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UNIVERSITIES

AND COLLEGES - *Religion*

The UNIVERSITY and the CHURCH

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THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CHURCH

The Lecturer's Point of View

The thesis I want to develop is based upon four assumptions which I should like to present as personal creedal affirmations. Admittedly they are stated rather dogmatically. I hope I can defend them and work out their implications successfully.

1. I believe that both the church and the university are institutions under God, that both are His instrumentalities for the realization of His purposes in history.

2. I believe that each has its own individual function and has its own contributions to make to the building of God's Kingdom.

3. I believe that each needs the presence, criticism, understanding and aid of the other in order that it may achieve its goals and attain its own self-realization.

4. I believe that each needs the help of the other in order that together they may achieve those purposes which they have in common.

From these affirmations it must be obvious what my point of view is. First of all, I have a sacramental conception of life and the world. For me this is God's world, and everything therein is His. Hence I regard both the university and the church as His and their functions and purposes as complementary to each other—not incompatible or antagonistic. For the same reasons I consider that my vocation as university professor and administrator is sacred and that I have God-given duties, responsibilities, and ambassadorial authority in His Kingdom, just as you clergymen have.

Second, I am unashamedly a university man—with a pro-university bias. I am deeply rooted in its life, proud to participate in its work, believe in its mission and its future, have faith in its integrity and reject the pessimistic, derogatory evaluations of the university that are current in many quarters. I would counsel against saying that it is "sick from top to bottom," as has been asserted by M. M. Thomas. Such an extreme statement does not, as I see it, portray the situation accurately. To be sure, the university does have many shortcomings and sins, difficulties and perplexities, its unfinished tasks, its inadequate educational philosophy and world view. But to me it looks healthy, vigorous and adventurous. Certainly it is self critical and thoroughly aware of its need for a clearer understanding of its purposes and for better ways of achieving them. Moreover, in my opinion it is largely meaningless to apply the word "crisis" specifically to the university unless we mean simply that the world is in crisis or that the society of which it is a part is in crisis.

Finally, I am not only pro-Christian and pro-university, but also definitely pro-church—and proud of it—deeply rooted in the church, devoted to its service, with faith in its mission, its integrity and its future. I deprecate and

repudiate the pessimistic views regarding it that are current in many circles—both outside and inside the church. It is not sick and on the verge of distintegrating. To be sure, it has its shortcomings and sins; and like the university it has unsolved problems and vexing perplexities. But it is acutely conscious of many of these and is courageously trying to resolve them. In my opinion it is keenly alive, active, adventurous, and propably as strong as it has ever been.

Perhaps before proceeding I should say briefly what I mean by the terms university and church—though this will be considered at greater length later.

A university is an institution with two responsibilities, first for the search for knowledge—knowledge conceived broadly; and second for education and training. I am distinguishing here between “university” and “college.” While the university has both of the two functions just referred to, the college is usually thought of as having only the second, education. Very few colleges feel that they have a responsibility for research.

As to the term “church,” I am afraid I shall not be using it consistently. Basically I personally mean by it the great universal, invisible church of the ecclesia. For me this and only this is *The Christian Church*. Most of the time, however, I suspect that in these lectures by “church” I shall mean “the churches” or denominations, the organizations maintaining professional representatives on the university campus. When I use a term such as “the church on campus” I shall always mean all of us together who are of the church and are working in its behalf on campus, the professionals officially representing the churches and the professors, students and others who are laymen, in short the Christian community in the university. I hope the context will always make it clear in which sense the term church will be used in a particular case.

As to my use of the term “university” I am afraid that here too I shall be inconsistent, and again I hope that the meaning intended in particular instances will be apparent from the context. Basically for me “the university” means the great, invisible community or fellowship of scholars and pilgrims in quest of truth and learning, who have themselves experienced both the thrills, joys and victories, as well as the bitter disappointments, failures and defeats of that quest. Sometimes I shall be referring to the university in this fundamental sense. At other times “university” will mean “the universities,” institutions which hire and fire professors, seek endowments, and which have in many ways formalized and stereotyped the quest. Most often, I think, “the university” will refer simply to all of us, to the visible communities of professors, students and others, which get their work done rather informally by simply following the university way of life in a manner to be discussed later.

While I shall be claiming that the university and church have some goals in common and should therefore be thought of as complementary to each other, I do not take the position that all their goals are identical. The responsibility of the church is to preach the gospel. For me salvation and education are not synonymous. Nor is the Kingdom of God identical with slum eradication or better plumbing. I am not a social gospeler in the sense of the optimistic liberal '30s. Nor do I believe in inevitable progress. The gos-

pel is relevant to social and cultural progress, but is not identical with such progress.

Concerning both the university and church it should be said, I believe, that they are still a long way from attaining their ideals. There are large sections of both that are still engaging mainly in ruminating the past, that show little awareness of or interest in the many issues of significance and relevance for today, and in which the prophetic voice is heard but rarely, if ever. Nevertheless I, for one, am incorrigibly both a churchman and university man with an undying faith in their destiny under God and with genuine respect and admiration for what they are doing.

May I now say that I shall not undertake to discuss the whole subject of *The University and The Church*. Rather I should like to present for consideration certain parts of it that have perplexed me, concerning which I have some strong convictions and which seem to me to have received less attention heretofore than have others. To put it another way, I should like to express some wishes and hopes which seem to reappear whenever as churchman I think about the relations between the church and the university.

The Urgent Need for Mutual Understanding

The first thing I often wish for is that there might be less misunderstanding and mistrust between the church and the university, and the first point I should like to make is that in considering the relations between them and in planning the strategy of church work in the university community the first basic desideratum should be that of attempting to remove these misunderstandings and suspicions as far as possible.

Why should so many representatives of the university and of the church talk and act as if they were opponents or even enemies?

Let us admit immediately that neither the university as an institution, nor the university faculties are Christian—specifically Christian. Moreover, let us acknowledge that in the habitual *thought patterns* of many university professors Christian concepts and ideals as such do not play any important role and that in their *experience patterns* religious experiences such as worship and prayer in the Christian sense are negligible in amount or importance. For many of them the Christian religion simply does not exist as a factor of any moment or consequence—with regard to either their own lives or the world at large. Many others are openly and actively opposed to religion as we think of it, and therefore also to Christianity. Finally, there can be no doubt that within the university there are those whose ethics and morals are widely at variance with Christian standards.

Now, if all this be granted, does it mean that the church and the university are irretrievably at opposite poles of a long axis that will forever keep them apart? I would say No, by no means! I would plead that there are powerful reasons for regarding them as indissolubly connected and related by bonds of common purposes and goals, and of similar ideals, attitudes and commitments.

In the first place I would say that university men and churchmen are typically much more alike than is commonly recognized. While all the negative things we have admitted about the attitudes of many university people toward religion and the church are true there is also another side. Isn't it

equally true, for instance, that university people typically are humble and courageous searchers for truth and wisdom willing to follow wherever the truth may lead regardless of consequences? And isn't it true that they have a sense of mission and vocation—relative to scholarship, education and the service of mankind? To me it seems that many of them are also deeply religious, much more so than is often realized—even though they may not be Christian. To me it has come to be a source of deep satisfaction and constant inspiration to observe their profound “reverence for life,” their genuine love of the good and the beautiful, their passionate commitment to justice, their fine sensitivity to the reality of the sacred. Many of them seem to me in their quiet unobtrusive way to be serving God—though they may never speak or think of Him explicitly in terms of religious language or concept.

If I may inject here a bit of Tillichean theological language, what I am suggesting is that large sections of university faculties belong to the “latent church”—even though not to the “church manifest.” Surely this puts them “on our side.”

Similarly the university as an institution has many characteristics the church should be able to approve of with enthusiasm. Let me mention a few that seem to me to be especially typical. In the university one finds a perpetual self-analysis and criticism of the status quo; a continual flux of ideas, ceaseless creation of new ideas and systems of thought, as well as the modification or annihilation and abandonment of insufficient old ones; dialectical tensions and reactions between different points of view and ways of thinking. Institutionally the university is committed to open and unrestricted inquiry, to free discussion, the sanctity of the rights of the individual and a minimum of regimentation. Contrary to much popular opinion in the church, it does recognize the reality and importance of the spiritual as well as of the material, and it is keenly aware of its social responsibility. Would you not agree that this sounds very much like what we would claim for the church?

