God averts the danger, our nation will either be destroyed or compelled to carry on a long, burdensome war." It seems indeed that at this time his purpose in pushing the war against Poland, instead of a treaty, was to build up an army there against the Hapsburg plans for Northern conquests. So in the first place he came to the defense of Stralsund; in the second place he doubled his efforts in Poland, whose power of resistance was being considerably increased by a succor of 15,000 imperial troops. That this turn against Poland-Prussia does not show a possible change in him in favor of a program

4) Letter of Wallenstein to Arnim, November 6, 1627.

5) Letter to Arnim, January 7, 1628.

6) Our own Martin Chemnitz's grandson, Philipp Bogislaw von Chemnitz (1605—1678), historian (pseudonym, Hippolytus a Lapide), published a history: *Der koeniglich-schwedische in Teutschland gefuehrte Krieg* (Part I in German and Latin, Part II in German only), which is very explicit in details and very abundant in documents. He devotes a good deal of space to those considerations. But compare F. Gallati, *Ph. B. v. Chemnitz und seine Quellen* (dissertation, 1902).

7) Letter to Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, November 6, 1627.

also considered, *viz.*, to direct an attack via Poland upon the Austrian possessions, that he still had the plan of carrying the attack upon Ferdinand into and via Germany, is evidenced by his message to The Hague.⁸⁾ However, he entered into negotiations with the imperial government to procure his country's safety, if possible, without invading German affairs. In these negotiations he demanded the emperor's withdrawal from his powerful position along the German coast, return of territories in North Germany to their original rulers, a general amnesty, and arrangements for Danish and other archbishoprics to be made by the electors and the estates of the Holy Roman Empire. There is no protest in these negotiations against the imperial suppression of the Church of the Reformation; the one concern is the Baltic question, and even the demands that none of the North German (Protestant) rulers shall remain or be deprived of their territories by the emperor, not even for deeds against him, is nothing but the demand that Hapsburg-Austria shall have absolutely no power over or in the German lowlands along the coast.

And yet there would have been, especially in 1629, after March, sufficient reason to introduce the religious question into the negotiations. For on September 13, 1628, the infamous Edict of Restitution had been ordered drafted, and on March 6, 1629, the emperor promulgated it, as an interpretative judgment as to how the Religious Peace of Augsburg, 1555, was to be applied. We remember that this diet resolution contained the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*. We remember further that the agreement was only between the Roman Catholic churches and the adherents of the Augsburg Confession. It was *not* a charter of religious liberty. Calvinists, Anabaptists, and others were excluded. The edict charged that the ecclesiastical reservation had not been observed by the non-Catholic estates.⁹⁾

At the Diet of Augsburg in 1555 the question was raised whether the religious "peace" was also to benefit those estates which would join the Augsburg Confession people later on. Against the Protestant objections, Article 18 was made to decree that, when an archbishop, prelate, or other clergyman left the old religion, he was at once to leave his archbishopric, etc., and to give up the income, while the chapters or other electoral bodies should be privileged again to elect

8) *Nos priora nostra de bello in Germaniam transferendo consilio omnino non immutaturi . . . repentino ac inexpectato transitu* (to Prussia-Poland). Quoted in G. Droysen, *Gustav Adolf*, II, 13.

9) The edict is printed, in the seventeenth-century German, in Schilling's *Quellenbuch z. Gesch. d. Neuzeit*, 1903, pp. 128. 129. A fairly full bibliography is given in *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 4 (1906), pp. 846 to 849, including the "Augapfel" controversy. Rather good is M. Ritter, *Der Ursprung der Restitutionsedikte* (*Hist. Ztschr.*, Vol. 76), and T. Tupetz, *Der Streit um die geistlichen Gueter*, 1629, Vienna, 1883, with maps.

