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# Rudolf Bultmann and The Old Testament: His Approach and Interpretation

RAYMOND F. SURBURG

*Following is the first of a two part essay. The author first discusses Bultmann's philosophical understanding of existence, his hermeneutical principles, his demythologization program and theological understanding of the New Testament. This lays the foundation for a subsequent presentation of Bultmann's approach to and understanding of the Old Testament.*

## PART ONE

THE OLD TESTAMENT is today a much disputed book, not only among those outside of the church but also among those within it. At various times in the centuries following the ascension of Christ, the Old Testament has been attacked. In the second century Marcion wrote a book to show that the Gospel and the Old Testament contradicted each other. Marcion recommended the separation of Christianity from Judaism because, according to his interpretation, the God of the Old Testament was different from that of the New. The Creator God of the Old Testament was the author of evil works, who was also the author of law, a vengeful and bloodthirsty being; while the God of the New Testament was the author of the Gospel characterized by love, abrogating the law and prophets.

According to Braaten, the rise of the historical method was responsible for placing a great gulf between the Old and New Testaments.<sup>1</sup> For Schleiermacher, the father of modern theology, the Old Testament did not possess the same degree of inspiration as the New, and consequently did not have the normative status of the New. He was in favor of allowing the New Testament to stand by itself because it alone expressed purely the pious self-consciousness of Christians; at best, the Old Testament might be added as an appendix to the New Testament books. Emil Brunner claims that Schleiermacher was guilty of putting the Old Testament on a level with paganism.<sup>2</sup> Thus in *The Christian Faith* Schleiermacher wrote: "Christianity does indeed stand in a special connection with Judaism; but as far as concerns its historical existence and its aim, its relations to Judaism and heathenism are the same."<sup>3</sup>

Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930) took a very hostile attitude toward the Old Testament and in his work *Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott* wrote:

The rejection of the Old Testament in the second century was an error which the great church rightly opposed; holding

on to it in the sixteenth century was a destiny which the Reformation was not able to escape; but for Protestantism to preserve it since the nineteenth century as a canonical document is the result of a religious and ecclesiastical paralysis. To clear the table and to honor the truth in our confession and instruction, that is the great feat required of Protestantism today—almost too late.<sup>4</sup>

In the twentieth century the "German Christians" motivated by anti-Semitism endeavored to persuade the Christians of Germany to get rid of the Old Testament. Alfred Rosenberg in his *Myth of the Twentieth Century* argued that a pure Aryan race should give up a book, written by Jews, which presented a tyrannical God. Although the Nazi threat of eliminating the Old Testament as a part of the Biblical canon was removed by the military defeat of Nazism in 1945, still a low view of the relationship of the Old Testament to the New is currently held by the existentialist school of Biblical interpretation. The Old Testament scholar Hans Wolff asserted in 1962 that for the average theologian in Europe the Old Testament is not normative nor canonical. In most pulpits the Old Testament is not used as the basis for preaching.<sup>5</sup> Concerning this matter Braaten wrote recently: "Modern existentialist theology, as relevant as its insights have been into the nature of human existence, has come to grief in its treatment of the Old Testament."<sup>6</sup> A debate between Gerhard von Rad and Hans Conzelmann had made clear that the Old Testament is regarded with a depreciatory attitude.<sup>7</sup> While it is true that no theologian today is advocating the removal of the Old Testament from the canonical Scriptures, yet as Braaten has said: "Schleiermacher's view that the Old Testament is only historical background, to be studied as a literary aid in understanding the New, lingers on in current existentialist-hermeneutical theology."<sup>8</sup> It is generally conceded that Bultmann has exercised a great influence on theological thought in the last two decades. Those New Testament scholars and theologians who have followed the views of Bultmann as expressed in his various essays, have been led to adopt a low view of the Old Testament, which unlike the New, is not considered to be a vehicle of God's living Word to the church and mankind today.

In this essay an examination will be made of Rudolf Bultmann's attitude toward and his interpretation of the Old Testament, and an evaluation made in the light of the hermeneutical principles of historic Protestantism and of the hermeneutics of the Lutheran Confessions.

Bultmann's academic preparation was mainly designed to fit him for work in the New Testament field. From 1916-1921 he was *professor extraordinarius* at Breslau. In 1920 Bultmann was called as a full professor at Giessen, succeeding the famous Wilhelm Bousset. In 1921 he accepted an invitation as full professor at Marburg where he remained until becoming professor emeritus in 1951. Although primarily a New Testament scholar, Bultmann

has expressed himself on the Old Testament and on its relationship to the New. His programmatic essay, "The Significance of the Old Testament for the Christian Faith," became the basis for theological discussion between Bultmann and a number of European and American theologians. It is available in a volume edited by Bernhard W. Anderson as *The Old Testament and the Christian Faith*.<sup>9</sup> Another essay valuable for ascertaining Bultmann's view on the Old Testament is his "Prophecy and Fulfillment."<sup>10</sup> The first part of his book *Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen* (*Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting*) deals with Old Testament heritage.<sup>11</sup> There are also various essays in the three volumes of *Glauben und Verstehen* that deal with different aspects of Old Testament theology and Old Testament interpretation.<sup>12</sup>

In order to assess Bultmann's attitude toward and his interpretation of the Old Testament, it will be necessary to examine his philosophical understanding of existence, his hermeneutical principles, his demythologization program and his theological understanding of the New Testament. Bultmann's approach to and understanding of the Old Testament are determined by his philosophical and hermeneutical principles and procedures as will be shown later in Part II of this essay.

### *I. Bultmann Influenced by Existentialism*

Those who have occupied themselves with the writings of Bultmann are agreed that the eminent New Testament professor has been influenced by existentialist philosophy.<sup>12a</sup> H. P. Owen wrote: "It is well known that Bultmann uses the terms existentialist philosophy in order to expound the nature of self-understanding."<sup>13</sup> Macquarrie has written a volume in which he has compared Heidegger and Bultmann and has shown that Bultmann is an existentialist theologian.<sup>14</sup> David Cairns asserted: "In Bultmann's theology demythologizing and the existential interpretation are connected as indissolubly as are dying and rising again in the Christian faith."<sup>15</sup> The Dutch theologian Herman Ridderbos wrote:

Bultmann's theology can be called an existentialist approach to and exposition of the Biblical message. Existentialist philosophy is very characteristic of the attitude to life of many in our time. The fact that Bultmann's theology is determined completely by philosophical existentialist conceptions of man, life, and the world, explains to a large measure the great number of his adherents and also the sharp opposition to him.<sup>16</sup>