Perhaps if the church were to come to recognize all this more clearly it would find it less difficult to consider the university a community of kindred spirits and an ally with similar goals. At any rate, I would say that until a campus worker representing the church has come to feel in a deep existential way that this is so he does not yet understand the university.

In thus pleading for more real understanding between the university and the church and for more conscious effort to bring it about, I have no delusions that the mistrust of the church on the part of the university will ever completely vanish. There will always be such tension, as must always be the case whenever the church really is itself. Here we are reminded of that paradoxical statement of the Master: “Not peace . . . but the sword.” What I am pleading for is that at least *we* churchmen shall understand, regardless of whether the university does or not; that *we* shall appreciate the worthy, that *we* shall not stand aloof with a holier-than-thou attitude, that *we* shall not be guilty of misrepresentation, that *we* shall see good where there is good, and that *we* shall do all that *we* possibly can to effect reconciliation and mutual understanding between the university and the church.

What I am pleading for, to put it another way, is the application of the golden rule in the consideration of university-church relations. We usually insist that when we discuss the church we think of it *at its best*. Let us therefore insist also that we think of the university *at its best*.

The Church Should Seek to Serve the University

The second hope I should like to express is that the forces of religion on the university campus, and especially the Christian forces, might come to regard it as one of their primary responsibilities to help the university to achieve its own peculiar goals, to aid it in its own attempts at self-realization. As I see it, Christian workers should not think of themselves as invaders of the university realm or as attackers of a university stronghold. Rather they should consider that one important reason for their being there is to give, to offer, to make available something that the university needs, but can not get except from the church. Surely this is part of the church's mission. In order to be able to achieve this, church workers should seek in every good sense to *identify themselves* with the university and to become part of its very warp and woof—without, of course, losing their own identity or the sense of their own distinctive mission. Only thus will the church ever succeed on the campus. To put it rather bluntly, it will *not* succeed if it gives the impression that it is interested mainly in its own ecclesiastical self or in its own particular purposes and needs, selfishly conceived.

The spirit of my suggestion is, I trust, in line with the remarks made here, on the University of Chicago campus, last year by Professor H. Richard Niebuhr in an address entitled *Theology—Not Queen, but Servant*. This title in itself tells a significant story. The church would do well in its approaches to the university to adopt such an attitude: “not queen, but servant!”—even though at times it may have to accept the role of a “suffering servant.” This should always be the attitude characterizing the religion and religious institutions which bear the name of the lowly Nazarene.

If we accept this view that the “church on campus” should endeavor to serve the university and help it to achieve its purposes—which by the way, I consider to be purposes under God—it becomes necessary to have clearly in mind what those purposes are. As I have already said, the university bears two main responsibilities: first, to search for knowledge; and second, to educate and train the citizenry. In this lecture I shall discuss only the first of these, the search.

When we say that the university has responsibility for scholarship and the search for knowledge we must think of knowledge broadly and inclusively, knowledge in every discipline, in all regions of the known and unknown, knowledge of every aspect of the world and of life, and all realms of reality and experience. It must be concerned with the social and personal, the objective and subjective, the factual and theoretical, the discovered and postulated, the rational and nonrational, the ethical and moral, and so on without limit. All significant knowledge, nothing excluded!

All this knowledge it must endeavor to see in the perspective of time, change, and history; of space, geography and cosmology; and of relationships, interactions and interdependencies among the disciplines. Only thus will it be real knowledge. Moreover, it must also attempt to interpret this knowledge in terms of significance and purpose from many points of view and in terms of a multitude of needs. It is obligated to concern itself not only with what is often called pure scholarship, but also with the world of practical affairs. For instance, it must be interested in applying and exploiting knowledge in

the development of technological methods and devices for "bread and butter purposes."

Finally, it must also seek knowledge in the sense of wisdom, ideals and standards by which human beings can live good rich, rewarding and peaceful lives.

The responsibility for and the difficulty of this comprehensive research is tremendous. To accomplish it the university needs all existing stores of knowledge and every known method of inquiry, communication and practical application. I find that very few people outside the university fully appreciate this. Very few appreciate either its magnitude and importance—for culture or for the coming of the Kingdom of God.

Before considering in detail how the church can make such contributions I should probably warn you that one of my strong convictions which I want to express in these lectures is that the church has responsibility for nurturing the intellectual aspects of life and religion and that it is high time for it to pay very much more attention explicitly to such matters than it has in the past. This is especially pertinent in the university community. I would not claim, of course, that this is the most important duty of the church. But I certainly do claim that it is very, very important, much more so than much of the church seems to think. For some reason or other we seem to have forgotten that the first great commandment, re-emphasized by the Master, includes the injunction to love the Lord our God with "all our mind."

Now with this off my chest I can proceed to suggest what contributions the church can make that would help the university to achieve its purposes and destiny. There are five I should like to discuss with you, recognizing that there are others that are equally important.

First, the church can acquaint the university with its own great body of knowledge and with that of religion in general. Those representing the church in the university community should endeavor to interpret their religion as an important and indispensable component of the scholarly enterprise and to show that it has a great deal to say that can be judged in terms of the standard categories and criteria of scholarship. Whatever else we may do on the campus in the name of Christ, if we don't succeed in this we shall not be contributing much relative to the university's own purposes. Moreover, without this everything else we may do will be misunderstood or misinterpreted to be mostly sentimentality perpetrated for the church's own sake.

It is an undeniable, though sad, fact that the Christian religion is widely regarded as an intellectually inferior or even useless article. It is often said to be exclusively in the realm of the emotions. Many university professors would never think of turning to Christianity for aid in either research or teaching in any field whatsoever. This situation needs to be changed. Somehow we should be able to convince the university that religion is a specialty field of inquiry and a discipline in its own right, and that it has so much to offer that without it the intellectual enterprise of the university must be woefully incomplete and seriously handicapped. Clearly, an institution of higher learning that is without specialists who are conducting research and giving instruction in religion can not be regarded as a real university any more than if it had no productive physicists or philosophers. Without them, neither its store of knowledge nor its research program can be at all adequate.

Second, can't we claim legitimately that religion like any other discipline has methods of research and inquiry, ways of attaining insight and finding truth that are unique to itself—though, of course, it makes much use of others also? What these are and what their potentialities and limitations are needs to become better known. Unless the university has them available at close range, its repertoire of procedures and techniques for exploring the unknown will be insufficient. The importance of this can not be overemphasized. This then is another reason for recognizing that without the resources of religion the university research program must necessarily be lacking in important components. Here too the church has something vitally important to offer.

Third, not the least important value of religion for the university resides in its relationships to and reaction upon other disciplines. Conversely, much of its strength and vigor and the worth of what it has to offer depends upon what it receives from the others. This is true of every discipline. A discipline is like a living organism in that it can not live by itself nor unto itself. The ecological interactions and interdependencies of the university domain are quite as real and determinative as are those existing biologically in the field and the forest.

To illustrate, in every university worthy of the name there are philosophers who are depended upon to function as critics, analyzers and synthesizers of much that goes on within its walls. But philosophers themselves can not thrive except in an environment of competent psychologists, semanticists, logicians, mathematicians, the experimentalists and theorists of the various sciences, artists and art critics, and others. It is amazing how in turn each of these needs all the others and how each has its effect upon the others—and all this in spite of the prevalence of the extreme specialistic departmentalization of the contemporary university that we hear so much about. It is out of such interrelations and interactions, out of the never-ceasing interdepartmental or interdisciplinary criticism, the innumerable tensions and the dialectical give and take, the cross currents of alternative views that are inevitable and desirable in such a complex, that there emerges the real genius of the university. And only so can there be a really live university with adventurous spirit, that is imaginative, dynamic and sufficient unto its time.

Now, it seems to me that such a university is impossible unless the discipline of religion is one of the disciplines deeply embedded in it—because without the kinds of action and reaction, criticism and countercriticism of which only religion is capable, the university's over-all network of interactions and interdependencies will contain large holes or voids, and therefore its total structure, its strength and elasticity will be impaired. Would anyone deny that a university in which philosophy, history, sociology, psychology have not felt the criticism and reaction of religion and theology must be either thoroughly immature or very nearly dead intellectually? But this can also be said about many other fields and their relation to religion.