a Roman Catholic, who would at once step into the unmodified usufruct of his position. Since so many of the higher offices were connected with secular rights, territorial possessions, and feudal and financial relations, archbishoprics, abbeys, etc., were in the hands of the younger sons of Roman Catholic princes and supported these young men. If Protestants were excluded from those positions, that was a loss for them in land, men, and income, and they would always remain in the minority in the three divisions of the diet.¹⁰⁾ Upon Melancthon's advice the Lutheran estates protested and even declared they would not be bound by the article. Action agreed with their words, and so the regulations of the *reservatum* were violated a good deal, particularly by the Calvinists, who did not consider themselves bound at all. The Supreme Court (*Reichskammergericht*) was passed by and also the judiciary of the court. All this was to be changed by the Edict of Restitution. The decree demanded that the administration of all endowed religious corporations, of all fiefs and properties that had been in the hands of the Roman Church up to 1552 (Treaty of Passau), should be returned to the papistic hierarchy and princes, even if the population meanwhile has become Protestant. Imperial commissioners were to execute the order with all strictness at once, and they did. This was calculated to be a strong enough blast to turn back the tide of the Reformation, to bring vast territories under the domination of Romish princes and the Jesuits, to enlarge particularly the ecclesiastic possessions of Austrian Hapsburg; and these, it was hoped, would soon enough be able to reduce the Church of the Reformation to an outlawed sect. Austria-Hapsburg loomed large, and the more awful because its armies were right on the spot, among the menaced Protestant princes. Pope Urban VIII, anti-Hapsburg though he was, nevertheless expressed his assent to the edict,¹¹⁾ but hoped that Ferdinand would derive no benefit from it. Not that he loved the Church less, but that he hated Hapsburg more,¹²⁾ and no triumph of the Jesuit Order was welcome to him. The outlook for the Protestant states, for the Lutheran Church, was dark, black.

And Gustavus Adolphus was a Lutheran, the faith of the Gospel lived in his heart. May we not imagine that the edict aroused in him the spirit of the crusader, determined to cross the sea and plains and rivers and to stop the uplifted arms of the powers trying to crush his brethren? We have no right to see in Gustavus Adolphus only the statesman, only the general, only the economist. We have all

10) P. Hinschius in Hauck's *Realenzyklopaedie* 3, Vol. 20, pp. 737—740.

11) There was a time when it was thought that he had refused his endorsement.

12) Hapsburg's aggressiveness in Italy drove Urban into the arms of Richelieu.

reason to see in him a genuinely Lutheran Christian.¹³⁾ We cannot but see in him a Christian who has the deepest sympathy with the religious sufferings of his brethren, also those in other countries. But the Edict of Restitution confirmed in him the already existing plan of an invasion in an indirect way only.

To carry out the plan of a Swedish invasion of Germany, he welcomed the help of Richelieu's agent and negotiated an armistice with Sigismund of Poland, thus getting his hands free for the "larger purpose." The Stockholm Riksråd, though ready to adjourn, was asked by him to await his arrival in order to discuss with him the important matter. Money was needed, man-power was needed,¹⁴⁾ ships were needed, and above all unanimity was needed. He had formulated his propositions in writing.¹⁵⁾ The document is a very picture of Gustavus Adolphus: patriotic, circumspect, impetuous, courageous, pious, not "yes — but," but "yes — therefore," determined to defend the faith, the Gospel. We may easily understand that the counselors, though the address was read to them, could fairly see the flaming, blue, trustful, earnest eyes of their absent king: Abraham Brahl; Carl Carlson, Gustav's natural son; John Skytte, the king's former instructor; Gabriel Oxenstjern; Per Baner; John Sparre; Matthias Soop. His letter appeals to them to dedicate themselves to the holy cause of their country. Their *evangelium* is in danger; the free exercise of their religion needs defense against the approaching enemy; the victories of the emperor mean a triumph of Romanism; and when Hapsburg has conquered and re-Romanized Germany, the same attack will be turned against Sweden and her evangelical Church. Droysen,¹⁶⁾ defending his thesis that the Edict of Restitution had nothing to do with Gustavus's and his counselors' program of invasion, remarks: ". . . not of the recently published edict does he think, nor does he plan by his Swedish arms to force the emperor into its revocation." But Gustavus's description of the recent misery on the Continent is the description of the effects of the edict.¹⁷⁾ Furthermore, the psychological effect which, he feared, would result on the Continent would have to be ascribed to the restitution sought by the edict. For, thus reasoned Gustavus and his counselors: If neither the Dutch nor the Swedes interfered, then the suffering Protestant estates, especially Mecklenburg and Pomerania

13) Compare his careful provisions for the religious education of his five-year-old daughter, Christine, the "Sibyl of the North."

14) In several districts of Sweden there were hardly any men left who could be drafted.

15) Dated Elbing, May 30, 1629, almost three months after the edict. *Hist. Archivum*, No. 5.

16) *Gustav Adolf*, II, 27.

