

Introduction To
Process Philosophy

JOHN F. JOHNSON

Jürgen Moltmann
And His Theology Of Hope

THE EDITOR

The New View Of Reality
And The Task Of The Church

OTTO C. HINTZE

Auctoritas Absoluta

THOMAS SOLTIS

The Moral Aspects Of War

MARTIN H. SCHARLEMANN

The New English Bible:
Old Testament

WILLIAM F. MEYER

Assignment To Xanadu, USA:
Bane Or Blessing

HARRY COINER and
ALLEN NAUSS


Theological Refractions

Pilgrim's Regress

Book Reviews

Index, Vol. 33

577.26



CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
LIBRARY
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS

the springfielder

XXXIV

NO. 1

VOL. XXXIV

JUNE, 1970



The New View of Reality and The Task of The Church

OTTO C. HINTZE

Editor's Note: The following essay originally presented as a study paper to a faculty study meeting has been revised for printing. Attached is an appendix with pertinent quotations and the essayist's comments.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY DESCRIBES the existence and preservation of the Church as solely the work of God. The Holy Spirit has used the means of grace to separate out a communion of believers who are the spotless and blameless Bride of Christ completely dependent upon Him. The Church is a spiritual Body whose Head is Christ, and all the members stay alive only through the relation of faith, by the grace of God.

Process philosophy could not view the Church as a reality that comes into being, grows and progresses toward its goal without concrescence with its "ground," the world. It could not see the Church in the world and yet not of the world. The Church would have to participate in the creative advance of the universe. It would be dependent upon other actual entities and their subjective aims. The Church Itself would be a novel concrescence that shares in shaping the consequent nature of God. No longer would it be the sole creation of God. From any viewpoint, the Church would be an evolved product of God, man, and the universe. Synergism in its broadest sense would replace grace. Believers would live no longer by faith alone. The means of grace would become a misnomer.

Extra ecclesiam nulla salus is Scriptural teaching. But this stands in opposition to Whitehead's conception of everlasting unity, where human and cosmic history move toward ultimate unity. God and the world process toward the fellowship of everlasting unity and completion. That means that through the creative process of the universe, everyone will end up the same way, in everlasting, never-ending, participation with God. "This, by the way," Whitehead is supposed to have said, "reduces the question whether individuality survives the death of the body to an estate of irrelevancy." Those outside the ark of the Church as well as those within would be saved. Whitehead also sees the consequent nature of God in terms of "the judgement of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved." According to him, then, there would be no condemnation, only redemption. Thus, the Church in the last analysis would not be the instrument that God has willed it to be. It would be superfluous.

"The universalistic tendencies of Whiteheadian philosophy," writes C. J. Curtis, "offer a fertile field for ecumenical endeavors to unite all churches in the spirit of modern ecumenicity. In this

philosophy there are many creative suggestions for the theory as well as the practice of ecumenicity. At the same time there are in it the categories of a yet wider and more universal concern for the drawing together of all living religions into one, worldwide, religious community. Christian theology today is not yet quite ready for the kind of new and creative approach to other religions which would be required for the creation of a dynamic movement of all religions toward a new and universal harmony and unity. The old, traditional notion that all non-Christian religions are 'pagan' religions, and especially Western Christianity is called and destined to convert 'the heathen,' is still very much with us today."¹

One of the duties of the Church is the communication of the Gospel. It is the mighty power that God gives His Church to change and motivate people—to innovate. But process philosophy has no need for a Gospel that is *the* power of God unto salvation. At best it could be *one* of the occasions which may be used as a datum for a novel concrescence. At worst, Gospel proclamation would convey nothing more than information about an exemplary Christ and His redemption of making the best of things. Listen carefully as C. J. Curtis applies Whiteheadian philosophy to the person and work of Christ. "Sin has us caught in its self-destructive trap, but Christ shows us the way out, because in the person of Jesus we see how right decisions can be actualized without making the same mistake twice. Christ thus was able to make the best of everything. The reason that the person of Christ can have exemplary and redemptive significance for us is that he was different from us in degree, but not in kind."² Whitehead himself had this to say:

The essence of Christianity is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of his agency in the world. The record is fragmentary, inconsistent and uncertain . . . But there can be no doubt as to what elements in the record have evoked a response from all that is best in human nature. The Mother, the Child, and the bare manger: the lowly man, homeless and self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love and sympathy: the suffering, the agony, the tender words as life ebbed, the final despair: and the whole with the authority of supreme victory.