Thus far in considering how the church and church forces can help the university to achieve its own purposes I have tried to develop the suggestion that they have an intellectual, scholarly contribution to make. I have referred to three items: first, the intellectual knowledge content of religion, second, its own methodology, and third, its critical and dialectical reactions upon other disciplines.

The fourth suggestion is that *religion has something to offer without which the university's experience with existential reality will be incomplete*. I refer here, of course, to the unique nature of religious experience and to the imperative necessity that the university understand just what this is.

In trying to elaborate this let us think again about the nature of the university itself, this time about a feature of its purposes and task that we have touched upon but very lightly, namely that the university must seek not only truth and conceptual knowledge, but also experience and cognition in non-conceptual realms. Its quest must include the exploration of all areas of reality and experience. It must *live*—widely, deeply, completely.

It is becoming more widely recognized than it used to be that there are many kinds of knowledge or insights that are unattainable by merely reading or hearing or thinking about them, or even by logical reasoning, but which yield to comprehension only in the process of living and experiencing. For example, I suppose everybody would agree that knowledge and true understanding of love can come only from direct experience of it. Similarly, the words "our country" can mean but very little unless that meaning has come out of actual living in "our country." Or what can the terms "Mozart serenade" and "Beethoven string quartet" signify to one who has not experienced them?

To put it another way, there are realms of reality in which what is most important and meaningful is not "truth" as such, but simply the experience itself. Sometimes we talk as if the greatest value in the world were truth and as if the search for truth were the only important task in university research. But this view seems to me to be totally incorrect. To seek comprehensive knowledge and broad understanding of the world includes also the seeking for beauty and goodness, and fun, structure and relationship, the sacred and holy, and so on.

Often this means that we are trying to penetrate the unknown in search of new experience that may be nonconceptual in its nature, nonconceptual because it can not be described or communicated in terms of words or propositions or mental images.

Unfortunately there are many of our students—and colleagues also—who seem to feel that reality is only that which is encountered between the jaws of calipers or on the pan of a chemical balance and that experience is valid, "normal," meaningful and "objective" only if it is experience with material or concrete reality, is amenable to treatment by logical processes and is describable by propositions that are either true or false. No doubt the causes for the prevalence of such foreshortened views—or feelings—stem from the contemporary dominance of the educational process by technology and by the natural and mathematical sciences. This is one reason why it is so tremendously important that the university community include scholars who are mainly concerned with other kinds of reality, e.g. nonconceptual experience and non-material reality. I refer here especially to the poets, writers and artists on whom we must count to explain and interpret the nature of the artistic experience. We need them to tell us from direct, first-hand knowledge what such experience is, what it means to them and what kinds of insight it yields and how this is related to conceptual truth and other aspects of reality and experience. Perhaps, too, they can tell us how we may have

such experience—and thus learn for ourselves that there is reality beyond that which we encounter in our own specialty fields.

To consider this more specifically let us look at the musical experience. Certainly it is basically unutterable or ineffable, i.e. essentially not describable by means of words or concepts, because it is nonconceptual in nature. The story is told that when, after Beethoven had played a sonata, he was asked what message he had intended to convey by it he simply turned around and without saying a word played the sonata again. What he thus meant to say, no doubt, was that the message, meaning and content of a musical composition can not be expressed or interpreted linguistically or conceptually except only approximately and always thoroughly unsatisfactorily. Therefore we must get used to the idea that the musical experience can actually be "described" and "interpreted" adequately only through music itself. It is imperative that the university appreciate this and learn to understand the musician's ways of communicating such experience. It is even more necessary, however, that such experience be included directly in the total mass of experience of the university—for how else can the university become aware of the entire realm of experience and reality unless it has lived also the musical experience?

Now in the same way and for the same reasons the university community should include men and women who can interpret the unique nature of the religious experience, as that may be distinguished from the scientific, artistic and still other types of experience, and who can help the university to understand religion's ways of communicating such experience. Much, though not all, of religious experience is basically nontranslatable and inexpressible in terms of concepts—though, as in the case of the artistic experience, we always find it necessary for various reasons to try to interpret it linguistically and symbolically. Most of all, of course, we should recognize that the university's sum total of experience must include religious experience at its best if it is to be at all inclusive and truly representative of life's experience, and if it is to have the basic material it needs for the study of life in all its manifestations and dimensions.

Perhaps before proceeding to another part of our subject we should pause to recall that most of those aspects of religion which I have referred to as the intellectual ones are actually only the result of our attempts to interpret and communicate religious experience and reality.

The basic facts of religion are happenings and events in history, experiences of persons and of the religious community—in our case the church. To deal with these intellectually we have the disciplines we call theology, church history, history of religions, comparative religion, psychology of religion, religious literature and still others. All these arise from our primitive urge to think about our experience and our social desire to share knowledge of it. For many of us these more elemental impulses turn into the more sophisticated desires and compulsions to analyze such experiences, to systematize our knowledge about them, to explain, understand and predict, to reach out in imagination into the new and as yet unknown. Thus there come into being what I have called the intellectual aspects of religion.

The situation here seems to me to be much like that in physics. Physics is dual in its nature. It has two aspects: the experimental or experiential, and the interpretive or theoretical. It is concerned fundamentally with our ex-

periences with certain kinds of objects, with motions and forces, with heat, sound, light, electricity, etc. Its basic knowledge and body of facts are empirical, experimental. Theoretical physics arises from our attempts to describe such empirical knowledge systematically, to discover cause and effect relations, to explicate the particular in terms of the general, to predict what might happen in new experimental situations and thus to reach out imaginatively into the unknown.

Similarly religion is dual in its nature. It has experimental and theoretical aspects. Theology is, as I see it, the theoretical part of religion. It is related to experimental religion as theoretical physics is to experimental physics. As in physics, both experiment and theory are important and absolutely indispensable. There is in religion, as in physics, a remarkable interplay and interaction between experience and theory without which both would soon become static and impotent. Empirical religion and theoretical religion, to wit theology, are in fact indissoluble.

This point is, in my opinion, extremely important for present considerations. It is imperative that the university understand this dual nature of religion. (Parenthetically, I suspect that a large part of the church also needs to learn this.) It should appreciate the fact that we must have both theology and empirical religion, should be aware of the function of each, the potentialities and limitations of both, the importance of their interplay and interaction, and should recognize the desirability of cultivating them both in the university community in such a way as to maintain a proper balance between them. To help the university to a correct understanding and appreciation of these exceedingly important matters should be a high priority responsibility of churchmen on the campus.

The *fifth* possible contribution to which I should like to call attention is *related to the university's quest for knowledge and understanding of the various philosophies of life*, which have been or are now significant in the world, in terms of which knowledge and life have meaning for different peoples and which are *the well-springs of motivations leading to decisions*. In a sense this quest may be regarded as part of the general search of knowledge which we have already considered. In another sense, however, it far transcends the quest for knowledge and philosophy, because it takes us *not only into the realm of cognition, but beyond it into that of volition* as well as into the region where cognition and volition overlap and interact. In this too the university must always be deeply interested, for it certainly is a part of existence.

Here the questions are: What do people do with knowledge? What does knowledge do to them? What do different kinds of knowledge and experience do to people? Why do people decide the way they do? To what extent are choices and decisions determined genetically or environmentally, ideologically or on the basis of utilitarian consideration? What does commitment mean and what are the factors determining it?

Now it is clear that this kind of research must involve on the one hand both people's knowledge and beliefs, and on the other their choices and actions, as well as their way of life and experience, and must include inquiry into how knowledge and belief effect and affect choice and action. Here again the university must have available for its search the resources, teachings and experience of the church. The Christian's faith and belief, his

thought and behavior patterns, recognition of responsibility to and dependence upon God as important factors in the area of volition all represent facts and problems of life which the university must investigate. Only through the church can the university gain reliable knowledge of that particular area of life and reality which is called the Christian life, and only in this way can the university's exploration of the realm of volition be sufficiently inclusive to be fully meaningful. It is especially in this connection, that the Christian scholar is called upon to state systematically what his complete philosophy is, to describe systematically what the Christian regards as his experiential relationship to God and how he has found these to influence his thought, decision, and action in everyday life. Perhaps this is what is meant by the term "Christian witness"—at least in part.

