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The Origins of the Object-Subject Antithesis in Lutheran Dogmatics

A Study in Terminology

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I

One of the tasks with which both Christian preaching and Christian dogmatics are confronted is the attempt to express Biblical testimony in non-Biblical terminology. Such an attempt is as difficult as it is necessary. In order to perform its responsibility, the proclamation of the Christian message in preaching must resort to ways of speaking that are not found in the Scriptures. Similarly, theologians have always found it necessary to collect into one expression what is said in several different parts of the Scriptures. But the difficulty in any such expression is that a word taken over from extra-Christian sources may often bring with it connotations that are foreign to Biblical faith. That necessity and that difficulty are almost exactly parallel.

In their definitions and discussions of the meaning of the Christian faith the great Lutheran dogmaticians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were faced by this fact. From the example of the ancient Church it was evident to them that theology could not avoid the use of a *vox ἄγγραφος* to summarize a particular Biblical doctrine.¹ And as Lutheranism came into conflict with various sects, it had to insist that not all dogmatic terms appear *expressis verbis* in the Scriptures, but that they are nevertheless justified as summaries of what the Scriptures teach.² Professor Pieper has pointed out in this connection that we have the heretics to thank for the fact that the Church has had to invent these terms.³

Several examples of such terms suggest themselves. The term *sacramentum*, practically indispensable in theology, is a *vox ἄγγραφος*, having its origins in civil law.⁴ In the latter part of the seventeenth century it seems to have become necessary for Lutherans to point out that it was not the Lord Jesus, but Tertullian, who had

first called Baptism a *sacramentum*.⁵ Another such term is *persona* as used in the doctrine of the Trinity; though there were some who regarded *persona* as a valid translation for ὑπόστασις in Hebrews 1:3, the fact remained that the ancient Church had coined a dogmatic terminology for which it was not always easy to find Biblical equivalents.⁶ In the same connection, the term *essentia* as applied to God also created difficulties.⁷ All three of these terms — *sacramentum*, *persona*, *essentia* — were necessary; but they also constituted a problem for the careful dogmatician.

That problem became even more acute in the case of those terms which do not summarize a particular doctrine, as do those referred to above, but which are rather employed as methodological devices in the exposition of all Christian doctrine. Among the most familiar methodological devices of this latter sort in Lutheran dogmatics are the Aristotelian distinction of *substantia* and *accidens* and the Aristotelian distinction of causes.⁸ But fully as important as either of these is the distinction of *objectum* and *subjectum*, together with the assumptions that lie behind that distinction. Because this antithesis between object and subject is so central in the terminology and methodology of the Lutheran dogmaticians, it deserves careful attention on the basis of the sources. In an effort to interpret the significance of the object-subject antithesis in Lutheran dogmatics, the present essay will seek to analyze the historical origins of that distinction in the dogmaticians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

II

The ultimate origins of the object-subject antithesis lie in the Greek interpretation of truth, though the terminology itself is a later, medieval invention. In Professor Koehler's words, "these are not Biblical terms, but they are used by dogmaticians."⁹ Their origin is, then, to be sought outside the Bible and, more specifically, in the Greek understanding of ἀλήθεια.¹⁰ For the Greeks, "truth" meant that a statement or proposition was an adequate representation of an external reality. Underlying that view is Greek monism, by which God and man were thought of as living in continuity, so that the Idea in the mind and the reality outside the mind stood in relation to each other. Even when the external reality is vague, as in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, this definition of truth remained.¹¹

When Greek thought was amalgamated with Christian thought in medieval theology, this Greek view of truth played a prominent role. As Rudolf Eucken has pointed out in his study of the object-subject antithesis, these terms first appear in Duns Scotus. As part of his metaphysics, Duns found he had to distinguish between truth as it is outside the mind and truth as it is inside the mind. "The word subjective was applied to whatever concerned the subject-matter of the judgment, that is, the concrete objects of thought; on the other hand the term objective referred to that which is contained in the mere *obicere* (*i. e.*, in the presenting of ideas) and hence qualifies the presenting subject."¹² It is evident that Duns' use of the term was the exact opposite of their use today; nevertheless, it was he who introduced the objective-subject antithesis into the discussion of philosophical truth and from there into the framework of Christian theology.