The Gospel then becomes merely good news of how to make the right decisions, choosing the good and eliminating the evil. It is *not* the Good News of the grace of God in Christ, of salvation procured for us. Since to Whitehead events are never "bare" events but always have a meaning, proclamation of the Gospel becomes no more than a report to people to trust the facts as they see them. "In this sense," to use the words of Wolfhart Pannenberg, "the kerygma is not to be thought of as bringing something to the event." Whiteheadian philosophy, therefore, is not able to accommodate divine mystery that is antecedent to and independent of the world and that needs to be revealed supernaturally; but all is quite obvious in history.

Applied to forgiveness the message would be merely a reference to the primordial permanence of God, and unrelated to the work of Christ. Forgiveness would be the means by which the creative advance is reestablished, and in that sense would regenerate. It is not pardon from debt that merits the wrath of God. Creative advance is reestablished by which we shall be moved along in process to ultimate unity and wholeness.

"The story of the person and life of Jesus of Nazareth is the story of experienced ideals—'of ideals entertained, of ideals aimed at, of ideals achieved, of ideals defaced,'"—but not of a personal Savior from sin. Essentially we would be measuring ourselves in respect to what we are not. In this context, Christian mission in other cultures could very well mean an appeal to the good and beautiful examples of the Buddha, or of one of the gods of the Hindu pantheon, or of even a Hindu *sadhu*, as well as of Christ. Christ would be no longer the uniquely powerful and living Savior who achieved God's ideals in our behalf, so that we could testify to that fact with finality. He would not be God's once-for-all special revelation and incarnation, God and man, to whom we would witness as being the only Savior of mankind without the involvement of the world.

Turning to Baptism, C. J. Curtis interprets it in the light of process metaphysics to be a "lure" for feeling and novel concrescence which draws us into the redemptive process of creativity. The concept of baptism as a process of novel concrescence includes both the once-for-all character of baptism and the need for its continuous daily repetition of drowning the old Adam. The subjective aim of the concrescence effected by baptism serves to unite the consequent stages of growth "of the new man," which is the interplay between conceptual and physical feelings (faith and works in traditional terminology).

"The 'gracious water of life' and the 'washing of regeneration in the Holy Spirit' " to use process theology, "refer to instances of the ultimate creativity (this not God) which make possible the emergence of new concrescences such as those engendered by the baptismal lure."¹ Now if we remember that a lure engenders the complex stages of physical and conceptual operations involved in the constitution of an actual entity, baptism then would no longer be the *gracious* water of life. Other subjects would always be in the picture and prehended by still other subjects. It would not be God alone who effected the results of baptism out of His grace. But according to Whiteheadian philosophy, concrescent man, with his own subjective aim would effect something right along with God. This is synergism once more, which is characteristic of the entire Whiteheadian system.

Concerning the Lord's Supper, C. J. Curtis tries again to explain it according to the manner in which a process theologian would look at it. In the first place, he says that process theology tries to get away from the old inadequate notions of substance and accident in the

Lord's Supper. "Once process takes the place of the old, traditional substance accident scheme, it becomes evident that the meaning of the Eucharist must be present in the whole universe . . . The Eucharist must be understood in terms of process and value, because 'it brings into our consciousness that permanent side of the universe which we can care for. It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value, for our own existence, a meaning that flows from the nature of things.' The traditional elements of the Lord's Supper give visible expression to this source of meaning which is grounded in the structure of the process of reality. At the same time the bread and wine of the Eucharist are among those primary physical data of experience through which the believer can apprehend the 'intensive relevance' of the eternal objects of God's primordial nature."⁵

If we understand this correctly, process theology would extend the meaning of the Lord's Supper to include far more than our Lord intended. It would explain in terms of value the meaning of our existence, which is to apprehend the intensive relevance of the external objects of God's primordial nature. Furthermore, the Lord's Supper would be made to offer less. If the Lord's Supper is a means to grasp pure possibilities or potentials which are the eternal objects, then it is less than a means of grace. Pure potentials and possibilities may be grasped, but where is unattached grace that forgives without strings attached to the future? And where is the strength of God unadulterated by cosmic effort to help us live a life in conformity with the will of God?