This, then, ends my discussion of the role of the church as servant to the university in helping it to achieve its purposes with regard to the quest for knowledge and insight. We now turn to the question of what the church stands to gain from the university—again in the realm of knowledge and the search for it.

The Church Needs the Help of the University

One of the most fundamental teachings of the Master is that he who loses his life shall find it. A seed that is buried is resurrected in the plant that emerges from the union of the seed with the soil enclosing and surrounding it.

In this sense I believe that the church stands to gain immeasurably from any truly altruistic, unselfish giving of itself in the honest attempt to help the university realize itself more completely. Surely it is a law not only of physics but also of life that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. If then the church were to give much it should also receive much in return, and in my opinion there is much that the university now has which the church could seek to its profit. Again let us think of the intellectual aspects of religion and more particularly the Christian religion. What has the church to gain in this area from the identification of its representatives with the university community? Of course any such gains can be evaluated meaningfully only with respect to the task and mission of the church. What is the church for?

The task of the church is to preach the gospel, or "communicate" the gospel, to use a term that has become almost painfully fashionable. The church is one of the channels of divine grace by which men are brought into an I—Thou relationship with God, as well as into an I—Thou—They relationship with God and one another, to use Van Dusen's expression. It is the fellowship of the saints, men and women who have experienced these relationships and who wish to share them with other men and women. The church has responsibility as an instrumentality of God for the building of His Kingdom on earth.

The description and interpretation of the knowledge and experience of the church, the formulation of its message is the duty of theology. Without theology the church is inarticulate.

Tillich defines theology and its purposes as follows:

"Theology is the methodical explanation of the contents of the Christian faith."

"A theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation."

—*Systematic Theology* 1, pg 28, pg 3.

If theology, Christian theology, is to fulfill this mission it must be aware of the times and must adapt itself methodologically to them. To every generation it must "explain" anew the "contents" of our faith in language and symbol that convey real meaning to that generation. To every generation it must "interpret" the truth and significance of the Christian message for its time. To every generation the theologian is, as Tillach says elsewhere,

"under the obligation of giving an account of the way he relates theology to other forms of knowledge."

Now if this is indeed the obligation and task of the church's theology it is easy to see how the church needs the help of the university. I suggest that there are five such needs which are of extreme importance. There are also others.

First, the church needs a great deal of the knowledge accumulated by the university in the past in many different fields. This is so obvious that I shall not dwell upon it at length. I shall assume that everyone will grant that this is extremely important. The difficulty is that much of this knowledge is easily accessible only within the university. This is, of course, especially true of new findings that have not yet found their way into common knowledge. Hence much of it can be obtained by the church only in the university, by on-the-scene contact.

Second, the church needs the many methodologies of scholarship developed by the university.

Third, the church needs the university's criticism of its own knowledge, methodology and systems of thought. This criticism can come directly by analysis or the pointing out of inaccuracy or error in method or fact, or as the result of polemical discussion, and *indirectly* by confrontation with alternative or possible competing knowledge, methodology or points of view, or by the insistence upon empirical verification.

Anyone who has tried to argue or to think out difficult questions in regard to his faith in the university community knows how exceedingly valuable such criticism can be. Lines of thought based on outmoded logic seem to show up quickly as unconvincing or spurious. Arguments that do not distinguish between fact and theory, the known and assumed, the experienced and the postulated, between history and myth seem to lose their force in a hurry. Then there is the tendency of some apologists of the church to build certain articles of their faith on the latest ideas and developments in science. Thus I have seen defenders of the faith gleefully grasp at some new development in my field, physics, and build it into a "proof" of the existence of God

in such a manner as to seem to say, "Now we've brought God back into the universe. Science now again allows us to believe in Him." This is going on right now with respect to the celebrated Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. This principle is supposed to have saved us from determinism which in turn was supposed to have eliminated the need for God. Since according to this principle there is always some uncertainty in our predictions this is alleged now to have recaptured the need for God as an explanation. We now can't get along without Him scientifically—so the argument runs.

What bothers some of us is, what would happen to a faith based upon, or bolstered up by, such an argument if, say, the Uncertainty Principle were later found to be invalid, as has happened to principles so often in the history of physics. The tendency apparent in some quarters to base one's theology on contemporary concepts of science rather than upon revelation needs the kind of criticism rarely available except in the university. One should be wary of new ideas and new methods and not build upon them too soon.

Fourth, the church needs the help of the university if it is to achieve an adequate understanding of the shifting intellectual climate of the times from generation to generation. Perhaps this seems obvious. However, it is actually a tremendous demand.

As a sort of text for this part of our thinking I should like to present a quotation from Howard Mumford Jones, which suggests that this demand will take on new urgency in the near future.

"So far as the western world is concerned, it is possible to assume either that our culture is breaking up around us or that we are experiencing the pangs of a global revolution so vast, so profound and perhaps so incomprehensible that men—even educated men—do not want to face it, and try to estimate its causes, its direction or its possible end."

It is not my intention to perpetrate an appeal to fear—fear of the disintegration of the world. I for one simply can't believe that we are facing any such eventuality. On the other hand it seems quite evident that we are facing the prospect of an almost incomprehensible global revolution. For present purposes I am thinking not so much of the possibility of a super-destructive war, nor of cataclysmic political, social and economic upheavals resulting from the advent of the practical availability of nuclear energy, but rather of the certainty of vast unprecedented revolutionary changes in our patterns of thought, which will transform both the content and methodology of our thinking. What seems truly unprecedented about the prospect is not so much the changes themselves, tremendous as these will be, but the enormous breathtaking rapidity of them together with the fact that we now have no adequate scholarly apparatus for handling changes of such rapidity. We have had many revolutions in thinking in the history of the world. But these have, I believe, always taken place over relatively long periods of time, at least several generations or even centuries. Until relatively recently a man could always expect to live throughout his life in a world which in almost all respects was like the one into which he was born. What he learned about the tools and content of thought during his youth in school and the university was essentially the same in his old age and remained adequate for his purposes until he died. This is no longer true.

While I don't actually wish to pose as a prophet I do want to call attention to three aspects of the future which I feel are significant for present

discussion. The first is the tremendous acceleration of the expansion of knowledge. Here I am not thinking so much of the speed with which the present horizons of the unknown will be pushed back by research as I am of the discovery of new horizons, i.e. the discovery of new orders of reality, new realms of hitherto unsuspected kinds of phenomena.

As illustrations of such possibilities I cite the discoveries during recent decades of the transmutability or interchangeability of matter and energy, the discovery of the reality of the subconscious as a powerfully effective part of the human personality, the astonishing findings in the field of psychosomatics—all of which would but recently have been regarded as “scientifically impossible,” because they all violate principles which were once regarded so basic to the structure of science and knowledge as to have essentially the status of fundamental axioms. The recent suggestion of Hoyle and others, that somewhere in the vastness of inter-stellar space-time the creation of matter is now going on, is simply a hint of the kind of strange revolutionary ideas we may have to deal with in the near future. And all this is as yet, I believe, but the faint glow of the intellectually revolutionary dawn of a brilliant new day, the character of which we can not now imagine—but in which we shall have to learn to live and think.

The second aspect of future scholarship which I shall presume to predict is this, that the discovery of new areas and kinds of knowledge, as well as the expansion of those now known, will reveal the disconcerting *inadequacy of many of the intellectual tools and ways of thinking we have developed thus far*. This has already happened, though in a relatively mild way, during recent years. Let me illustrate briefly. Fifty years ago there was for practical scholarly purposes one, and only one, geometry which was used for the description of space relations in astronomy and physics. The rank and file of physicists knew “geometry” only as the old Euclidian geometry they had learned in school. It never occurred to them to ask whether this geometry was adequate for the description of the universe, because everybody (except a very few “pure” mathematicians) took it for granted that this geometry was absolute in its truth. It could be and was “proved” to be so by immutable logic. Anything else just never occurred to anybody.