Thus Bultmann's position has been categorized as "existentialist" which means that his theological stance has been affected by his adoption of a philosophical viewpoint, first attributed to Kierkegaard (1813-55), and that came into prominence in the first half of the twentieth century. The school of existentialism claims that existence cannot be conceived, i.e. become an object of thought but that it may be experienced and lived. The fundamental thesis

of existentialism contends that existence is prior to essence. Western philosophy since the time of the Greeks had been preoccupied with the idea of ESSENCE, with the general and universal features of anything, rather than with concrete individual, human existence. By emphasizing the priority of existence to essence, a radical new departure in philosophy was initiated. According to Ramm:

This thesis means that my personal existence is prior to existence, my problem of being, my concern with my selfhood, my situation in the world of reality. Man cannot begin with a theory of reality, a metaphysics or ontology; he can begin where he is, human being in the midst of all the contingencies of human existence.<sup>17</sup>

For the existentialist such categories of classical philosophy as "soul," "virtue," "substance," "accidents," "essence," and "existence" are impersonal and inadequate because they do not do justice to the basic character of human life as "change," "consciousness," "process," "movement," "passion" and "decision". The rejection of the emphasis of classical Western philosophy has resulted, according to Harvey, into "two otherwise apparently contradictory tendencies in existentialism: (1) the attack on abstract thought and intellectual detachment . . . (2) the highly abstruse development of new categories that aim to do justice to the unique character of human existence."<sup>18</sup> Since it is claimed that existence is prior to essence, one cannot approach life or philosophy rationalistically. It is impossible to view life from the top of the world or to look back upon history as if one stood at the end of it, life cannot be known rationally. It cannot be understood speculatively. Life can only be understood by men and women as existents through participation in existence.

Bultmann has placed himself in opposition to the old theological liberalism in that he has made a sharp distinction between his position and the liberal theology's moral and ethical rationalism as constituting the kernel of the gospel. For Bultmann the gospel's content did not consist in timeless truths nor was it to be found in eternal verities, much less in a metaphysical system as held by Wilhelm Herrmann. As Ridderbos has pointed out, for Bultmann the contents of the gospel consisted of "the actual change and emancipation which the gospel calls forth in the whole of human existence, as soon as man obeys the call to *Entscheidung*."<sup>19</sup> In this existentialist interpretation the influence of Kierkegaard is undoubtedly found.

## II. Bultmann Influenced by Heidegger

Analyzers of Bultmann's writings and thought, however, believe that it is Martin Heidegger especially, one of Bultmann's former colleagues at Marburg, who influenced Bultmann more than any other modern thinker. James Robinson claimed that Bultmann utilized the categories of Heidegger's *Time and Being* (1927) "to state the New Testament kerygma in a way accessible to a post-

mythological age."<sup>20</sup> Bornkamm stated that Bultmann used Heidegger's philosophical analysis of existence in his Gifford lectures, *Geschichte und Eschatologie*. Bultmann has worked out his understanding of history according to Heideggerian concepts.<sup>21</sup> The Marburg New Testament professor dedicated the first volume of *Glauben und Verstehen* to Heidegger. Between 1922 to 1928 Bultmann entered into a particularly close relationship with Heidegger and began to draw heavily upon his ideas. It seemed to him that Heidegger's philosophy had a special contribution to make to his study and understanding of the New Testament. Thus Bultmann wrote:

Above all, Heidegger's existentialist analysis of the ontological structure of being would seem to be more than a secularized, philosophical version of the New Testament view of human life . . . Is not that exactly the New Testament understanding of human life? Some critics have objected that I am borrowing Heidegger's categories and forcing them upon the New Testament. I am afraid that this only shows that they are blinding their eyes to the real problem, which is that the philosophers are saying the same thing as the New Testament and saying it quite independently.<sup>22</sup>

Heidegger, Camus and Sartre are twentieth century existentialists who have not worked out their philosophical systems from the viewpoint of Christianity, as Kierkegaard has done. Heidegger has not come to any theistic conclusions. For his point of departure Bultmann has employed the conceptual framework of Heidegger, as reflected in the latter's earlier writings.<sup>22a</sup> At the present time when German theology is emphasizing the use of the later Heidegger for theological thought, Bultmann still continues to defend the superior theological relevance of the earlier Heidegger over the latter Heidegger.<sup>23</sup> Besides obtaining his understanding of man and history from Heidegger, Bultmann has also derived the actualistic idea that a person only exists when he chooses his freedom in responsibility. Although Heidegger does not believe in a personal God, yet Bultmann is convinced that Heidegger's analysis of human nature is in harmony with the New Testament, so that his philosophical concepts are useful in expressing the Christian understanding for modern man.

### III. Bultmann's Hermeneutical Principles

Bultmann's interpretation of the Old and New Testaments is radically different from the exegesis as practiced by theological liberalism, neo-orthodoxy or Protestant orthodoxy, whether of the Lutheran or Calvinistic variety. Bultmann has adopted a new system of hermeneutics. Forstman claimed: "If Bultmann is somewhat unusual in that he has written nothing specifically on the subject of authority, he is also somewhat unusual in the amount of attention he has given to the general problem of hermeneutics."<sup>24</sup>

Hermeneutics has been a subject concerning which much study has taken place in Germany since the Reformation, and Bultmann has been particularly influenced by Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Dilthey in his *Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik* (1900) argued that the self is a peculiar synthesis of thought, will and feeling which is only intelligible in terms of its immediate lived relationships. Traditionally, hermeneutics was considered the science setting forth the principles for interpretation; while the practice of the principles of hermeneutics was known as exegesis. According to the traditional approach to a Scriptural book the "hermeneut" was to set forth what the text said. Making it relevant to the time of the exegete would be the application, not to be confused with what the objective text delineated. This distinction Bultmann has rejected.

The eminent Marburg New Testament scholar has published two essays, in which he has set forth his understanding of hermeneutics, which for him is equivalent to the correct interpretation of a text. They are: "The Problem of Hermeneutics" (1950)<sup>25</sup> and "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?" (1957)<sup>26</sup>. Ideas set forth clearly in these two essays, it should be noted, are to be found scattered through his publications much prior to 1950 and 1957. In the first of these two essays Bultmann in an extended footnote made it clear that he disagrees sharply with traditional hermeneutical rules, taking G. Heinrici, Fr. Torm, and Er. Fascher to task for their inadequate understanding of hermeneutics.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, Bultmann praised Fritz Buri's critical analysis in which the latter discussed the hermeneutical problems of Protestantism. Thus Bultmann wrote: "However, in its development it is obvious that hermeneutics as the art of scientific understanding is in no way adequately defined by traditional hermeneutic rules."<sup>28</sup> Again in the same programmatic essay he asserted:

I find myself in agreement with him (i.e. Buri) in the same way, in his struggle for the critical historical comprehension of Scripture, as I am in his refusal to accept a 'pneumatic, suprahistorical comprehension of Scripture' and what is called theological hermeneutics, by virtue of which a 'christological exegesis' of the Old Testament is carried on.<sup>29</sup>

Bultmann contends that exegesis without presuppositions does not exist, although he believes it is possible to approach the interpretation of a text in an unprejudiced manner.<sup>30</sup> He maintains that the "hermeneut" is subject to all conditions which an interpreter of any literary document must observe. It is essential that the interpreter of a text be a master of the language and grammar in which the text was written and have a knowledge of the historical context out of which the document comes and which it reflects.