CONCLUSION

Curtis, Pittenger and others believe that the old traditional conceptualization of Christian theology is woefully inadequate to seriously relate to 20th century man, and that process philosophy provides the best framework available for the rearticulation of it.

After reading through the attempts of both Curtis and Pittenger, it might be said on the positive side that they bring an emphasis of novel movement and change to theology. But this is nothing new to the careful reader of the Bible. With God all things have been possible, and for ages He has moved, innovated and acted in His own unique and marvelous way.

Speaking of the reconceptualization of the Christian faith, it is doubtful whether process theology can bring any more certainty, or make any more sense, or make the "miracle" aspect any more intelligible than traditional expressions. It is without doubt that such a reconceptualization is doubly difficult and far out of the reach of the common man.

Process theology postulates the nature of God and his working on the basis of the analogy of alleged human experience with evolution. Carl Henry has this to say about that, "The God of the Bible does not wait for speculative philosophers to postulate His nature on the basis of analogies from human experience. The personal God of revealed Christianity speaks and acts for Himself and declares His purpose intelligibly."⁶

Curtis writes in his introduction to *The Task of Philosophical Theology*: "The day is ripe to build a new theology, to construct an ecumenical theology, to break down barriers, to see new relationships, to reinterpret, to universalize, to synthesize." He believes that process theology is able to do that and he has made the attempt. But actually it leads one to raise more questions than it purports to answer. As Levi has indicated,⁷ evil is implicated in the very nature of actuality, and all goodness lies in the imposition of modes of order. Its basic weakness, in our opinion, is that it is predicated upon the impossible, unscientific⁸ and unscriptural premise of evolution.

The new reality leads in the opposite direction from Christian grace and truly unaided innovation by God to a thoroughly synergistic system. The God, Christ,—and where does the Holy Spirit come in?—of process theology is not the God of the Bible. God's conception of the task of His Church is garbled and emasculated if clothed in the precepts of Whiteheadian process philosophy.

APPENDIX

The new view of reality that we have been discussing has as its basis process metaphysics which stands in opposition to existentialism and positivism. Let me first share with you one of the most lucid and simple explanations of this philosophy that I have come across. E. R. Baltazar in a monograph of his concerning Teilhard de Chardin illustrates the philosophy of procession in this manner:⁹

Let us consider another concrete example to illustrate how process does not proceed from substance. A seed corresponds perfectly to the Aristoteo-Thomistic notion of substance: self-enclosed, well-defined, able to exist of itself. Now, if one literally translates the substance-accident category with respect to the seed, so that process is an activity of the seed, then this would have to mean that the seed left alone is able to germinate itself, grow itself, flower and bear fruit, all by itself, i.e., without help from the "ground" (soil, moisture, heat, etc.). Given this example, one can see that the process of the seed does not proceed from the seed. What causes germination is the *union* of the seed with its "ground." It is the ground that germinates the seed, that makes it grow, matures it and lets it flower and bear fruit. Process is this continuous vital union of seed and "ground". That this union cannot be within the seed is obvious for it is the seed that is within the process and *is* the process, since this union is successively the seedling, the plant, the fruit. We have reached here the first stage in our conversion of the notion of substance. Thus the center of substance is process. In the example of the seed, it is not the seed that stays put, and the ground comes toward it; it is the seed that tends toward the ground. The ground is the center and the seed roots itself in it.

The second stage in this conversion is the destruction of the notion of substance as having its own act of "to be." Again, let us consider an example from the world of nature. If we look at a plant, abstracting from its rootedness in the ground, the plant seems to have its own act of "to be." But a little consideration is sufficient to show that it is the union of the plant with the ground which is the very existence of the plant. Uproot the plant and it is dead. Clearly there is no proper act of "to be" separate from the ground. All the things that we see and call substance, i.e., as having autonomous existence are really the result of *union* . . . no object or substance in this universe can be understood apart from the evolutionary unity of the universe in which it is situated and from which it takes its meaning and existence . . . To be is always to-be with. Being

is always being-with-another . . . What is true of the analysis of individual beings is true of the universe as a single evolutionary unity. The universe is a process: it is born . . .