Now, however, most of us realize that many geometries are possible, no single one of which can be claimed to be “true” merely because it has been “established” by logic. In fact in mathematics we ordinarily don’t use the word “truth.” We speak of a geometric system as being not true or false, but rather valid or invalid, and useful or not useful. We know that Euclidian geometry is not adequate for the description of all spatial relations of the world, and that other geometries may be much more satisfactory for some purposes. This means that an intellectual tool that we regarded throughout most of our intellectual history as an absolute foundation of certainty and as an instrument yielding undeniable truth has lost its status. The implications of this for scholarship are tremendous as most of us now realize, and its consequences during recent decades have already been revolutionary.

Another example. When I was a student here at the University of Chicago, long ago, I thought that logic was an absolute in the sense that it represented immutable laws of the mind, that in some way it was related to universal, absolute truth, that somehow it was embedded in the ultimate structure of the universe in such a way that it must inevitably yield certainty—if its laws

were not violated. Nor was I alone in thinking this. It was the way virtually all of us thought—though by that time a few lone geniuses had already warned us that things might actually be otherwise. We soon learned that these warnings were correct. Logic is not what we used to think it was. The strange fact is that there can be many different logics, all equally valid, but not equally useful for given purposes. We now realize that no logic necessarily yields truth about the objective universe and that at best it can lead to certainty only with regard to validity, rather than truth. Thus another instrument of research and scholarship has had to be re-evaluated and given a very different status in the intellectual enterprise. The potential of consequences of this particular revolutionary change in our modes of thinking is just now beginning to be suspected.

One more illustration. Just a few years ago the science of mechanics was a theoretical instrument of analysis and description that also had a status approximating that of a universal absolute. While the Newtonian version of mechanics had had to be modified in view of the epoch making discoveries and creations of Einstein, mechanics thus modified has for very good reasons continued to be considered thoroughly valid as a description of certain aspects of the physical world and as a tool for research into the motion of physical bodies. Until recently its principles and laws were considered to be applicable to all physical bodies, regardless of mass and size, and therefore appropriate for the study of all motions in the universe. This can no longer be maintained. We now know that this mechanics is not universally applicable. Thus it does not apply to the realm of the very small, for instance the interior of the atom. For this realm we must use a different tool, namely the new science of quantum mechanics.

I shall not weary you with an exposition of the virtues of this new intellectual instrument. But it is important to realize what its acceptance means, namely that certain basic concepts and methods that were once considered to have meaning and applicability throughout the cosmos have turned out not to be valid in a part of it, i.e. in the realm of the very small, and that when we deal with the microworld we must use thought patterns that are very different from those we employ when dealing with bodies of “ordinary” size. It has been suggested recently that it is likely that we shall find that in investigations of intergalactic space, the macroworld, it may be necessary to use a third kind of mechanics, a third way of thinking, different from the other two. This would indeed be intellectual revolution with a vengeance.

It would be possible, of course, to cite similarly startling developments in other fields of thought also. But neither the time nor my competence would justify my attempting to do that.

I hope that our thinking about some of these specific examples will not cause us to miss the point about this second aspect of future scholarship, namely that there is in the making a revolution not only in the content of our thought but in the ways we think, our methods of reasoning. *Not only will our vocabularies change, but also our semantics and logic, and our modes of experimenting and theorizing.*

The third feature of things to come to which I want to refer is the probability that we shall no doubt insist more than is customary today on considering alternative points of view and that we shall recognize more clearly

than seems possible today how points of view as well as modes of thought are conditioned and determined to a large extent by cultural, environmental and genetic factors. I suspect that this state of affairs will result automatically from the fact that our world is shrinking rapidly because of modern technological means of transportation and communication. Everybody in the world will soon be everybody else's rather close neighbor. Everybody will soon become personally aware of cultures and modes of life and thought other than his own, and will come to realize that often people hold different views simply because they are different people.

Already we are beginning to realize how isolated and insular people of any given country are likely to be intellectually and culturally, and how much the peace of the world depends upon different peoples' understanding each other. We are also learning increasingly how difficult real understanding across racial or national boundaries is because of basic difference in modes of life and thought. The fact is that we simply do not understand the Russians and the Chinese and they don't understand us; and, of course, the same thing can be said in general about different peoples and cultures and their lack of existential and intellectual understanding of one another.

All this is bound to change. We shall inevitably learn to know and understand one another very much better than we do now. There are many indications that we shall soon be thinking habitually, as best we can, in terms of the views and the thought patterns of other peoples. We shall soon have matured to the stage in which we shall never be satisfied with making decisions in scholarship or in practical affairs as long as we know of only one point of view. We shall, I believe, soon habitually demand alternatives of both data patterns and methodological patterns—before we undertake to formulate answers or draw conclusions. Always we shall want to take into account the consequences which any particular choice may have for other people and for systems of thought other than our own.

I wonder what will happen to many of our present ideas and dogmas when that time comes, when we shall always habitually stop to think what they might do or mean to people who approach them with very different presuppositions and ways of thinking, and when we discover that perhaps in some basic respects other ways of handling truth and experience may be better than ours. Will we by that time have learned how to assimilate or reject one another's views and insights by some method that is not provincial but is defensible relative to all of truth and experience that may be known at any given time?

When a while ago I suggested as my fourth main point that the church needs the orientation the university can offer it relative to the changing intellectual climate of the times, I had in mind especially the three aspects of the intellectual climate of the near future which I have just discussed: first, the accelerated increase of knowledge especially by the discovery of new orders of reality and new types of experiences; second, enormously rapid revolutionary changes in our methodological thought patterns and the creation of utterly new modes and tools of thought and investigation; and third, the habitual insistence on knowing, understanding and taking into account different points of view and ways of thinking before drawing conclusions and making decisions. I suggest that the church can learn this best and quickest when it is itself engaged with the university in the search for these

and can thus itself feel the tensions and reactions between the new and the old.

My *fifth* suggestion flows rather naturally out of the other four. It may be that the church's experience in the university community may help it in a positive way to adjust its theology more rapidly to the changing intellectual environment of which it is a part. Remembering Tillich's statement of the dual obligation of theology, namely to state the truth of the Christian message and to interpret that truth for every new generation, clearly the church must from generation to generation restate its message in language and concepts intelligible to that generation, and must reinterpret its message so as to make clear its relevance and significance for that generation.

It is, of course, well known that the church has usually succeeded eventually in adapting its preaching and teaching to the needs, realities, problems and concepts of the changing times. To do this in the future, however, is going to be increasingly difficult because of the rapidity of change to which we have already referred. The adjustment of theological thought patterns to the changing thought patterns in its intellectual environment will have to be *very much more rapid than ever before in Christian history*—if they are to remain relevant and potent.

Another kind, and new kind, of response and adjustment of theological thinking that will be called for in the future arises from the third aspect of future scholarship to which I have referred—namely the need to *take into account widely different audiences and alternative points of view and patterns of thought existing simultaneously*. Again I feel that there the university will have much to offer the church—because it itself will have to make such adjustments in many fields and with respect to many inter-field relationships.

What is needed here, among other things, is a set of methods specifically designed to deal with rapid intellectual changes and with aggregates of widely different modes of thought that exist simultaneously. In the main our scholarly apparatus has been designed in an essentially static intellectual environment and for use only in that kind of a setting. Now we must begin to design techniques far more potent because we must deal with problems of far greater changeability, techniques that will enable us to take in our stride what was formerly regarded as impossible. We must somehow learn how to assimilate promptly the startling new without too much dislocation in the old. We must learn how to talk and interpret in very different intellectual settings simultaneously—as if successive generations were contemporaneous.

Probably a basic characteristic of such a methodology would be its ability (a) to distinguish clearly and rapidly between the permanent and the transitory, the unexpendable and expendable, between the basic and the derived aspects or components of new systems of thought and belief, and (b) to recognize readily the fundamental similarities that may be hidden in apparently dissimilar aspects.

This is, of course, a very large order. But there can be no doubt that we need such techniques with desperate urgency—and I think that both the church and the university need them.