Because both Luther and Melanchthon were opposed to the speculative metaphysics of the medieval doctors, the Scotist version of object and subject does not appear as such in the main body of their theology. Rather, the terms *objectum* and *subjectum* in earliest Lutheran theology would seem to owe their origin to Humanist grammar and Humanist psychology. Melanchthon's *Liber de anima* has a fully developed theory of *objectum* in the modern sense. As each of the five senses has *objecta* peculiar to it,¹³ so God and all things are the proper *externum objectum* of the intellect¹⁴ and the Good is the proper *objectum* of the will.¹⁵ And in this sense, Christian faith, too, may be said to have *objecta*, that is, things to which it attaches itself.¹⁶ Taking his cue from Melanchthon, Aegidius Hunnius also spoke of "objectum cognitionis Deus ipse."¹⁷ When the "Credo in unum Deum" of the Nicene Creed is parsed, "Deum" will be seen to be the object and an implied "ego" in "Credo" the subject. By this grammatical distinction, *objectum fidei* eventually became a technical term of Lutheran dogmatics.¹⁸

The term *subjectum*, on the other hand, does not seem to have been clarified for a long time. During the sixteenth century it is used synonymously with *substantia*¹⁹ and therefore in contexts where we would probably use the term "object."²⁰ Even though the grammatical implications of the term *subjectum* were set down in opposition to the Calvinistic interpretation of the word,²¹ the con-

fused use of the term remained.²² The clearest statement of *subjectum fidei* in contradistinction to *objectum fidei* is that of Johann Gerhard: "Subjectum fidei . . . est homo."²³ With the exceptions noted, Lutheran theology had developed the distinction between the knowing subject and the known object by the middle of the seventeenth century and was applying it to the articulation of Christian truth.²⁴ Once the distinction had established itself, it pervaded the entire *corpus doctrinae* of the Lutheran dogmaticians.

III

There is perhaps no *locus* in which the influence of the object-subject antithesis is more evident than in the description of faith that is to be found in the Lutheran dogmaticians. This can be seen from the familiar distinction between the *fides quae creditur* (objective) and the *fides qua creditur* (subjective). The distinction was most succinctly stated by the medieval scholastic Peter Lombard and was taken over from him by the dogmaticians: "That which we believe is one thing, the faith by which we believe is another; and yet both are called by the name 'faith' — that which we believe and that by which we believe. *Fides quae creditur* is called *fides materialis*, *fides qua creditur* is called *fides formalis*; for *fides quae creditur* is the object of *fides qua creditur*."²⁵ Within the context of the Lombard's Semi-Pelagian theology, such a distinction had a definite place. For by the knowledge of *fides quae creditur*, a man was doing "as much as is in him"; and God would inevitably confer His grace upon such a man through the *fides qua creditur*. But when the distinction was transplanted into Lutheran theology, which was vigorously opposed to Semi-Pelagianism, how was it to be reinterpreted?

In adopting the Lombard's distinction of *fides quae creditur* and *fides qua creditur*, the Lutheran dogmaticians of the seventeenth century were led to lay undue stress upon the objective element in faith, employing New Testament passages for it that do not apply — a trend which Professor Pieper criticizes in them.²⁶ In fact, Lutheran dogmatics elaborated the medieval distinction into a trichotomy of *notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia*, which Professor Pieper has also subjected to very telling criticism.²⁷ The trichotomy of *notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia* was introduced into Lutheran theology by