17) Gustavus offered his territory as an asylum for the Protestant refugees, by a signed proclamation.

and the cities, would despair, become accustomed to the Roman yoke, and in time support the attack upon Sweden.¹⁸⁾ So, then, the terrible religious situation in German lands had at least this part to play in resolving upon the German war: the power of the emperor to change the North German friends of Protestant Sweden into enemies of Swedish Protestantism must be checked, aye, destroyed, for the sake of the Church in Sweden. In more than one sense, then, the war was to be an offensive one, it is true; but in reality it was a defensive war, a defense of political, economic, and religious freedom, and the religious influence must be included in the reasoning of the Riksråd when they declared, on October 27: *Principalis causa belli inter nos et Caesarem est quod is vult Sueciam et Mare Balticum occupare.*

Gustavus Adolphus crossed over with his army. His negotiations with prospective allies; the short-visioned attitude and the bread-and-butter motives of some of the princes whom he came to help; the financial help of 1,200,000 livres per year offered by Contarini for Venice and by Richelieu, the enemy of Hapsburg, but lover of German Rhinelands; the fall and rise of Wallenstein; the victorious campaign of the Lion of the North and the snickering joy of Barbieri-Urban VIII; the at first astonished sigh, and then jubilant shout, of relief of German Protestants — all these things we need not relate here. Where he was or where he had passed through, the executions of the edict ceased. In the old *Reichsstadt* Augsburg, for the first time again since many years, Lutheran worship was conducted; in town after town Protestant administration of secularized ecclesiastical lands was reinstituted; the steel fist of Ferdinand II and the coils of Loyolism were torn from the throat of Protestantism. Gustavus Adolphus was utterly opposed to Calvinism.¹⁹⁾ But he insisted upon the protection of the Calvinists where he came into control of Reformed territory. This is not so much an indication of his religious tolerance as rather a demonstration against Ferdinand's "interpretation" of the Religious Peace of Augsburg; the Hapsburg judge was to be hit. When he entered the ultra-Romanist city of Munich, the Bavarian instigators of Protestant-baiting trembled. But he held his protecting hands over priest and Mass; the duke-electoral became neutral. His winter headquarters at Mainz (1631—32) showed him to be the ruler that could take final decision of European affairs into his own hands.²⁰⁾ There was talk of his taking the crown of the

18) Protocol of the Riksråd of October 27. Quoted in Droysen, II, 35.

19) He had left strict anti-Calvin instructions behind for the training of his little daughter. That she later embraced Calvinism is no point against the statement. (Still later she joined the Roman Church.)

20) For popular opinion, see Weller, *Lieder des Dreissigjaehrigen Krieges*; Opel und Cohn, *Der Dreissigjaehrige Krieg*; Dittfurth, *Die historisch-politischen Volkslieder des Dreissigjaehrigen Kriegs*, Heidelberg, 1882.

Holy Roman Empire in place of Hapsburg. No, that was not his purpose. But why shouldn't he? Because the Holy Roman Empire had been built up, since Otto I, on a distinctly medieval conception of the kingdom of God on earth, and he saw clearly that this old snail would not fit into the house which the rediscovered Gospel was building. Let the empire be, but take away from it its influence upon Protestant Germany, and that permanently. So, when John George of Saxony vacillated, — Wallenstein's influence, — he proposed that all Evangelical princes, cities, and estates of Germany should form a "sure, reputable, and honest alliance with Sweden, remembering that they owed their safety, next to God, to Gustavus," and this in the sense in which his Riksråd had advocated, most emphatically, for the prevention of any disastrous recurrences, a reorganization of the *Corpus Evangelicorum* under the leadership and "presidency" of the crown of Sweden. The *Corpus Evangelicorum* existed.²¹⁾ The Evangelical estates in the German diets had united in order to take up in common the interests of the individual members, as the Roman Catholic estates also did, so that *corpus* dealt with *corpus*, which was recognized since the Diet of Ratisbon, 1582. The tendency of the Protestants was to have their *corpus* recognized as a regular constituent part of government, a sort of department, or board. This concept was taken into Gustavus's plan, with the addition that in place of the Saxon electors the King of Sweden should be the head.²²⁾ Can we in this proposal see only a wish for Gustavus's national ambition? Must we not see the earnest wish by the strong arm of the great power of the North to protect the peaceful development of the Church on the Continent? Of course we recognize to-day that the plan had a great deal of "earthliness" in it; but that was there anyway. We recognize that it might have been impossible to carry it out under the Holy Roman Empire form; but was not the constitution of that empire out of date anyway? For the times, as they were, the plan was powerful — provided Sweden retained its leadership. At any rate, the project of just this kind of a *Corpus Evangelicorum* again shows the fertility of the great king's thought on the safety of the evangelical Church abroad and — at home. And secondly, the popular name of Joshua, Jude Makkabee, Gideon, for the time he lived, was appropriate.²³⁾

RICHARD W. HEINTZE.

21) It was also called *Corpus Sociorum Augustanae Confessionis*.

22) Not Gustavus personally, but the Swedish crown, i. e., a permanent arrangement.

23) Gustavus's motives are examined in J. Kretzschmar, *Gustav Adolfs Pläne und Ziele in Deutschland* (*Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens*, Vol. 18, 1909).