If there were time, and if you were interested, it would be fun to try to tell you about techniques of that sort that are developing in physics, and which are of such a nature and are turning out to be so successful that to a

rank amateur like myself it seems possible that they may be adaptable at least to some extent to the purposes of theology. One is referred to as the operational method or the operational point of view. It was devised soon after the appearance of the general relativity theory which had so devastating an effect upon the thinking of physicists of that time, because they had allowed themselves to become wedded to certain metaphysical concepts which turned out to be almost insurmountable obstacles to thinking when certain startling new phenomena were discovered.

This operational method or the habits of thinking that came out of it enabled us to handle with relative ease and a minimum of shock a whole series of rapid revolutionary developments in physics since then, which in our pre-Einsteinian state of mind we could have dealt with only with the greatest difficulty. It has given physics confidence that it can successfully effect other great changes rapidly. We now realize that no matter what comes along we shall always have two elements in any situation. Throughout the flux and change from old to new there will always be, on the one hand, the basic, certain and unchanging, and, on the other hand, the transient, expendable, changing. And we feel that our method will help us to recognize the difference between them.

Perhaps a similar kind of thinking would help the church in its thinking. It would require that we ask about every concept: Does it represent a fact or mental construct? Why do we need it? What facts brought it into use? About every mental construct in theology we would habitually say: This idea we shall use as long as it is useful, and we shall discard it when it is no longer useful. About every element of our thinking which we call factual we would continually ask: Can this be demonstrated in experience? or What is the historical evidence?

This kind of thinking has become fairly common in the university, but not as yet in the church. Perhaps this is what is required of a theology that is truly "confessional," as H. Richard Niebuhr asserts all theology ought to be, or that is actually "phenomenological," to use Tillich's very appropriate term.

I can't help feeling that herein lies some hope for the future methodology of religious thinking and that herein lies hope that the university can aid the church in its important task of keeping its message understandable and relevant in perpetual contemporaneity.

Now I should like to round out my suggestions regarding what the church may advantageously gain from the university by stating in reverse what I proposed in my first lecture. It will amount to saying that the church needs to get from the university everything the university can get from the church.

The church needs the knowledge that the university has accumulated.

The church needs the criticism, reaction, and dialectical challenge and response of the university.

The church must be aware and appreciative of the great areas of reality and experience, other than its own, which the university explores or itself experiences.

The church needs confrontation by alternative philosophies of life and of the world and should become aware of any significance and potency they may possess with respect to volition, action and behavior.

In concluding this part of our discussion I suggest that it would be tacti-

cally and strategically desirable and sound for its own purposes if the church were to assure the university in tones of unmistakable sincerity that it welcomes and hopes to profit from all knowledge and criticism, and that it fears none whatsoever—not even in those fields which in terms of contemporary developments seem most to threaten and challenge the validity of Christian experience and thought.

Responsibilities for Education

Thus far we have considered university-church relations with respect to their responsibility for scholarship and the *search for knowledge*. I should like now to consider their relation in regard to the task of *education*. Since there has been much more frequent and extensive discussion of this subject than of the other I shall speak of it only briefly—even though education certainly is at least as important and worthy of attention as is research.

I should like to point out that a *fruitful and meaningful way of thinking about the enterprise of higher education is to regard it also as a quest for truth and insight*. Up to this point we have been thinking in a sense mainly about the faculty's search for new knowledge. Education may be thought of as the students' search for new knowledge—knowledge that is new to the students themselves, even though, to be sure, it may not be new to the university community as a whole. Here again the term knowledge is to be conceived broadly to include factual and theoretical knowledge, understanding and wisdom, as well as the kind of knowledge represented by various types of skills. This conception of education stresses the student's own responsibility for learning, which is thought of as active effort to discover, evaluate and appropriate what he needs. According to this view the teacher's role is that of a coach, counsellor or resource person whose duty it is to help the student achieve his own learning, in contrast to other conceptions of teaching which seem to cast the student in a more passive role and the teacher in a very much more dominant and determinative one. This view also emphasizes the methodological and decisional aspects of learning; i.e. if it is the student's own search that is important it follows that we must help him to be conscious of and become expert in the use of appropriate methods for the search, to decide on the validity and reliability of findings, and to be critical of his thinking. Finally, it would seem that this relatively greater emphasis upon the aggressive search for knowledge rather than upon more passive reception of it should result in more venturesome and efficient habits of thought and should prove more useful and potent later in life, especially in critical situations which involve rapid flux of strange new modes of thought or experience, and which demand rather frequent, highly consequential decisions in unprecedented situations. Therefore this kind of an educational philosophy should find hospitable reception by both the university and the church.

If this point of view is indeed accepted then it follows that what we have said about how the church can help the university to reach its objectives with respect to the search for knowledge applies equally well with regard to its purposes in education. That is to say, if the university's quest should lead into all the important areas of knowledge and life, including the realm of religion, then the student's should also. Similarly, if the university in

its search needs to become aware of the potentialities and limitations of all important methodologies, including that peculiar to religion and theology, then the student needs it also. Whatever his chosen discipline or specialty field may be, he should personally in his own mental struggling feel the actions and reactions upon it of the kinds of ideas and ways of thought that are prevalent in other fields, including again those of religion. Surely his search should lead him also to some understanding of the varieties of reality and experience that are encountered in fields other than his own. Of course this part of his search would be unfortunately incomplete unless it revealed the reality and unique nature of religious experience. Finally his quest should result in commitments and a philosophy or way of life, and a conscience which are effective and motivating in the realm of volition, ethics, and life as he may encounter them. I suppose few educators would deny that in the student's reaching out for such a philosophy of life and source of motivations he should be confronted with various significant possibilities. We of the church would want to insist, of course, that the Christian way and interpretation of life should be one of the alternatives he should have the opportunity of considering critically while he is making his choices during his university experience. I suppose most of us would also agree that any commitments of such a nature that the student may have made, or any broad conclusions or points of view he may have achieved or inherited before coming to the university, should be subjected to the fires of criticism and analysis in the light of other beliefs and orientations while he is in the university. College years are always a time of transition in one's thinking about the basic things of life, a time of examination, of comparative analysis and criticism, of soul searching re-evaluation and modification of beliefs and commitments, a shaking of faiths, often also strengthening of faiths. Most educators would agree, however, I think, that this inevitable educational process should be carried on with the aid of wise, helpful and sympathetic mentors and advisors whose insights and knowledge are both broad and deep, in order that such experiences may not become psychologically traumatic, but rather shall be truly constructive, enriching and conducive to genuine growth and maturation of the student.

For all these reasons, in order that the university may more fully and successfully achieve such educational objectives, the church must be represented on campus and make its contributions there. And again we should recognize that the church can make these most easily and effectively if its representatives become fully integrated into and whole-heartedly identified with the university.

Finally, and without going into details regarding the matter, I would submit that the church has much to gain educationally from such a relationship with the university. The church has very important educational responsibilities and enterprises of its own. I feel sure that what it may learn and experience as educational servant in the university is bound to result in enrichment of its own ideals, standards, programs and procedures of education.

In my opinion the educational job of the university is more difficult than its research job. It requires much more knowledge, skill, artistry, imagination and patience on the part of a professor to educate and train the young for the search than it is to conduct it himself. Moreover it demands much more of the university faculty as a whole to formulate an educational problem

and to agree on appropriate solutions to it than is demanded in the case of a research problem.

That this is true is not recognized generally and frequently it is denied. While I must not take time to argue it at length, I do want to show why I think that this is certainly the case in physics—and I mention physics particularly because it is the only field in which I can claim some degree of professional competence. To do research in this field for example, one must (a) master a large body of subject matter content as well as a large repertoire of existing research methods and procedures, (b) have originality sufficient for the invention of new techniques, and (c) have the kind of imagination that is required to decide in the first place what kind of research is likely to be most fruitful and significant. This is a rather formidable set of prerequisites to success in the search for new knowledge in physics. *But*, to teach and coach the inexperienced in the ways of the quest demands *all this and much more*. It requires also (d) knowledge of the functioning of the human mind, (e) knowledge of the large store of pedagogical resources of various kinds available to the teacher which may be helpful to him in his instruction, and finally (f), it requires a higher order of ability in applying such knowledge in helping the student to learn effectively. All this means that the university must be eternally interested not only in the search for knowledge itself, but also, and to a no lesser extent, in the search for the best means of maximizing the learning of its students.