The historical interpretation presupposes the method of historical-critical research.<sup>31</sup> In this area Bultmann developed the use of form criticism, adopted from Gunkel, and applied it to New

Testament studies, as is evident in his *History of the Synoptic Tradition* (4th ed., 1961). For Bultmann the use of the historical-critical methodology meant interpreting history in the sense of a closed continuum, in which individual events are connected by the cause and effect relationship. There may, therefore, be no intrusion of the supernatural into the events of history; consequently, the belief in miracles is excluded.

Hermeneutics, however, must go beyond a mere analysis of form and grammar; it must seek an understanding of the "life-moment" of the writer. In his essay "The Problem of Hermeneutics" Bultmann insists that two things specifically are necessary for an interpretation that is more than scholarly routine: *Vorverständnis* (preunderstanding) and an openness to the meaning of man. The exegete must have a prior understanding of the subject. The *Vorverständnis* or prior understanding necessary was stated by Bultmann thus:

A comprehension—an interpretation—is, it follows, *constantly* oriented to a particular formulation of a question, a particular 'objective.' But included in this, therefore, is the fact that it is *governed always by a prior understanding of the subject* in accordance with which it investigates the text. The formulation of the question, and an interpretation, is possible at all only on the basis of such prior understanding.<sup>32</sup>

A second major point in Bultmann's hermeneutics is his contention that the interpreter must be open to the text's meaning for man, what understanding it has of "*human being in its possibilities as the possibilities that belong specifically to the one who understands.*"<sup>33</sup> Again he asserted: "The presupposition for understanding necessary for interpretation is the interpreter's relationship in his life to the subject which is directly expressed in the text."<sup>34</sup> It is necessary to ask the questions of a book which the book itself is answering. According to Bultmann's understanding of the Bible the latter shows no interest in the facts of past history or in theological data. It rather exposes the life of the reader to the problem of his personal existence. For Bultmann the "hermeneut" is at the same time mediator. "That means that the interpretation does not limit itself to making understandable the past as such, but is to show the relation, in its own historical 'vitality,' active in the present."<sup>35</sup> This implies that the text conveys demand and promise, not only for itself but also for the interpreter. This encounter with the text Bultmann denominates "an existentiell encounter" and requires of the interpreter an "existentiell decision."<sup>36</sup> English translators of Bultmann's writings usually render his term "existentiell" by "existential."

The existential approach to the text means that history must be understood in a different manner than heretofore. In Biblical documents the interpreter is confronted with historical happenings of many centuries ago and is faced with words spoken in ages past.



To understand history properly the interpreter must not simply view it from the outside as a spectator, but in interpreting historical documents he must stand in history and share responsibility for it. Thus the person trying to understand an historical document must participate in history with his own existence. Therefore, in presenting history the scheme of subject and object, valid in the study of the sciences, cannot be employed when dealing with literary documents.<sup>37</sup>

Another major presupposition of Bultmann's hermeneutics is his thesis that the understanding of a text is never a definitive one, but one which must remain open, because the meaning of a text is always changing as the Scriptures disclose themselves in a new manner in the future to an interpreter.<sup>38</sup>

#### IV. *Theological Implications of Bultmann's Hermeneutics*

This hermeneutical system Bultmann calls "existential hermeneutics." Michalson claimed that all of Bultmann's "theological novelties and accents originate here."<sup>39</sup> The adoption of Bultmann's existentialist hermeneutical principles results in an existentialist theology. There are some important implications for theology which result from the application of Bultmann's hermeneutics. What are some of the conclusions which, when compared with the teachings of historic Christianity, will be radically different?

From the Bultmannian perspective it is wrong to espouse an objective approach to theology. He rejects such objective certainties as the Word of God, the canon of Holy Scripture, the confessions of the Church, which are simply dismissed as products of the past history of the Church.<sup>40</sup> This means that it is erroneous to entertain an objective approach to the knowledge of God or to formulate *Weltanschauungen*, world views. Belief in God "is not a general truth at my disposal which I perceive and apply."<sup>41</sup> In his essay, published in 1925, entitled "What Meaning Has It, to Speak of God" Bultmann asserted:

If one understands by speaking "of God" speaking objectively "about God" then such speech has no meaning at all, for in the moment in which it appears it has lost its object, God. For where the thought "God" is conceived at all, it means that God is the Almighty, that is, the reality which determines all things. But this thought is not conceived at all when I speak objectively *about* God, that is, when I look upon God as an object of thought, toward which I can orientate myself if I take a standpoint from which I am neutral to the question of God and his being which I can decline or, if they are enlightening, accept . . . For every "speaking *about*" strikes out from a standpoint outside of that about which it is speaking. But there can be no standpoint outside of God, and therefore it is quite impossible to speak of God in general statements and general truths which are true without respect to the concrete existential (existentiell) situation of the speaker.<sup>42</sup>

He maintains that it is impossible to develop a Christian world view that would be legitimate or valid. In his article "Crisis in Belief" Bultmann asserted:

What we call a theistic or a Christian *Weltanschauung* makes God a principle in understanding the world—an idea. To *belief*, God is the incomprehensible, enigmatic power that surges through my concrete life, and sets limits to it—a power which I can come to know only and for itself.<sup>43</sup>

In a *Weltanschauung* a person evaluates everything on the basis of a general understanding of the universe, where individual phenomena are seen as instances of the general rule. This is wrong from Bultmann's position, for he stated:

In a *Weltanschauung* I simply escape from the reality of my existence which is actually real only in the 'moment,' in the question involved in the 'moment' and in the decision called for by the 'moment.' We can see in the longing for a *Weltanschauung* an escape from the enigma and from the decisive question of the 'moment.' It is man's escape from himself; it is the effort to find security in generalizations.<sup>44</sup>

It is sinful for man to attempt to view the world objectively, or to formulate valid general principles which will explain all things, including God. This is sinful for two reasons, according to the Marburg New Testament specialist. Forstman has given them in the following words:

First because it is a man's own construction, his effort which becomes the basis on which he tries to organize his life; and second, because such search for universal, timeless laws is carried on without regard to his own concrete historical life and the claims made upon it.<sup>45</sup>

Bultmann is opposed to those who desire to find *lasting security* which men do when they hold to some world view. He rebuked those who desire some objective security, as the belief in a historical Jesus, in the objective statements of Scripture, in dogmas of faith, or in ethical and moral formulations. According to Bultmann it is impossible to write a biography of Jesus; Jesus did not possess Messianic consciousness. Historical research cannot furnish the Christian with any security.