The final result of the preceding kind of analysis would be a new ontology. The notion of being would be converted from being as substance to being as process . . . Being is being only when it is born to *its* world; and outside it, there is no being, only death. This truth is the primitive datum of ontology. Being is union-with-a-world, not substance . . .

Process is also necessarily the basis of epistemology, of truth. It is only in process that being unfolds, reveals itself to itself and to others. To say that the essence of the seed is seedness is pure tautology. There is no revelation of being here, but concealedness. Substance then has no meaning in itself apart from its ground or world, for meaning is based on true existence and this is attained only in the union of substance with its world. To define is to relate, not to cut off and isolate . . .

The law that individualization is to be in union may again be illustrated by the example of a plant. The more it is rooted in the ground, the greater its growth, its differentiation, its fullness; and if we move to a higher level, we observe that the "I" becomes truly a personality when it is united with its "Thou," and the greater that union, the greater the personalization . . . Existence, selfhood or individuality, and meaning are all therefore to be found in the context of union or process.

The third and last stage in the conversion of *substance* is the elimination of the view that substance (or nature) attains its end by its own powers alone. The end of being is fullness by a process of growth; but growth always presupposes a "ground," and hence it is through *union* that the end of being is attained . . . Since *substance* tends to its "other" in order to *be* and be *true*, the dynamism of being is not a having but a giving . . . Being in its essence is a gift. Being must first be a *we* before it can become an *I*. The seed must die to itself and give itself to the ground before there is new life. This pattern and dynamism is repeated throughout the whole hierarchy of being up to the Infinite Being . . . Since being tends towards the other in order to be, being is not in itself but in the other. Its *presentness* is not being; its future is the place of being and truth . . . in an evolving universe, to stay put is to die. Permanency is falsehood; process is truth. The reason is that the domain of being and truth is the future, and the only way to attain the future is to be in time. To be outside time, then is untruth; while to be in time is truth. Instead of assimilating time into substance and so destroying its reality, we should bring substance into time, make it process, and thus restore to time its reality. With this new view, there is now a metaphysical basis for involvement in time.¹

Thus we could continue to go into further detail to describe the deep and far-reaching changes that result from this new view of reality.

Alfred North Whitehead is widely accredited to be the "seminal mind" and formative influence in later definitive statements of process-metaphysics,¹⁰ although Henri Bergson (French) and Samuel Alexander (English) influenced him with their process and quasi-naturalistic philosophies. Because Whitehead is so considered, it would be instructive for us to look at the task of the Church in the light of this fountainhead rather than the many resultant streams.

What has been stated by Baltazar, above, will serve partially as our window through which we shall in the first place peer at the rather formidable philosophical nomenclature of Whitehead.¹¹

Actual entities, also called actual occasions, are the final realities of which the universe consists. God is an actual entity, and so are creatures and created things. How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is. Its being is constituted by its becoming. The "seed" is an actual entity, as is the "ground." The final facts are, all alike actual entities; and these are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.

Concrescence is the becoming of an actual entity through the growing together of a number of originally separate parts of experience into a new unity. In other words, it is the name for the union, the process of becoming. The analysis of the components abstracts from the concrescence. The only appeal is to intuition.

We then have a process of organization guided by the *subjective aim* of the concrescence which aims at a novel togetherness of experience. The final stage of a concrescence, i.e., that toward which the entire process moves, is called the *satisfaction*.

But neither the subjective aim nor the satisfaction can be abstracted from the concrescence. The moment that the concrescence has achieved its satisfaction and become an actual entity, it perishes (it loses its subjective aim), and thus becomes an objective datum for a novel concrescence.

Creativity is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe conjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity. At the same time, creativity is the principle of novelty which introduces novelty into the content of the many. The *creative advance* is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates.

Eternal objects are the pure possibilities or potentials, the abstract aspects or patterns of all that might come to pass in the created order. God in His primordial aspect is abstractly understood as the eternal reality whose awareness conceptually includes all the possibilities of eternal objects. God has a consequent aspect, or nature, in which He is the recipient of all that has occurred in the order of creation. God's physical and everlasting nature, His consequent nature, is the result of the factuality of the occasions in the process entering into and helping to mould the divine experience in its capacity for infinite adjustment and relationship.