Philip Melanchthon.²⁸ Like the medieval distinction of *fides quae creditur* and *fides qua creditur*, this trichotomy also made room for the operation of the human will in conversion. For its central term, *assensus*, of which we shall have more to say later, was also the term in which Melanchthon expressed his synergism.²⁹ After Melanchthon, the trichotomy was taken up by Tileman Hesshusius (1527—1588) into the second edition of his dogmatics.³⁰ Although Chemnitz divided faith into four parts instead of three,³¹ the trichotomy eventually became standardized in the Lutheran dogmaticians.³²

The crucial term in that trichotomy of *notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia*, is the second, *assensus*. For as the distinction became more and more clear-cut, the term *assensus* and the verb *assentiri* acquired more and more of an intellectual connotation. The insistence that faith is *fiducia* is a central affirmation of the Lutheran Confessions, especially of the Apology.³³ But the term *assentiri* occurs in the Apology, too. Significantly, it is used in contrast to the *fides historica* of Roman Catholicism,³⁴ to the “notitia historiae seu dogmatum” which the intellectualism of Rome equated with faith.³⁵ Faith, the Apology insists, is no mere intellectual agreement, in the Greek sense, that a set of propositions corresponds to external reality; “est autem fides proprie dicta, quae assentitur promissioni; de hac fide loquitur scriptura.”³⁶

This was in keeping with the usage of *assensus* and *assentiri* at that time. In 1540, Caspar Cruciger employs *assentiri* as virtually equivalent to “obey.”³⁷ A generation later, the Latin version of the Formula of Concord speaks of “evangelio vere credere aut assentiri, et id pro veritate agnoscere”; but *assentiri* here serves to render the German “das Jawort dazu geben.”³⁸ And in a later paragraph “credere aut assentiri” is again a rendition of “glauben oder das Jawort dazu geben.”³⁹ Yet another generation later, in the work of Balthasar Meisner quoted earlier, Christian *assentiri* is explained: “ut simul me totum ipsi quasi concredam et omnibus cogitationibus in eum confidam.”⁴⁰ Thus, far from having an essentially intellectual content, *assentiri* means the entrusting of the total person to God. It was, then, practically synonymous with *fiducia*, and was specifically ascribed to the *voluntas* rather than to the *intellectus*.

At the same time, however, *assensus* could be ascribed to the

intellectus. Melanchthon had connected *voluntas* and *assentiri*, as noted above.⁴¹ But it must be remembered that in Melanchthon's reinterpretation of Aristotelian psychology, the *intellectus* and the *voluntas* were almost equated.⁴² As a result, he could also ascribe *assensus* to the *intellectus*: "Fides est noticia, qua adsentimur dicto sine dubitatione, victi testimoniis vel autoritate," an intellectual and authoritarian act.⁴³ Alongside the development sketched in the preceding paragraph (*assensus voluntatis*) was the ascription of *assensus* to the *intellectus*. Of the two uses, the voluntaristic and the intellectualistic, the latter was to win the day. Thus, Hesshusius attaches *assensus* to "totum Dei verbum" and only *fiducia* to the "promissionem gratuitam de remissione peccatorum."⁴⁴ For Chemnitz, too, *notitia* and *assensio* belong to the *mens*, while *desiderium* and *fiducia* belong to the *voluntas et cor*.⁴⁵ Like Hesshusius, Balthasar Mentzer makes the entire Word of God the object of *assensus*, and only the grace of God the object of *fiducia*.⁴⁶ In this he was followed by Gerhard⁴⁷ and by David Hollaz,⁴⁸ both of whom place the locus of *assensus* in the *intellectus*. Indeed, by the end of the seventeenth century it had even become possible for a Lutheran theologian to maintain that the demons who believe and tremble have *assensus* as well as *notitia* and lack only *fiducia*.⁴⁹

Although the dogmaticians criticized the philosophical distinction between the intellect and the will,⁵⁰ as had the Apology before them,⁵¹ they nevertheless made use of it in their definition of *assensus*, turning it from the response of the total person to the agreement of the intellect. In this way, the objective *fides quae creditur* could achieve a position of prominence; for the intellect deals with objective truth, while the will subjectively follows through on the objective truth which the intellect has grasped.