This analysis of world views and the results of historical research form the pattern according to which Bultmann assesses the historic doctrines of the Christian faith as found in the ecumenical creeds of Christendom. Bultmann employs the logic of Melancthon's christological statement: "This is to know his benefits, not to contemplate his natures or the mode of his incarnation."<sup>46</sup> For Bultmann faith is found in the *relation* between God and man, and since faith has to do with man's concrete historical existence, doctrines which do not come from the reciprocal character of faith and relate to

man's existential existence are beyond human comprehension and thus are meaningless.

In some cases this may mean rejecting traditional doctrines totally, but in other cases it will involve a reinterpretation to show their meaningfulness. Regarding the doctrine of creation, Bultmann wrote:

The creedal belief in God as creator is not a guarantee given in advance by means of which I am permitted to understand any event as wrought by God. The understanding of God as creator is genuine only when I understand myself here and now as the creature of God.

"Statements of belief," he added, "are not general statements."<sup>47</sup> Bultmann rejects the christological interpretations of the Christian creeds regarding the person of Christ. Knowing the formulation of the doctrine of the person of Christ makes no contribution to the relation between God and man. These christological dogmas make no contribution to a person's concrete existential situation; in fact, they obscure the focal point of faith, namely "that through Christ our righteousness has been created, that he has been crucified and has risen on our behalf."<sup>48</sup> Any doctrine which does not speak of God's claim upon me is "illegitimate." General statements about God, religious dogmas that do not affect man are, according to Bultmann, sinful, erroneous and illusory.

#### V. Bultmann's Concept of Revelation

Revelation cannot be identified with past happenings nor can God's revelation be objectified in a written form. The subject and object of revelation are not a series of propositions or body of dogma; it is neither more or less than the living God himself. This emphasis is not unique with Bultmann; other theologians such as Temple, Hebert, Bulgakoff, Barth and Brunner have asserted the same. Bultmann's contributions, however, are to be found in other characteristics ascribed by him to revelation. In his essay "The Hidden and the Revealed God" he claimed that God's act of revelation is concealed in the events that mediate it.<sup>49</sup> No one can ever isolate God's act and present it as an object of observation. "Only the 'natural' happening is generally visible and ascertainable. In it is accomplished the hidden act of God."<sup>50</sup> While Bultmann describes God as speaking through acts, he does not understand them as historical events observable by men. God's acts or deeds cannot be seen by the physical eye, but only by the eye of faith. In his book, *Jesus and Mythology* Bultmann wrote:

God as acting does not refer to an event which can be perceived by me without myself being drawn into the event as into God's action, without myself taking part in it as being acted upon. In other words, to speak of God as acting involves the events of personal existence . . . Thus God's love and care *etc.* are not images or symbols; these conceptions mean real experiences of God as acting here and now.<sup>51</sup>

Another aspect of Bultmann's concept of revelation is that it occurs in an "encounter." When a preacher proclaims the kerygma he is not merely pointing to revelation but he is the medium of encounter in which God addresses man and man answers God and this makes preaching itself revelation. This act of revelation is repeated constantly and should never be identified with a system of dogma, but is an *act*.<sup>52</sup> However, this act of God's self-disclosure in the proclamation of the kerygma would be incomplete unless it results in self-knowledge to the hearer. Revelation does not only reveal the Speaker, but shows also what the hearer can become.<sup>53</sup>

In harmony with his existential approach, revelation is always in the *present*. To place revelation in the past would mean removing it from the sphere of self-understanding. Therefore, to speak of the historical person of Jesus as the Revealer of God is meaningless, for Christ is the means now through whom we have an existentialist encounter.<sup>54</sup> Bultmann in his later writings stresses the difference between the "Jesus of history" and the "Christ of faith."<sup>55</sup> In his response to Schniewind, Bultmann wrote: "I still deny that historical research can ever encounter any traces of the epiphany of God in Christ."<sup>56</sup>

According to Bultmann, Christ is the person through whom God reveals his saving Word. But why does God select the man Christ? Why not Buddha or Socrates? Bultmann's answer is: "Now it also becomes clear that the Revealer is nothing but a definite historical man, Jesus of Nazareth. Why this specific man? That is a question that must not, may not, be answered—for to do so would destroy the offense which belongs ineradicably to the Revelation."<sup>57</sup>

In an essay published in 1941 Bultmann expressed his views on general or natural revelation. According to this article non-Christians can have a knowledge of God as a power transcending their own existence, but they cannot have a positive true knowledge of him. Only Christianity can inform them who this true being is. Thus Bultmann asserted:

*The Christian belief therefore criticizes on the basis of its knowledge not the non-Christian inquiry about God—it can only penetrate into it and illuminate it but first of all the answer which the non-Christian inquiry constructs. It asserts indeed that man apart from Christianity could not arrive at an answer at all, even if he carried on to the end in the clarity and seriousness of his inquiry. It asserts that all answers apart from the Christian answer are illusions.*<sup>58</sup>

It becomes apparent from this statement that Judaism as found in the Old Testament does not know the true God because Christ is not to be found in the Old Testament. This will help to make clear why among other reasons the Old Testament is not, for Bultmann, a true revelation of God and does not possess the authority for Christians ascribed to it by traditional Christianity.

From the application of Bultmann's hermeneutics it becomes clear that it amounts to an anthropological interpretation. His

hermeneutics combines anthropology to such a degree that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. The rules of interpretation are to some extent contained in his anthropology<sup>59</sup> which results in his making theology the equivalent to anthropology, and christology becomes simultaneously soteriology.