Feelings are the agencies which draw things perceived "out there" into the constitution of the perceiving subject. This means that a feeling is the appropriation of some elements in the universe to be components in the real internal constitution of its subject. The elements are felt under an abstraction.

Lures are connected with feelings and are comparable to germs which engender the complex stages of physical and conceptual operations involved in the constitution of an actual entity. They evoke from each occasion in the ongoing process the movement towards satisfaction of its subjective aim.

A *nexus* is an individual fact of togetherness among actual entities.

A *prehension* is an act by means of which an actual entity grasps another actual or non-actual entity and makes it an object of its experience. Basically there are two species of prehensions: a) positive prehensions which are termed 'feelings,' and b) negative prehensions which are said to 'eliminate from feeling.' The *subject* prehends; the *datum* is that which is prehended; and the *subjective form* is how that subject prehends that datum.

Superject refers to the subject as it emerges from its process of concrescence and thus becomes a potential datum for a future concrescence. "The philosophy of Whitehead," so says Albert Levi in his book, *Philosophy and the Modern World*, "like that of Plato, is haunted by principles of division expressed as 'ideal opposites': joy and sorrow, good and evil, permanence and flux, the one and the many, order and disorder, God and the world, etc. Ideals group themselves about these oppositions, and the world is the victim of the paradoxes which they present. Beauty demands order, but cannot exist without the disorder which discords introduce. . . The good of actualization requires the evil of limitations."¹²

And so on down the line.

"The task of the creative advance is the reconciliation of these oppositions. . . . The opposed elements of the universe stand in the relation of mutual implication. But more important: existentially, they require one another. Thus the universe is the active expression of its own variety of oppositions. The analogy with Hegel is, therefore, not completely apt, (although Hegel very definitely influenced Whitehead.) The dialectical opposition of thesis and antithesis which always in Hegel receives its logical resolution in such a way as to override and therefore nullify the discrepancy, in Whitehead is completely different. In Hegel, opposition disappears in mid-air by an act of dialectical magic. Whitehead is too existentially oriented for such theatrical illusion. His opposites are elements in the nature of things. They are incorrigibly *there*."¹³

"Whitehead's philosophy is indeed a 'vision of the whole,' with these principal aspects: 1) a theory of time in which time enters into the essence of materiality, 2) a theory of relatedness in which the world enters into the constitution of each actuality, and 3) a theory of inheritance whereby endurance is explained as conformal inheritance of pattern."¹⁴ Levi continues to say that the ultimate wisdom of Whitehead's philosophy lies in his vision of the whole. "It is not primarily in seeing that God is the principle of concretion, or that evil is implicated in the very nature of actuality, or even that all goodness lies in the imposition of modes of order. Its ultimate wisdom lies in the perception that the solemnity and the grandeur of the world arises out of the slow process of unification in which the diversities of existence are utilized, although they are never lost."¹⁵

Whitehead's philosophy may be categorized as idealistic naturalism or naturalistic idealism.

C. J. Curtis summarizes Whitehead's religious position with this statement: "In the mature statement of Whitehead's religious views, science and religion, Christianity and humanism, idealism and naturalism have been woven into the fabric of his mystical religious vision to form a new and creative whole."¹⁶

"Reality," according to Whitehead, "is one universal process (one-layered) systematically governed according to certain laws by cosmic mind, or God."¹⁷

Before we attempt to analyze the task of the church in the light of Whitehead's new view of reality, it is essential to summarize briefly his cosmology and his conceptions of history and Christ.

Whitehead bases his theological notion of the world on the recognition that "in every respect God and the World move conversely to each other in respect to their process. God is primordially one, namely, He is the primordial unity of relevance of the many potential forms: in the process He acquires a consequent multiplicity, which the primordial character absorbs into its own unity. The world is primordially many, namely, the many actual occasions with their physical finitude; in the process it acquires a consequent unity, which is a novel occasion and is absorbed into the multiplicity of the primordial character. Thus God is to be conceived as one and as many in the converse sense in which the World is to be conceived as many as one."¹⁸ . . . Each temporal occasion embodies God, and is embodied in God. In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the World; in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God. Also the World's nature is a primordial datum for God; and God's nature is a primordial datum for the World. Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final terms which is everlastingness—the Apotheosis of the World."¹⁹ (This means that the world will eventually reach divine status). The world needs God, and God needs the world. "The world moves towards its everlasting unity, which is the objective aim of its process, as it evolves in a relationship of 'creative interchange,' with the love of God for the world. The process of the evolution of the world therefore, means that at the same time God's nature is ever enlarging itself in this final phase of the passage of the world into everlasting unity." God is still God, but has become enriched. "In the course of passage into everlasting unity, 'what is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the

reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back into the world.' The central motif of cosmology is the celebration and examination of this reciprocal relationship between God and the world."²⁰