The Biblical use of πιστεύω, especially in James 2:19 and in the pericope John 4:50-53,⁵² compelled the dogmatician to devise categories under which this sort of πίστις could be distinguished from saving faith. From the Apology they took the concept of a *fides historica*. In addition, they took the Apology's phrase, *fides specialis*, and made a technical term of it.⁵³ Over and above these, they spoke of a *fides dogmatica*, a *fides miraculosa*, a *fides generalis*, and several others.⁵⁴ The difficulty lay in ascertaining what continuity existed between these uses of πίστις and the πίστις by which men

are justified. That continuity was localized in the *fides quae creditur* — the “objective” content which they all share. The difference between them lay in the *fides qua creditur* — the “subjective” element which is present only in the regenerate.

IV

From all this it would appear that the object-subject antithesis, with its corollary distinctions, performed a useful function in the classical Lutheran dogmatians. It sought to give voice to the important theological declaration that there is a “given” in Christian faith over which the believer has no disposition or control. Thus, the body and blood of Christ are present in the Lord’s Supper, regardless of the worthiness of either officiant or recipient.⁵⁵ I do not call God into existence by my faith in Him, nor dare I write my own Bible. I must listen to the Word, which He has historically set down. This was the dynamic intention behind the object-subject antithesis.

But the word studies presented here would seem to indicate that the form which this dynamic took in the object-subject antithesis and its corollaries left something to be desired as an expression and clarification of Christian doctrine. The distinction of object and subject in faith stems from the speculative metaphysics of Scotist philosophy, and yet it appears in Lutheran theology. The distinction of *fides quae creditur* and *fides qua creditur* stems from the Semi-Pelagianism of medieval theology and was taken over from there into the body of Lutheran dogmatics. The distinction of *notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia* stems from the synergism of Melancthon’s theology, and yet it was retained by the later Lutheran dogmatians.

This was accomplished in spite of the fact that Lutheran dogmatics vigorously opposed speculative metaphysics, medieval Semi-Pelagianism, and Melancthonian synergism. The only way these three distinctions could be accommodated to the structure of Lutheran theology was by an increased emphasis upon the role of the intellect in faith. In this way, the “objective” came to outweigh the “subjective.” And even when Pietism protested against the overemphases of its predecessors, it had to do so in terms of the object-subject antithesis, stressing the latter in preference to the

former. It would seem, then, that neither the "objectivism" of seventeenth-century Lutheranism nor the "subjectivism" of eighteenth-century Lutheranism does complete justice to the Biblical doctrine of faith as this appears in the New Testament, and as it was recovered in the faith of Luther and the theology of the Lutheran Confessions.

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FOOTNOTES

¹ On *vox ἄγγραφος*, cf. Martin Chemnitz, *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, ed. by E. Preuss (Leipzig, 1915), p. 80; also his *Loci theologici*, ed. by Polycarp Leyser (3 vols.; Frankfurt, 1653), I, pp. 43—44.

² See the discussion of Abraham Calov, "An omnes Fidei Articuli creditu ad salutem necessarii ὁπωσ in Scripturis traditi esse debeant," *Systema locorum theologicorum* (Wittenberg, 1640—1677), I, pp. 804—807; and Tileman Hesshusius' defense of τέχνηα in theology, as in other "artes": *De duabus naturis in Christo, earumque unione hypostatica tractatus* (Magdeburg, 1590), leaf H2b—H8a.

³ Franz Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik* (St. Louis, 1917—1924), I, p. 508.

⁴ The derivation of *sacramentum* from civil law is traced by Calov with several representative quotations, *Systema*, IX, pp. 88—89. One of the most scholarly discussions of the term and its validity by a seventeenth-century Lutheran is that of Balthasar Meisner, *Philosophia sobria* (Wittenberg, 1611 to 1627), II, pp. 142—151. For a modern scholar's findings, cf. Hans von Soden, "Μυστήριον und sacramentum in den ersten zwei Jahrhunderten der Kirche," *Zeitschrift fuer die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XII (1911), pp. 188 ff.