#### VI. Bultmann's Demythologization Program

Bultmann's name has become associated with the term "demythologization." In 1941 Bultmann launched a demand for the demythologizing of the Church's preaching. In his article, "New Testament and Mythology," he linked his famous program of interpretation with demythologization. Forstman claimed that this program for demythologization of the New Testament should be discussed as a sub-point of his hermeneutics and should be considered in the total context of Bultmann's thought.<sup>60</sup> Bultmann himself has referred to his "demythologization" on a number of occasions as a hermeneutic method.<sup>61</sup> Already in the last essay of *Glauben und Verstehen*, I (1933) Bultmann defined this program.<sup>62</sup> Wingren claimed that it is strange that "The New Testament and Mythology" occasioned such a furor in theological circles when everything in it was old and familiar.<sup>63</sup>

According to the Marburg professor the message of the New Testament is drawn from the myths of Jewish apocalyptic literature and from the Gnostic myths of redemption.<sup>64</sup> Since the New Testament writers were affected by their culture and environment, they expressed their cosmology in the framework of a three-level universe, a heaven above, an earth beneath, and a hell under the earth. The New Testament writers believed that nature and human life were influenced by supernatural agents (Satan, demons, angels, God) who can invade and influence the course of human history. Bultmann postulated that the Gospel is also presented under the guise of mythological terms. A pre-existent God sent a heavenly being into the world to effect a salvation, conceived and planned in eternity. This heavenly being performed many miracles which attested to his heavenly origin. Through a substitutionary death He overcame the power of demons. He arose from the dead and ascended into heaven. The New Testament Church expected His early return on the clouds of heaven. History is depicted in the New Testament as proceeding to a literal, cosmic end. According to Bultmann these teachings are mythological. The supernatural is synonymous for him with the mythological.

In dealing with the Bible, both the Old and New Testaments, the interpreter is confronted by a world view that is mythological and impossible. No modern intellectual person can possibly believe or accept the Biblical world view. The supernatural element prominent in both testaments must be reinterpreted, involving the rejection of the miraculous element interwoven into the Biblical narratives. A closed universe does not permit the possibility that the world can be invaded by supernatural beings.

Modern man cannot accept the Biblical world view and could only do so by sacrificing his intellect. The mythology of the New Testament requires not elimination (as in liberal theology) but its reinterpretation, specifically in existential terms. Everything that is incompatible with the temper and outlook of a scientific era must be jettisoned, otherwise a stumbling block is placed into the path of twentieth-century man. The Biblical record must be stripped of every element of myth so that the essence of the Gospel, the kerygma, may be correctly apprehended in Christian preaching,

This type of hermeneutical approach results in the rejection of the following Christian doctrines of historic Christianity and of the Lutheran Confessions: 1. The pre-existence of Christ; 2. The Virgin Birth of Christ; 3. The sinlessness of Christ; 4. The deity of Christ; 5. The substitutionary death of Christ on the cross for mankind's sin; 6. The resurrection of Christ; 7. The ascension of Christ; 8. The future return of Christ in glory; 9. The final judgment of the world; 10. The personality and power of the Holy Spirit; 11. The doctrine of the Trinity; 12. The existence of a spiritual world; 13. Death as a consequence of sin; and, 14. The doctrine of original sin.<sup>65</sup>

This is an imposing list of fundamental Christian doctrines whose repudiation is nothing less than the radical transformation of classical Christianity. As Hughes has asserted: "Indeed the reader's immediate reaction will probably be to ask whether Bultmann has not after all done what he accuses the liberal theologians of the last century of doing, namely, throwing away the kerygma with mythology."<sup>66</sup>

According to Bultmann the mythological elements of the New Testament are in no way an inherent part of the Christian message. In order to overcome the obsolescence of the New Testament and preserve its truth, one must interpret the *meaning* of the myth. *Entmythologisierung* or demythologizing means the interpretation of the myth, and as Dinkler has observed, it is "therefore a particular application of biblical hermeneutics."<sup>67</sup> The interpreter of Scripture must ask what lies behind the forms of the Bible, that are time-bound and historically conditioned? It is especially important to ask: What do these myths say about man's human existence before God? The interpreter must endeavor to discover the concept of man's self-understanding under the concept of myth, and thus an existentialist interpretation must be employed. In setting forth such an interpretation Dinkler claimed that Bultmann uses the "defined categories of Heidegger's philosophy."<sup>68</sup>

Bultmann distinguishes between kerygma and myth as he carries out his program of demythologizing. His existential interpretation aims at giving the abiding truth of the kerygma, contained in the myth. The Greek word *kerygma* means the action of proclamation. In the New Testament *kerygma* refers to the proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth as Christ, Lord, and Savior for us (*pro nobis*).

Bultmann distinguishes between kerygma and myth, kerygma and theology, although he acknowledges that the kerygmatic message of the New Testament is embedded in theological or mythological formulations. Dinkler claimed that the heart of Bultmann's demythologizing program consisted of two things especially:

The lifting up of the kerygma from the traditional text-pattern as the divine call, and the laying bare of man's response in faith as manifest in his new self-understanding.<sup>69</sup>

What does Bultmann understand under the "kerygma" which needs not to be jettisoned along with the framework in which it is expressed? In one of his essays he defined it as follows:

The message of the New Testament is not a *weltanschauung* which would teach the *idea* of a forgiving God, or the idea of God's grace; on the contrary, it is the proclamation of an *act* of God, by which he forgives sin . . . The New Testament proclaims that the freedom and arbitrary nature of God's action is authenticated by the fact that he has acted decisively for all the world and for all time in the person of a concrete, historical man, *Jesus of Nazareth*. Through him everyone is addressed and is asked if he is willing to hear God's message of forgiveness and grace here. In Jesus Christ the destiny of every man is decided. He is *the eschatological act of God*.

In support Bultmann then quoted 2 Corinthians 5:17-19:

Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new. And all things are of God, who has reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ and hath given us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation.

However, it is significant that Bultmann did not continue the Pauline quotation to the end of verse 21, "For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." Concepts such as sinlessness and substitution are out of harmony with Bultmannian cosmological premises.

The center of the kerygma is the fact that God has acted decisively in the event of Christ, a once-for-all event. In his essay "Crisis and Belief" (1931) Bultmann asserted:

For Christianity belief in God is not belief and trust in God as a general principle, but belief in a definite Word proclaimed to the believer. The event is *Jesus Christ*, in whom, as the New Testament says, God has spoken, and whom the New Testament itself calls the Word.<sup>71</sup>

Since Bultmann insists "that Christian belief has its peculiar character in speaking of an event," and that "on this event a message is based and authenticated which confronts man as *God's Word*" it becomes necessary to determine what does and what does not be-

long to "the event." Bultmann's interpretation of the "Christ-event" will help to make clear what he means when he claimed the Christian kerygma is a skandalon or stumbling block. The skandalon of the kerygma is the fact that "in the very assertion that belief in God simply cannot and must not arise as a general human attitude, but only as a response to God's Word and that it is this *one* Word-found in the New Testament and based on the Christ-event—which is God's Word."<sup>72</sup>

Bultmann does not regard the Christ-event as unique and supernatural, but as a relative phenomenon which belonged to the normal order of things. The New Testament depicts the Christ-event both as miraculous and as historical, but it is impossible to maintain this double viewpoint in a scientific age. The Marburg professor considers Jesus of Nazareth a man<sup>73</sup> whose person and work are to be stripped of the mythological or supernatural and the result, as Hughes remarked, is that Jesus "becomes a relative mortal link in the age-long claim of humanity," and it is on this mere man that the focus of the Christian skandalon is focused.<sup>74</sup> That God chose an ordinary individual through whom to make known the way of redemption is the stumbling block which cannot be avoided. All that Bultmann will allow concerning Jesus is that he was an historical personage and that his crucifixion was an historical event. That Bultmann understood what happened on the cross is clear from the following:

The Jesus who was crucified was the pre-existent, incarnate Son of God, and as such was without sin. He is the victim whose blood atones for our sins. He bears vicariously the sin of the world, and by enduring the punishment for sin on our behalf he delivers us from death.