As for history, "history is process, i.e., the process of becoming and perishing is the real, internal constitution of history. The reference to becoming and perishing points immediately to the fact that the nature of history is bound up with the concrescence of individual actual entities. The process of historical concrescence is characterized by two, jointly relevant, basic categories. First, there is nothing in historical process which drifts into history from nowhere, and then becomes part of the concrescent actuality of some historical entity. In other words, 'every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason *either* in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, *or* in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence.' Second, in the context of historical process, 'the concrescence of each individual entity is internally determined and is externally free.' The joint fulfillment of these two categories characterizes every historical event, including the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ. . . The self-creative unity of the universe completes the concrescence of every historical fact. . . The whole movement of history is in the direction of an increase of creative emphasis. . . The slow movement of human and cosmic history toward an ultimate unity with maximum intensity of creative emphasis is an evolutionary process, but 'not an indefinite progress.'"²¹

With regard to Christ we must remember that reality, whether human or divine, is process, change, and evolution. "Christ went thru the process of human existence. He was without sin in his life, but not because he was the incarnation of a sinless substance, and therefore could not sin even if he had wanted to," so says C. J. Curtis. "The temptations of Christ show that he was capable of sinning, that he was attracted by sin. But they also show that his life was a process of decision making directed against sin. He was sinless in this process of decision not to sin. The actuality of Christ's life was the process in which divine potentialities (such as sinlessness) were actualized. Jesus evolved into a religious genius and a son of God. He was not born as a complete and perfect man. The scandal of traditional theology," says Curtis, "is that it refuses to accept the reality of process in the humanity of Christ and gets involved in speculations about the Virgin Birth which led us to conceive of reality in terms of static actualities."²²

Now let's get down to the task of the Church in the light of this new reality. The task of all believers in Christ is the communication of the Gospel, putting it to work in their lives, and the administration of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, all according to God's will as revealed in His Holy Scriptures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Curtis, Charles J. *The Task of Philosophical Theology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1967.
- Henry, Carl F. H., "The Reality and Identity of God," *Christianity Today*, March 14, 1969.
- Levi, Albert W., *Philosophy And The Modern World*, Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1966.
- Philosophy and Religion: Some Contemporary Perspectives*. Edited by Jerry H. Gill. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1968.
- Pittenger, William Norman. *Process-thought and Christian Faith*, First American Edition. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

FOOTNOTES

1. C. J. Curtis, *The Task of Philosophical Theology*, p. 24.
2. *Ibid.* p. 45.

3. *Ibid.* p. 45.
4. *Ibid.* pp. 35-36.
5. *Ibid.* pp. 100-101.
6. C. F. Henry, "The Reality and Identity of God," *Christianity Today*, March 28, 1969, p. 15.
7. See appendix.
8. "Nowhere in all its vast extent is there any trace of purpose or even of prospective significance. It is impelled from behind by blind physical forces, a gigantic and chaotic jazz dance of particles and radiations, in which the overall tendency we have so far been able to detect is that summarized in the Second Law of Thermodynamics—the tendency to run down." Julian Huxley, *Evolution in Action*, London: Penguin, 1953, p. 14.
9. J. H. Gill, *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 313-323.
10. C. F. H. Henry. "The Reality and Identity of God," *Christianity Today*. March 1969. P. 4.
11. These definitions are composite, from both Levi and Curtis, who quote from Whitehead's *Process And Reality*, pp. 27-38, et alia.
12. *Ibid.* p. 530.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Albert Levi. *Philosophy and The Modern World*. p. 505.
15. *Ibid.* p. 531.
16. C. J. Curtis, *op. cit.*, p. 13
17. *Ibid.* p. 12.
18. A Whitehead. *Process and Reality*. p. 529.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Curtis, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 87, 89.
22. *Ibid.* p. 43.