⁵ Georg Moebius, *Vindiciae Hutterianae pro compendio theologico* (Leipzig, 1672), p. 467. Tertullian's use of *sacramentum* is carefully examined by Ferdinand Kattenbusch, *Das apostolische Symbol* (Leipzig, 1894—1900), II, pp. 94—97.

⁶ See Meisner's discussion of ὑπόστασις, *Philosophia sobria*, II, pp. 279 to 284, and the comments of Moebius, *op. cit.*, pp. 77—78; on ὑπόστασις, see also Chemnitz, *Loci*, II, p. 246.

⁷ Aegidius Hunnius, *Articulus de Trinitate per quaestiones et responsiones pertractatus* (Frankfort, 1589), pp. 54—56, felt able to root *essentia* in the etymology of the Old Testament Jehovah; a little later, pp. 87—88, he equates Jehovah with *essentia aut existentia*. See also Hesshusius' discussion, *De duabus naturis*, leaf O4a—O6b, of the relation between *essentia* and the *essentialia Dei idiomatica*.

⁸ For a discussion of *substantia* and *accidens*, see Abraham Calov, *Scripta philosophica* (Luebeck, 1651), *Metaphysica divina*, II, p. 155; for a discussion of various *causae*, cf. David Hollaz, *Examen theologicum acroamaticum* (Leipzig, 1722), II, pp. 28—39.

⁹ E. W. A. Koehler, "Objective Justification," *CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY*, XVI, (1945), p. 231.

¹⁰ Wilhelm Luther, *Wahrheit und Luege im aeltesten Griechentum* (Leipzig, 1935) is a penetrating analysis of how ἀλήθεια came to take on the meaning that it did in the context of Greek religion and metaphysics.

¹¹ See the masterful summary of "Meno. The New Knowledge" in Werner Jaeger, *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture*, tr. by Gilbert Highet, II (New York, 1943), pp. 160—173.

¹² Rudolf Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, tr. by Meyrick Booth (New York, 1912), pp. 35—63, is the best historical analysis known to me of the origins of "objective-subjective," though he does not refer to the Lutheran dogmaticians at all.

¹³ "Liber de anima," *Corpus Reformatorum* (Halle, 1834 ff.; hereafter abbreviated as CR) 13, 109—119.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, CR 13, 143.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, CR 13, 154—155.

¹⁶ The term appears at least twice in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. IV, par. 53, and Art. IV, par. 55, *Concordia Triglotta*, Saint Louis, 1921), pp. 134—136.

¹⁷ *Articulus de Trinitate*, p. 42; see also Chemnitz, *Loci theologici*, II, p. 245.

¹⁸ Johann Adam Scherzer, *Systema theologiae* (2d ed.; Leipzig and Frankfurt, 1685), p. 429; Hollaz, *Examen*, II, pp. 650—655, are two representative discussions.

¹⁹ So by Hesshusius, *De duabus naturis*, leaf H7a: "subjectum cum accidente dicitur concretum," also leaf O5b; see, too, Chemnitz, *Loci theologici*, II, p. 246: "substantia est subjectum omnium accidentium."

²⁰ As when Christ's human nature is spoken of as the *subjectum* of the Incarnation by Chemnitz, *De duabus naturis in Christo* (Leipzig, 1590), p. 12.

²¹ Balthasar Meisner, *Philosophia sobria*, I, pp. 237—240.

²² See the confusion in Calov, *Systema*, I, pp. 43—44, where *subjectum* and *objectum* are used interchangeably; and *ibid.*, I, p. 292, where the *subjectum revelationis* is the person to whom a revelation is given — whom we would term the "object" of the revelation.

²³ Johann Gerhard, *Loci theologici*, ed. by E. Preuss (9 vols.; Berlin, 1863 ff.), III, p. 364.