But immediately he added: "This mythological interpretation is a mixture of sacrificial and juridical analogies which have ceased to be tenable for us."<sup>75</sup>

The heart of the kerygma, according to Bultmann is Christ crucified and risen. What are the meaning and significance of these two events? He claimed that the cross and resurrection are not separate events. Upon this basis he could say: "Faith in the resurrection is really the same as faith in the saving efficacy of the cross."<sup>76</sup> He stated unequivocally that "the resurrection itself is not an event of past history."<sup>77</sup> To Jaspers he wrote: "He is convinced as I am that a corpse cannot come to life or arise from the grave."<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, to understand Bultmann's interpretation of the death and resurrection of Christ it must be realized that the Marburg professor regards present day preaching as an extension of the Christ-event. In harmony with his existentialist interpretation of history, for Bultmann the event of Jesus Christ is not tied to an event in past time or space but it is represented to the hearer as a present possibility for decision.<sup>79</sup> Thus in his *Theology of the New Testament* Bultmann wrote: "Belief in the resurrection and faith that Christ himself, yes God himself, speaks in the proclaimed word—are identical."<sup>80</sup>



Since Christ meets us nowhere else than in the word of preaching Bultmann reached the conclusion that "the faith of Easter is just this faith-faith in the word of preaching."<sup>81</sup> Not only the Resurrection but also the Incarnation of Christ is an existential and eschatological event which occurs in any person's experience. It is in the proclamation of the message that "the Word of God becomes incarnate. For the incarnation is likewise an eschatological event and not a datable event of the past; it is an event which is continually being reenacted in the event of the proclamation."<sup>82</sup> Through preaching thus men are confronted "with the question whether they are willing to understand themselves as men who were crucified and risen with Christ."<sup>83</sup> By means of the proclamation of the kerygma, the death and the resurrection of Christ offer men the possibility of an existence concerning which a decision must be made.

Bultmann's views on the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ, it hardly needs to be pointed out, differ considerably from the New Testament presentation and the view held by the Lutheran Confessions. In the Bultmannian scheme the crucifixion is recognized as an historical event while the resurrection is a non-historical happening. But in the New Testament both the crucifixion and the resurrection are treated as events occurring on the same level of history. For the New Testament writers both events transpired.<sup>84</sup>

What then is Bultmann's interpretation of St. Paul's phrase "crucified and risen with Christ?" It is tantamount to a formula that affords a "possibility of existence," a sort of formula for existential living concerning which the hearer is challenged through the kerygma to make a decision. This type of existence for which man can make a decision applies only to this life, for there is nothing beyond death toward which the individual can look forward; man may not anticipate a personal resurrection from the dead. Bultmann rejected the idea as abhorrent that death is a punishment for sin as St. Paul teaches in Roman 5:12. Naturalism and idealism regard death as a simple and natural process of nature.<sup>85</sup> Man can look forward to nothing beyond death.

This flight from futurity is in harmony with existential philosophy, which is only concerned with the moment of existence, and is also in agreement with the Bultmannian concept of eschatology. As traditionally understood, eschatology dealt with future and unfulfilled events, with the last things, with the culmination of this age. According to the New Testament the history of this present age will reach its climax in a series of final events, of which the visible second coming of Christ with His holy angels will be the most significant, to be followed by the judgment of all nations and men. Therefore, the element of futurity is an important aspect of New Testament eschatology.

Bultmann's approach to the New Testament results in the surrender of the future which is swallowed up into the present,

while simultaneously the past is neglected.<sup>85a</sup> This position has been criticized by Macquarrie as "an excessive devaluation of the objective-historical origins of the Christian faith,"<sup>86</sup> and as a tendency to overemphasize those elements in Christian teaching which are in harmony with existentialism. Bultmann has set forth his position very clearly in the following words:

The Now in which the message is proclaimed is the eschatological Now . . . The paradox of history and eschatology is that the eschatological event has happened within history and happens everywhere in preaching. That means: eschatology in a true Christian understanding of it is not the future end of history, but history must no longer be understood as saving history, but as profane history.<sup>87</sup>

History has been swallowed up in Bultmann's own brand of existentialist eschatology. As Hughes has pointed out, it means the engulfing of salvation history, which according to the Bible has a past, present and future.<sup>88</sup>

Bultmann looks upon the salvation-event as merely "an eschatological occurrence." In his *Theology of the New Testament* he wrote that the salvation happening is not just a fact of the past but that it takes place anew in the present.<sup>89</sup> This is, however, different from the New Testament where the reader is referred back to one decisive event that transpired only once, when Christ lived, died, arose again and ascended into heaven.<sup>90</sup> Bultmann has removed the uniqueness of the events of the historical life of Jesus, the God-man. He has surrendered the objective character of the apostolic message by a substitution of a thorough going subjectivism. What God has done is identified by the "now" of man's eschatological response.

The subjectivism of Bultmann's stance is further apparent in his treatment of the New Testament statements of Christ's deity. To passages which the Christian Church of every age has considered as clearly teaching Christ's deity, he has responded by claiming that "pronouncements" about Jesus divinity or deity are not in fact pronouncements of this nature but are to be understood as statements giving expression to his significance.<sup>91</sup> For Bultmann they do not set forth objective ontological facts, the essential Godhead of Jesus, but are merely value-judgments, made at a given moment in an existential situation. For example, Bultmann suggested that the Petrine confession in John 6:69: "And we believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" should be understood just as a confession for the "moment" it was pronounced and not as a statement to prove the deity of Christ.<sup>92</sup> In this interpretation Christ no longer is the center of reference but the individual who utters the statement. This results in the subjectivizing of the truth and subjectivity is equated with truth. It is incorrect to say, according to Bultmann, that Christ helps me because He is God's Son, but He is God's Son because He helps me.<sup>93</sup> Such subjectivity reverses the christological teaching of the New Testament and makes

it easy to understand the reason why the Chalcedonian definition of Christ's person is dismissed by Bultmann as now impossible for our day.