Not only is this relatively greater difficulty of the educational task significant for the individual physics professor in his teaching, but it shows up also for the physics department as a whole, or for the entire science faculty, when it attempts to set up, say, teaching objectives for physics in general, i.e. when it deals with curricular matters. It does not take long for research experts to outline objectives for a research project and to agree on how to proceed in meeting those objectives, but when a group of physics professors gets together to discuss what should be accomplished by a physics course intended for general education purposes they have very serious disagreements that are resolved, if resolved at all, only with great difficulty and after long periods of discussion. The main reason for this is that educational problems are by their very nature much more perplexing and demanding than are research problems. There is much more involved. There are more variables and causal factors. There are available fewer reliable and straightforward methods for finding the answers.

The reason why I mention this here is that I feel that many of the church's criticisms of the university as an educational institution are based at least partly on a most unfortunate lack of understanding of the immensity and complexity of the educational task.

In part such criticisms arise also out of lack of appreciation and understanding of the way a university operates and why because of its very nature it must necessarily operate that way. They also betray, it seems to me, a lack of balanced understanding of what the university should and can be expected to accomplish. Therefore if the church is going to be genuinely helpful in the university community it needs to learn to take a different view of these matters.

To become somewhat more specific, and to "get down to cases" let us consider Moberly's well known charge that the university is not asking the most

important questions and that it is preoccupied utterly with questions of secondary importance. (Incidentally in spite of my criticisms I greatly admire Moberly's book.)

In his book "The Crisis of the University," chapter III, I find the following statements:

"What we have, in fact, today is the chaotic university." (pg. 50)

"Broadly speaking, the university is not asking the really fundamental questions. In particular there has been something like a taboo on the treatment of contentious issues of politics or religion." (pg. 50)

"... such a taboo is disastrous and indefensible. . . . It abjures any contribution to answering the major question—How shall a man live? (pg. 51)

"If you want a bomb, a chemistry department will teach you how to make it, if you want a cathedral the department of architecture will teach you how to build it, if . . . But when you ask whether and why you want bombs or cathedrals or healthy bodies, the university, on this view, must be content to be dumb and impotent. *It can give help and guidance in all things subsidiary but not in the attainment of the one thing needful*" (Italics mine.) (pg. 52)

Earlier in his book Moberly quotes Sir Richard Livingstone, speaking as Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, as follows: "What the world most needs and most lacks today is a clear and worthy view of life. . . . What do we do to give the undergraduate such a view? I think we must reply, 'Little or nothing?' Moberly then goes on to remark, ". . . the task is no longer even being seriously attempted." (pg. 22)

Now I must confess that I can not accept these assertions with the enthusiasm and hearty endorsement they seem to receive from many of my fellow churchmen. I have read them over and over again. Each time I become more uncomfortable about them. And my feelings and reactions are thoroughly mixed. On the one hand, as a university man who thinks he is realistic in his awareness of the serious shortcomings of the contemporary university I can't help but hang my head in shame admitting freely that much of what the distinguished Sirs Moberly and Livingstone say is all too true. I myself am regarded on our campus, I believe, as a rather hardboiled, severe critic of higher education and of the university. And yet, on the other hand, again as a realistic university man, I also feel sometimes like lifting my head proudly in protest and vehemently saying of much that Moberly and others seem to imply that it just "ain't necessarily so"—to quote from the famous song in Gershwin's light opera. What ain't so, in my opinion, is that the university is apathetic to such matters, that it is not asking such questions, that it is not even trying to answer them, that it is doing nothing about them. Nor do I like such clichés as "the chaotic university," "the purposeless university" or the "bankruptcy of our university pretensions." Not long ago a distinguished educator and preacher used as a text for his Sunday morning chapel sermon on our campus the verse in Daniel about men running "to and fro and knowledge shall be increased," and he suggested that this was a good portrait of the university: men running around in circles, or going in all directions at once without any guiding star or without any sense of purpose. In my opinion such assertions are neither accurate and true, nor helpful and constructive.

Obviously, of course, it is not important what I think or how I react. But

it is important that we look carefully at such charges, since to a considerable extent they have molded opinion and attitude within the church relative to the university. In the attempt to do this let us ask some straightforward questions.

What does it mean to say that the university does not ask the really fundamental questions? When is it proper to say that the university does or does not ask such a question as: *How shall a man live?* (Parenthetically, let it be noted that this particular one is a rather far-reaching and all-inclusive question.)

There are at least three circumstances under which the university can legitimately be said to be asking a given fundamental question. First, one may assert it properly when there exists within its community a serious program of research which is seeking answers to that question. Second, the university certainly is asking that question when some of its professors, individually or in groups, are giving serious thought to it in courses or otherwise as part of their educational concerns or teaching. Here I am saying that when influential voices within the university are asking a question this is sufficient reason for considering that the university is asking it—even though not everybody in the university may be asking it. Third, the university is asking that question when in its official state papers or pronouncements there appears the formulation of an institutional educational objective definitely related to that question. By an official university pronouncement or institutional objective I mean one that represents the university faculty's views as indicated, say, by a formal, corporate vote. In this third sense it matters not at all how many people in the university are asking a question or raising an issue, it is not a question asked "by the university" unless it is one that is asked formally by the community as a whole. Now it should be remarked that university men are almost unanimously allergic to and congenitally deprecatory and suspicious of official pronouncements, issues, question and answers—and this for good and sufficient reasons. Therefore only very, very rarely can a question be said to be asked by the university formally and corporately in this third sense. Conversely, only very, very rarely can it be said of a question that it is not being asked seriously by the university in the first and second sense.

I should say without hesitation or reservation that in the first and second sense *the university is indeed asking the kinds of basic questions Moberly and the rest of us would like it to ask and try to answer.* It is not asking some of them, perhaps even many of them, in the third sense—and I, for one, do not think it should try to. If it did try many of us would object.

If the question *How shall a man live?* calls for such answers as, he shall be honest and good, he shall be motivated by the highest ideals, he shall not steal, he shall be a good citizen, he shall be a good father, a good American, he shall endeavor to develop all his faculties and he shall work and live up to his full capacities as far as that may be possible, then, I say, the university is seriously asking it even in the third sense and is trying to answer it within the limits of its capacity and resources.

If, on the other hand, it were expected that the question at issue be answered officially, i.e. in the third sense, with such replies as: he shall be a Christian, or Jew, or Mohammedan, or he shall be fully committed to the

service of God, he should pray every day, he should live with the Bible as his guide, he should belong to the church, then I say that the university is not and should not be trying either to ask or to answer it, except in the sense of placing alternatives before the student and suggesting that a choice and consequent commitment are highly desirable.

Let us look at a few of the other questions about which the university is supposed to be dumb or apathetic and impotent. Why a bomb? Why a cathedral? Why healthy bodies? Here I would again plead Believe it not! It is not true that the university is not concerned about these questions. I don't hesitate to say that if any university graduate were to assert that he never heard such questions discussed seriously on campus in one way or another I would be inclined to doubt either the adequacy of his memory or his honesty. If he asserted that the questions had indeed been raised, but that the answers proposed were unsatisfactory, I would not doubt it for a minute. These are tough questions. The answers are not found easily, and even if they were available in nice sharp outline and clearcut issue, the business of helping the student to find them—i.e. the educational problems they involve—would be just as difficult. *Just how would you propose that a teacher handle the question of the ethics of the atom bomb as it confronts the statesman or the physicist?*

Somewhere Moberly is on record, I believe, as having said that no student should pass through the university without having been confronted definitely by the Christian faith. With this I agree. I am sure, however, that Moberly does not mean that every student should be required to take a course in which he would thus be confronted in an evangelistic sense.

We have here *terrific* educational problems and questions of program and procedure that are not easily answered. The fact is, and we might as well face it, whether we be of the university or of its critics, *the university simply does not at this stage of educational history possess enough knowledge and know-how (to use a modern slang term) to enable it to solve such existentially basic problems in a truly satisfactory manner. And alongside this fact I would place another, namely, that the church does not yet possess such knowledge or know-how either.*

Sometimes churchmen talk as though they believed that if all university professors were suddenly to become Christian this would solve all educational problems. But, alas, surely this can't be so. According to the theology I have been taught the Christian religion provides no shortcuts to knowledge or skills, no panaceas or cure-alls, no ready-made answers in any field of scholarship or activity, not even in theology and religious education. A wonderful, grand, wise old man, who was president of a college in which I was once a very young instructor, used to say "God's revelation was not intended to provide us with knowledge we should be able to get with the brains He gave us." He was right.