²⁴ My research has failed to discover when and how the plural "truths" in the sense of "true statements" or "doctrines" first came into use, though such usage is closely connected with the development described above. Both ΠΙΣΤΙΣ in the Old Testament and ἀλήθεια in the New appear in the singular. And when our dogmaticians speak of *duplex veritas*, they are not referring to "truths," but to their view that philosophical truth and theological truth dare never be in conflict with each other; see my essay, "Natural Theology in David Hollaz," *CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY*, XVIII (1947), p. 260.

²⁵ Peter Lombard, 3. sent. dist. 23, lit. C., quoted approvingly by Johann Gerhard, *Loci theologici*, III, p. 350. See also Hollaz, *Examen*, II, p. 647: "Objective faith, or *fides quae creditur*, is loosely (*improprie*) termed faith, for it is the object of faith. . . . But subjective faith, or *qua creditur*, is faith strictly so called (*proprie dicta*), which is in a man as in a subject."

²⁶ Franz Pieper, *Dogmatik*, II, p. 540: "Aeltere Theologen haben oeffters unnoetigerweise πίστις im objektiven Sinne genommen."

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 512—514.

²⁸ "Certissimum est fide in hac doctrina non tantum significari noticiam, quam et diaboli tenent, sed significari simul *noticiam* historiae, et *assensionem*, qua promissionem tibi applicas, et *fiduciam* acquiescentem in mediatore et in Deo, iuxta promissionem": "Enarratio epistolae prioris ad Timotheum" (1550 to 1551), CR 15, 1312 (italics my own).

²⁹ ". . . hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus sanctus et humana voluntas *assentiens* nec repugnans verbo Dei": "Loci theologici" (1543), CR 21, 658.

³⁰ Tileman Hesshusius, *Examen Theologicum, complectens praecipua capita doctrinae* (2d ed.; Frankfurt, 1578), p. 80.

³¹ Martin Chemnitz, *Loci theologici*, II, p. 252; the four parts are: 1. *notitia*; 2. *assensio*; 3. *desiderium*; 4. *fiducia*.

³² Cf. David Hollaz, *Examen*, II, p. 649: "Aliud enim est credere Deum, aliud credere Deo, aliud credere in Deum. Credimus esse Deum per notitiam, credimus Deo per assensum, credimus in Deum per fiduciam"; also *ibid.*, II, p. 659, where he distinguishes an *apprehensio vel receptio meriti Christi triplex*: "cognoscitiva, quae fit per notitiam; approbativa, quae fit per assensum; appropriativa, vel adhaesiva per fiduciam."

³³ Article IV of the Apology makes this insistence repeatedly: par. 44, *Triglotta*, p. 132; par. 46, p. 132 (*cognitio!*); par. 58, p. 136; par. 62, p. 138; par. 69, p. 140 (*confidere*); par. 79, p. 142; par. 80, p. 142; par. 81, p. 142; par. 82, p. 144; par. 99, p. 150; par. 101, p. 150 (*notitia Christi* equals: "nosse beneficia Christi, promissiones credere, quod, quae promisit Deus propter Christum, certo praestet"). But the Formula of Concord is equally insistent on this point: Solida Declaratio, Art. V, par. 22, p. 958; par. 25, p. 960; Art. VII, par. 62, p. 994: "credere praedicato Verbo Dei, in quo nobis Christus, verus Deus et homo, cum omnibus beneficiis . . . offertur. . . . Haec qui ex Verbo Dei commemorari audit, fide accipit sibi applicat et hac consolatione totus nititur . . . qui, inquam, vera fiducia in verbo evangelii firmiter in omnibus tribulationibus et tentationibus acquiescit. . . ."

³⁴ Art. IV, par. 48, *Triglotta*, p. 134: "non est tantum notitia historiae, sed est *assentiri* promissioni Dei . . . est velle et accipere oblatam promissionem"; not an "otiosa notitia," par. 61, p. 136; par. 115, p. 154; not an "otiosa cogitatio," par. 64, p. 138.