Vital to the theological understanding of the New Testament, as given by Bultmann, is his interpretation of history, which he portrays under the categories of *Historie* and *Geschichte*.<sup>94</sup> *Historie* (history) deals with ordinary events that are open to investigation by the scientific historian. This is general history where the drama of human interaction takes place. Here men plan and accomplish deeds without the aid of supernatural beings. However, such ordinary history is not a source of ultimate value and meaning. On the other hand, true history, or *Geschichte*, must be understood entirely in terms of the living personal encounter, and not in terms of a succession of events or happenings in the past which are outside of the individual. *Geschichte* must be distinguished from the particular event of ordinary history. In *Geschichte* there is a true level of occurrence, there is a time of decision.

Bultmann's existential understanding of history resolves itself into the fact that only that is true history for the individual which is *his* history. According to this conception of history the individual does not place his world and others as objects over against himself as subject. Here Bultmann has followed Heidegger and endeavored to go beyond the distinction of subject and object. Heidegger held that it was incorrect to say that man *has* being, which he then relates to the world; his being is itself being-in-the-world. Man does not exist as an isolated self which is then related to other selves, but man's being is being-for-the-other. According to this Heideggerian concept, adopted by Bultmann, man is unable to detach himself from his own personal setting; he cannot place himself as subject over against other people in history as objects because he is involved in existence, his existence, and so he is the center of history. When Bultmann made the statement that "the true reality for biblical thought is *history*," he is not referring to the historical events of the Bible. In 1945 in an essay dealing with the Biblical picture of man, Bultmann wrote that "the real life of man . . . develops in the sphere of what is individual-of contingent encounters . . . In this decision at a given moment . . . lies the attainment or the loss of his real being."<sup>95</sup>

In the Old and New Testaments sin separates man from God. Sin needs to be atoned for; in the New Testament Jesus is depicted as the Lamb of God that takes away the sin of the world. Through the death of Christ upon the cross the world has been reconciled to God. Faith in the crucified Jesus, created by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, is the means by which forgiveness of sins is bestowed upon the sinner. "Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5:1). Bultmann's understanding of sin and justification is conceived of in existentialist terms. Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism, described man as an existent that could either exist the right or

wrong way. This distinction was worked out by Heidegger into the categories of authentic and inauthentic existence. Man exists authentically when his original possibilities, belonging to his being as man, are fulfilled. His existence is inauthentic when his possibilities are projected on something alien to himself.<sup>96</sup>

As has already been shown, Bultmann claimed that Heidegger's existentialist analysis is only a secular philosophical exposition of the New Testament view of man. The natural man (the being-of-man-without-Christ) has a concern for himself aroused by anxiety and must again and again choose in a moment of decision (*Entscheidung*) between the past and future. Man must decide whether he will give himself over to the world of visible objects, the world of the masses, or whether he will obtain his own "actuality" in the relinquishment of all uncertainty by unconditionally surrendering himself to the future over which he has no control. Bultmann's concept of human existence is dominated by the idea of concrete-historicity. Man is a sinner not because he is born with original sin or because he has violated a commandment of God. Before faith man's existence is qualified by being a sinner, a creature fallen on the world. By virtue of his natural existence man is already fallen.

Man can lose himself and remain in the past, or he can open himself to the future by throwing away all security and by this means acquire authentic existence. Bultmann identified this with New Testament "faith."<sup>97</sup> When a man makes a decision in the present, he reaches out to the future and it is this reaching out which the New Testament means by eschatology.

Philosophy *knows* what genuine "historic existence" involves but philosophy assumes that all man needs is to be informed what true authentic existence is and he will realize it. However, the New Testament asserts that man's authentic being is not controlled by man. Even though man knows what he ought to be, he cannot realize it. If man is to attain freedom, it must be by "an act of God."<sup>98</sup> The New Testament does not give a doctrine of man's authentic being but it contains "the proclamation of an act of redemption which was wrought in Christ."

The salvation of man, according to Bultmann, is to be found in "openness to the future: "in his being receptive to the future in which he is making himself accessible in what confronts him in the "now."<sup>99</sup> Freedom, furthermore, is defined as "nothing else than being open for the genuine future, letting one's self be determined by the future."<sup>100</sup> Bultmann asserted that "man falls prey to nothingness and death in cutting himself off from the future in dread," in fact, "the real crux of sin is focussed in the dread of the man who is unwilling to surrender to what is mystery to him."<sup>101</sup>

### VIII. *Reactions and Evaluations of Bultmann's Position*

Liberal as well as conservative scholars have reacted critically to Bultmann's conclusions. Thus a liberal theologian like Nels F. S. Ferre made the following evaluation:

All attempts to claim that Bultmann has done away merely with an outworn cosmology, leaving the ontology of the Gospel undisturbed, are stuff and nonsense. Bultmann is no liberal who is bringing Christianity up-to-date by differentiating between outworn and indestructible elements of Christian faith. He is the pioneer of the most radical retranslation and transvaluation of the faith itself into existentialist categories.<sup>102</sup>

The transformation effected by the application of Bultmann's existentialist hermeneutics to the New Testament has been pointedly expressed by David Cairns in these words:

The actual result is to bring before modern man a gospel without the gospels, so that not without justification we may quote Mary Magdalene and say: 'They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him.'<sup>103</sup>

At the 1952 assembly of bishops of the United Lutheran Church of Germany, a pastoral letter was issued denouncing the theology of demythologizing as "false doctrine." In support of this decision an official volume of essays was published by Ernst Kinder in which the charge is made that Bultmann has denied the "objective factualness" of such great redemptive events as the incarnation, atonement, resurrection, ascension and second coming.<sup>104</sup> Theologians belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, as well as Protestant theologians, ranging from liberal to conservative, have rejected Bultmann's restatement of the Christian message.<sup>105</sup> Some of the main objections have been the following: (1) Bultmann's emphasis on the centrality and indispensability of the event Jesus Christ is vitiated by Bultmann's interpretation in such a way that its objective character is denied. (2) Bultmann permits his understanding of the New Testament to be determined by his preunderstanding of the Scriptures and of man according to existentialist categories. (3) A great deal of what Bultmann classifies as mythological is essential to the Biblical *kerygma*, as for instance, God's participation in history, God's activity through mighty acts, the necessity of of Christ being God and man, the need of real atonement.<sup>106</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

1. Carl Braaten, *New Directions in Theology Today*. Vol. II History and Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 105.
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3. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*. H. R. Mackin and J. S. Stewart, eds. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), p. 60.
4. Quoted from Hans Joachim Kraus, *Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart* (Neukirchen: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsverein, 1956), p. 35.
5. Hans Walter Wolff, *Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), p. 325.