I submit therefore that to find the solutions to some of these very, very difficult questions will require a tremendous amount of research, first with regard to the issues themselves and the knowledge that is pertinent to them, and, second with regard to the educational problems growing out of them. To find their solutions will require the whole-hearted, sympathetic cooperation of everybody. And it will require certainly the kind of help only the

church can give the university—and the kind of help the church can give while it is also learning from and being helped by the reaction upon it of the university, as I have suggested earlier in connection with research. Until the solutions are in we shall have to learn to be patient and not be demanding what is now impossible—and meanwhile we must work, work, work, and search, search, search unceasingly, and quit throwing brickbats of mutual recrimination.

In the interim there certainly is one thing we should be doing. We should intensify and accelerate our efforts to introduce religion into the curriculum of the university. Of all the great areas of life and reality religion is the only one concerning which American education, including higher education, has remained largely silent. (The historical reasons for this are perfectly clear and need not be reviewed here.) It is now high time to remove this defect. We teach students about political science, about money and banking, about bridge-building, about home making, about fishing, alas, but concerning that great area of life which is religion we have in the educational enterprise of the university a great vacuum. It doesn't make sense. Moreover the solution of many of our problems, intellectual, social, and international, demands that we know something about religion and that our knowledge of it shall be more than superficial. The only way to handle this is to recognize it as an area for teaching—as well as an area for research as it was considered to be in my first lecture.

This calls for instruction in religion itself, including a judicious amount of theology, as part of general education. It calls also for instruction in areas peripheral to religion itself, namely the literature, philosophy and sociology of religion, religious art, religious education, etc. It demands also that other fields of scholarship and affairs be taught with a perspective which includes a proper appreciation of the meaning and the role of religion in history, culture and in the lives of individual human beings.

There are several formidable obstacles to the realization of this hope some of which we should look at frankly, though we shall not discuss them separately in detail.

First of all, in state-supported universities there is the fear of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the introduction of religion into the curriculum.

Second, and related to the first, there is the fear of various religious groups that this would be the first step in the direction of state control or interference in religion.

Third, there is the conviction of some religious groups that religion is in no way the business of the university.

Fourth, many religious groups feel that the university for several reasons is and always will be thoroughly incompetent to handle religion properly in the curriculum and that if it tries to do it it will do more harm than good.

Fifth, there is the feeling on the part of many university people that it is in principle impossible to operate in the realm of religion in a truly scholarly manner—because they feel that theology is basically authoritarian.

Sixth, many university people think that introducing religion into courses would turn class rooms into places of worship or evangelistic propaganda.

Seventh, there is the fear that bringing religion on to the campus would

bring with it sectarian controversies and catch the university in an inevitable sectarian political cross fire.

Eighth, and the last I shall mention, is the opinion held widely on campus that there are not enough competent scholars in religion, i.e. real scholars who know what research is and who understand the spirit and ideals of the university, to make it practically worthwhile even to consider the desirability of introducing religion into the university curriculum—even if it could be done in principle.

While these objections do at first glance look rather formidable it seems to me that a careful examination reveals that most, if not all, of them arise out of misunderstanding or ignorance of the real nature of religion and of higher education, or of the actual intent of those who are proposing to introduce religion into the state university's curriculum. Therefore our hope of overcoming them must lie in our ability to clear up these misunderstandings.

To begin with it should be pointed out that separation of church and state does not mean separation of religion from public education. That this is a proper interpretation legally is becoming increasingly clear from recent court decisions. We will not take time to go into details here.

Next, there is good legal opinion to the effect that there is a distinction between what may be called *religious education* on the one hand, and *religion in education*, or *education about religion* on the other. Of course, many such distinctions have been made, some of which seem to have legal validity and others of which do not. There seems to be, however, increasing agreement that in a state-supported institution it is legal to provide curricular education *about religion*, but not *religious education*, if by the latter we mean education definitely intended to produce religious outcomes and commitments. *Education about religion* would be designed to acquaint the student with the nature of religion, with religious institutions and their role in society, and with the intellectual content of religion, but would not include the process of sectarian proselytizing. There is no reason whatsoever why the usual criteria of scholarship and unbiased, objective inquiry should not characterize such teaching and why it should not therefore be worthy of a place in the educational enterprise of the university.

That this is indeed possible should be evident, of course, from the fact that it has been done successfully and without any serious challenge in our best private universities throughout the history of American higher education. Even more explicitly relevant evidence is the experience of an increasing number of state supported universities. These offer ample evidence that religion can play a significant role and achieve a highly respected status in the educational enterprise of the university, that it can make important contributions both in specialized and general education, and that it can do this without violating legal limitations. Nor is there any indication whatsoever, so far as I am aware, pointing in the direction of the loss of the independence of religion or of any concomitant danger of, or tendency toward, externally-imposed controls. In fact the success of such ventures has done much in every way to allay the fears and remove the misunderstandings that are basic to opposition and that constitute such obstacles as I have mentioned. Here again is an area in which eventual wide-spread success will depend on real

cooperation, sympathetic understanding and mutual trust between university and church.

This brings me to my next point. There is a great need not only for education of students in this area, but also of the faculty. It seems to me to be an indisputable fact that most faculty people are, like most other American adults, essentially illiterate with regard to religion. I consider it not to be an exaggeration to assert that the average American adult's conception of religion is essentially that which he obtained in Sunday school when he was still in the elementary grades. One reason for this, obviously, is the almost complete absence of religion from the enterprise of public education. Another equally potent reason is that the church's religious education has been tragically inefficient—to put it mildly. To remedy this situation adequately will require a very determined, energetic, carefully conceived long range program in both school and church.

For present purposes, however, the question is what can be done now within the university to educate its faculty with regard to this one great area of life concerning which the education of most of them has been almost completely silent.

First of all I would say that the church should speed up the reorientation of its work in the university community toward placing greater emphasis on and concentrating more systematic effort upon faculty work and relatively less on student work. Departments of religion should consider the education of the faculty as one of their primary objectives. Campus church workers should do likewise. They should be chosen for their ability to interpret their religion in faculty circles as well as for other purposes. Perhaps, there should be some whose portfolios designate faculty work as their only duty. We need more faculty study and discussion groups, more evangelism—of the right type—directed toward the faculty, more lecture series, more noncredit courses, more summer seminars, more of everything that is appropriate to a university community in helping faculty members in their own personal search for knowledge and experience of things religious, and more particularly of things Christian. And there must be very much more theology mixed into these efforts than in the past.

Then we must somehow learn how to guide committed faculty members into more effective church service on campus, through the channels (a) of more systematic religious student counselling services by faculty laymen, (b) of teaching with religious perspectives, (c) of faculty participation in student fireside discussions, (d) non-credit courses for students, (e) of making Christian ideals known and operative in university administration through faculty committees. For church campus workers this should be a real challenge and opportunity.

About noncurricular student work on the campus I shall not say much. I am even less of an expert in this field than in others. I would, however, if I may, offer counsel about three matters.

First, campus workers should remember that they have an important responsibility in the field of extracurricular education. I would plead that they not let the pressure for student activities and program absorb all their energy and effort, that they reserve some of it for solid systematic educational endeavor. Second, if they are going to help the university achieve its goals they will have to *work on campus and become a part of it*. If they want to

reach students and faculty they will have to go where they are and not be satisfied with some of them coming to the off-campus foundation centers. There needs more definitely to be an *on-campus thrust*, an *on-campus program* of church work. Third, the on-campus work should be ecumenical, wholeheartedly cooperative, presenting to the university a truly united front. The university campus should not be a happy hunting ground for the churches or sects, but rather the university community should include within its confines a real Christian community of *the church*. I am proud to be a member of a church whose policy for campus work is just that. And I am proud to be a member of a local Christian community in which all representatives of the churches are sincerely trying to establish a truly ecumenical community of the church on campus.

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