³⁵ Art. III, par. 262, *Triglotta*, p. 224.

³⁶ Art. IV, par. 113, *Triglotta*, p. 154.

³⁷ Caspar Cruciger, *In epistolam Pauli ad Timotheum priorem Commentarius* (Strassburg, 1540), p. 66: "Deus in his naturis quae sic condidit ut haberent liberum assensum, non semper agit voluntate efficaci, nec affert necessitatem assentiendi *voluntati* nostrae, quae sic condita est ut possit non assentiri. Ut autem assentiatur *voluntas*, et obediat divinae voluntati, necesse est accedere efficacem motionem Dei."

³⁸ Solida Declaratio, Art. II, par. 13, *Triglotta*, p. 884; cf. also Tileman Hesshusius' phrase: "Agnoscamus nos illi (Spiritui) hanc reverentiam et obedientiam debere: ut credamus vera esse quae ipse tam perspicue docuit," *De duabus naturis*, leaf P4b.

³⁹ Solida Declaratio, Art. II, par. 18, *Triglotta*, p. 888.

⁴⁰ Balthasar Meisner, *Philosophia sobria*, II, p. 257.

⁴¹ See the quotation in note 29 above.

⁴² On this equation, see R. R. Caemmerer, "The Melanchthonian Blight," *CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY*, XVIII (1947), pp. 321—338.

⁴³ Melanchthon, "Liber de anima," *CR* 13, 166. Despite his tremendous acquaintance with Melanchthon's words and works, Hans Engelland seems to me to overlook this ambivalence in Melanchthon's use of *assensus*: *Melanchthon, Glauben und Handeln* (Munich, 1931), p. 585, note 36.

⁴⁴ *Examen theologicum*, p. 80; and yet, *ibid.*, p. 112, he can say: "Paulus . . . jubet ut promissioni firmiter adsentiamur," and *ibid.*, p. 70, quoting Melanchthon, though not by name (see note 29 above), he can ascribe *assensus* to the *voluntas*.

⁴⁵ Chemnitz, *Loci theologici*, II, p. 252.

⁴⁶ Balthasar Mentzer, *Disputationes theologicae et scholasticae XIV* (Marburg, 1600), Disp. V: "De justificatione hominis peccatoris coram Deo," par. 91—92.

⁴⁷ Gerhard, *Loci theologici*, III, p. 354, based on Thomas Aquinas, on *assensus* and *intellectus*, *ibid.*, p. 350.

⁴⁸ Hollaz, *Examen*, II, p. 649.

⁴⁹ Johann Adam Scherzer, *Systema theologiae*, pp. 300—301.

⁵⁰ Hollaz, *Examen*, II, p. 658; see the strong statement of Gerhard, *Loci*, p. 364, responding to the argument that faith cannot be *fiducia* because it is in the intellect: "Argumentum petitum est non e schola Spiritus sancti, sed ex principiis philosophicis. . . . Scriptura intellectum et voluntatem non distinguit. . . ."

⁵¹ Art. III, par. 183, *Triglotta*, p. 204.

⁵² On the faith of demons in James 2:19, cf. Melanchthon, "Loci theologici" (1543), *CR* 21, 785; Heshsius, *Examen theologicum*, p. 81.

⁵³ The phrase occurs in the Apology, Art. IV, par. 45, *Triglotta*, p. 132. It seems, however, that Melanchthon did not employ it as a technical term; for though he makes use of it again in the *Loci* of 1535, *CR* 21, 491, his next reference to it, in the *Loci* of 1543, *CR* 21, 889, adds an explanatory note: "Hac fide speciali, ut sic dicam. . . ."

⁵⁴ The various species of *fides* are distinguished by Hollaz, *Examen*, II, 647; see also Gerhard's approving reference to Bonaventura's distinction of ten types of faith, *Loci theologici*, III, p. 350.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Formula of Concord, Solida Declaratio, Art. VII, par. 123, *Triglotta*, pp. 1012—1014.