6. Braaten, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.
7. Exchange found in *Evangelische Theologie*, 24, 3 and 7, 1964.
8. Braaten, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
9. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Significance of the Old Testament for Christian Faith," in Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-35.
10. Rudolf Bultmann, "Prophecy and Fulfillment," in Claus Westermann, ed., *Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics*. English translation by James Luther Mays (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1964), pp. 50-75.
11. Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting* Translated by R. H. Fuller (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 15-102.
12. Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen*, Zweiter Band, (Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1952), "Adam, wo bist du?," pp. 105-116; "Das Christentum als orientalische Religion," pp. 187-210; "Die Bedeutung der alttestamentlichen jüdischen Tradition für das christliche Abendland," pp. 236-245. In *Glauben und Verstehen*, Dritter Band, zweite unveränderte Auflage (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1962), "Der Mensch und seine Umwelt nach dem Urteil der Bible," pp. 151-165.
- 12a. Professor George W. Davis has entitled his sympathetic investigation of Bultmann's contribution to theological thought: *Existentialism and Theology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 88 pp. Cf. his statement on p. viii.
13. H. P. Owen, "Revelation," in Charles W. Kegley, ed. *The Theology of Bultmann* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 45.
14. John Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology. A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955).
15. David Cairns, *A Gospel without Myth?* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1960), p. 41.
16. Herman Ridderbos, *Bultmann*. Translated by David H. Freeman (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1960), p. 9.
17. Bernard Ramm, *A Handbook of Contemporary Theology*. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966), p. 46.
18. Van A. Harvey, *A Handbook of Theological Terms* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 92-93.
19. Ridderbos, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
20. James H. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," in Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
21. Günther Bornkamm, "The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann," in Kegley, *op. cit.*, p. 8: cf. also Bultmann's own statement in *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 45.
22. Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Hans Werner Bartsch, *Keryma and Myth*. Revised translation by Reginald Fuller (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 24-25.
- 22a. Cr. Ian Henderson, *Myth in the New Testament* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), pp. 21-38.
23. James M. Robinson and John A. Cobb, *The Later Heidegger and Theology* vol. I (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 63.
24. H. Jackson Forstman, "Bultmann's Conception and Use of Scripture," *Interpretation*, 17:459, October, 1963.
25. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological*. Translated by James C. G. Craig (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 234-261.
26. *Existence and Faith. Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann*. Selected, translated, and introduced by Schubert M. Ogden (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), pp. 289-296.
27. Bultmann, *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 235. footnote 2.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
30. Ogden, *Existence and Faith*, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 291.; Cf. also Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Kundsinn, *Form Criticism. Two Essays on New Testament Research*. Translated by Frederick C. Grant (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 17-31.
32. Bultmann, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
35. Rudolf Bultmann, "Reply," in Kegley, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Cf. also Chapter 4 "Modern Biblical Interpretation and Existential Philosophy," in *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 45-49.
36. Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 295.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
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40. Otto Michal, "Event of Salvation and Word in the New Testament," in Kegley, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
41. Bultmann, "The Crisis in Belief," *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
42. Rudolf Bultmann, "Welchen Sinn hat es von Gott zu reden," in *Glauben und Verstehen*. Erster Band, Dritte, unveränderte Auflage (Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck,] 1958), p. 260.
43. Bultmann, *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Forstman, *op. cit.*, p. 450.
46. As quoted by Forstman, *op. cit.*, pp. 450-451.
47. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
48. Bultmann, "Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments," in *Glauben und Verstehen*, I, p. 260.
49. Bultmann, "Concerning the Hidden and Revealed God (1917)," in Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
50. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
51. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.
52. Bultmann, "Revelation in the New Testament," Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
55. Cf. Owen, "Revelation," in Kegley, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
56. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
57. Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (London: SCM Press, 1955), II, p. 69.
58. Bultmann, "The Question of Natural Revelation," *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
59. Gustav Wingren, *Theology in Conflict*. Nygren-Barth-Bultmann. Translated by Eric Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), pp. 45, 129.
60. Forstman, *op. cit.*, p. 461.
61. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
62. Rudolf Bultmann, "Die Bedeutung des Alten Testaments für den christlichen Glauben," in *Glauben und Verstehen*, Erster Band, *op. cit.*, p. 331, footnote 3.
63. Wingren, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
64. The following is based on Bultmann's essay, "New Testament and Mythology," in Bartsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-45.

65. Ernest Rienecker, *Stellungnahme zu Bultmann's "Entmythologisierung"* (Wuppertal: Verlag von R. Brockhaus, 1951), pp. 32-70; P. E. Hughes, *Scripture and Myth* (London: The Tyndale Press, 1956), p. 7. Cf. also Walter Kunneth, "Bultmann's Philosophy and the Reality of Salvation," in Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville, *Kerygma and History* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962) pp. 94-96.
66. Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
67. Eric Dinkler, "Myth (Demythologizing)," in *A Handbook of Christian Theology* (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), p. 241.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*, p. 242. The same analysis is made by Edwin Good, "The Meaning of Demythologization," in Kegley, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
70. Bultmann, "The Understanding of Man and the World in the New Testament and in the Greek World," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
71. Bultmann, "The Crisis in Belief," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
73. Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*. Translated by Frederick Knobel (SCM Press, Ltd., 1955), II, pp. 46, 75. Cf. p. 69.
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75. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 41. Cf. also pp. 38-39.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
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80. Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*. Translated by Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), I, p. 305.
81. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
82. Bartsch, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
84. Acts 1:4; 2:23-24; 1 Cor. 15:4.
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- 85a. Herbert C. Wolf, *Kierkegaard and Bultmann: The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1965), p. 90.
86. John Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
87. Rudolf Bultmann, "History and Eschatology in the New Testament," in *New Testament Studies*, 1:66, September, 1954.
88. Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
89. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, *op. cit.*, I, p. 302.
90. Cf. the criticism of Ernst Kinder, "Historical Criticism and Demythologizing," in Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville, *Kerygma and History* (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), pp. 69-79.
91. Bultmann, "The Christological Confession of the World Council of Churches," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 280.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*
94. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.; Robert T. Knudsen, "Rudolf Bultmann," in Philip Edgcumbe Hughes (ed.), *Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966), p. 142; H. P. Owen, *Revelation and Existence. A Study in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1957), p. 25.
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98. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
99. Bultmann, "The Understanding of Man," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
100. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, Vol. I. p. 335.
101. Bultmann, "The Understanding of Man," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
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104. Ernst Kinder, *Ein Wort Lutherischer Theologie zur Entmythologisierung* (Munich, 1952), The essays by Ellwein, Kinder and Künneth have been translated and published in English translation by Braaten and Harrisville, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-119.
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